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Abstract 
South African criminology’s structural aetiology is in crisis. This dissertation offers a novel 
account of the nature, origin, severity, implications, and possibilities of that crisis. It suggests 
that, rather than a normative problem, it should be understood as an empirical one, related to 
the challenge of crime prevalence measurement. The question of crime prevalence patterns 
and trends has mistakenly been treated as trivial. This dissertation conducts meta-theoretical 
and historical analyses to reveal a fundamental criminological quandary: making defensible 
and testable claims about aggregate crime prevalence patterns and trends is at once both 
indispensable and impossible. This dilemma is in some respects inherent to the task of 
primary criminology, but its origin and manifestation are also uniquely crippling and 
revealing in the South African context. The aetiological crisis is more severe, more 
fundamental, and more complex than previously thought. In demonstration of this, this 
dissertation seeks to establish, as defensibly as possible, just one observation about long-term 
South African crime prevalence trends that would seem to require explanatory effort. It 
collects official South African police murder statistics over the longest-possible time frame 
and at the lowest-possible level of aggregation and combines them with census data using 
Geographic Information System technology. The result is by far the most extensive and 
defensible possible description of South African long-term crime prevalence patterns and 
trends. It shows a large, unprecedented, widespread murder rate decrease from 1994 to 2011. 
This poses problems for existing theory and reveals the discipline’s failure to even identify 
that which is relatively unequivocal and requires explanation. This dissertation concludes that 
there is an unidentified void at what should be the empirical heart of South African 
criminology. There is much to gain in engaging head-on the question of how to go about 
systematic empirical observation in the context of profound ambiguity about the meaning and 
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Chapter one: Introduction 
Background: stagnation and public criminology 
This dissertation presents a challenge to the contemporary discipline of South African 
criminology. It asks how we might assess its attempts at the structural explanation of crime, 
account for its shortcomings in this task, and address them by means of official crime 
statistics. The core problem it addresses is that of how to produce useful knowledge about the 
causes of crime. 
It arose from a feeling of déjà vu. Consider the following extracts from a newspaper 
article on rising crime in Soweto and South Africa, titled: ‘When violence becomes a way of 
life...’ 
Colonel Piet Delport, head of the Soweto CID, says that most of the murders 
in the township are committed ‘on the spur of the moment. It may be in connection 
with robberies, often at the end of the month when people come home on the trains 
with their money, as they walk in the dark alleys or in the open veld at night. Many 
murders take place when they are a bit tipsy in the shebeens. They get into an argument 
and one stabs the other.’ …  
Although Col. Delport says the Press has exaggerated the extent of increased 
violence in Soweto, statistics shows a steady rise in the murder rate and the township 
has compared unfavourably for some years with high crime areas of the United States, 
for example… Soweto, however, shares its violent reputation with other areas of South 
Africa… And South Africa’s overall crime graph is among the most violently 
escalating in the world. 
The rising murder rate, says, one criminologist, is partly explained by the 
number of firearms that have found their way into Soweto over the last few years. Guns 
kill rather more surely than the knives of the past…  
‘Crime is a very complex phenomenon,’ said a spokesman for the National 
Institute for Crime Prevention and Rehabilitation of Offenders (Nicro). ‘In general, a 
combination of social, economic and political factors are responsible for our high crime 
rate. The criminal and the victim…are generally found in the poorest and most 
deteriorated, backward and socially degenerate living conditions. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the coloured and black townships generate so much crime. They are 
generally characterised by poverty, overcrowding, insufficient and sub-standard 
housing, a shortage — and sometimes a complete absence — of basic amenities and 
facilities, lack of street lighting and inadequate policing.’ 
He said blacks and coloureds often did not identify emotionally with some of 
the laws of the country. ‘This means the social controls which cause people to refrain 
from criminal behaviour in normal communities do not operate in the African 
townships. In the eyes of most Africans it is not a disgrace to have been in prison.’ … 
Mr Isaac Meletse, chairman, of a Nicro committee, says unemployment is 
obviously the major cause of crime in Soweto and other black townships. ‘Affluence 
and poverty exist side by side in places like Johannesburg and Soweto. Those who can 
afford are increasingly affording, while the poor get poorer.’… 
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Mr John Sibeko, a social worker employed in industry, says the entire 
environment of Soweto promotes crime. ‘It is a disorganised community and 
social institutions are not able to provide for the peoples’ needs… ‘And there 
comes a time when people have no respect for the law’…  
This lack of faith in the law’s ability or willingness to protect their 
interests is common not only among criminals in Soweto but among many of 
their victims as well. Mr Bernard Raskin, a PhD student researching rape at the 
Institute of Criminology in Cape Town, says recorded rates throughout the 
world reflect only a proportion of the crime actually committed… One in four 
of the householders surveyed [in parts of Soweto] had at least one victim of 
robbery, assault, rape or theft. But only 27% reported the crimes to the police… 
An important insight into serious crimes of violence in socially and 
economically deprived areas might lie in the community’s attitude to the use 
of violence, says Mr Raskin... Such a cultural acceptance of violence would 
partly explain both its frequency and the extent to which crimes are not 
reported to the police.1 
 
The article’s elements will be familiar to any casual consumer of modern South 
African crime journalism: statistics on police-recorded crimes are provided and shown to 
compare unfavourably with places like the United States; a police spokesperson suggests that 
crime is largely driven by drunken interpersonal arguments and opportunistic predation on 
those few with incomes; the rising murder rate is linked to increased availability of firearms; 
experts point to the concentration of crime in deprived areas, with high unemployment, poor 
facilities, inadequate policing, and a sense of community disorganisation; there is mention of 
inequality, as well as a widespread sense of alienation from the law and the normalisation of 
violence and imprisonment; and an important caveat is introduced (not incidentally, by a 
criminologist at the University of Cape Town) as to the incompleteness of the official police-
recorded crime statistics, given that many — especially in ‘socially and economically 
deprived areas’ — see little incentive to report crime to the police. With a few semantic 
tweaks, these arguments could have been produced by any local media house within the last 
year. 
In fact, this article was published in the Rand Daily Mail on the 12th of June 1979. It 
is striking that, despite the passage of over 40 eventful years, despite the scale of the 
intervening reorganisation of structures of politics, law, policing, higher education, and 
media, an article on the same subject today would look little different. So it is that this 
 
1 ‘When Violence Becomes a Way of Life...’ Rand Daily Mail 12 June 1979. 
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dissertation arose from a sense of déjà vu and from the puzzle of how so little could have 
changed in both popular and scholarly discourse around the trends, patterns, and causes of 
crime in South Africa. 
Whereas dissertations in other disciplines may need to devote considerable space to 
justifying their practical implications, this is seldom so in criminology. The impact of crime 
on the bodies, lives, and livelihoods of those in the country will be viscerally familiar to the 
reader. Incidents of individual loss and trauma ripple outward to cause incalculable harm. 
Fear of crime leads people to avoid going to public spaces, using public transport, allowing 
their children to play outside, starting a home business, or even dressing the way they 
choose.2 Attempts to prevent and respond to crime divert vast resources away from more 
productive investments in national development.3 Over R152 billion, or 8.4 per cent of South 
Africa’s 2019/20 national budget has been allocated to police services, law courts and 
prisons.4 Understanding crime — how, when, where, and especially why it happens — is 
fundamental to its prevention. It is a matter of urgent and literal life and death, but also of the 
current and future health and functioning of the entire polity. 
This dissertation is also informed by the belief that criminologists have a duty not just 
of observation and analysis, but of responsible engagement with popular ‘crime talk’. The 
relations between private troubles and public issues remain as intriguing and fruitful as ever.5 
In this spirit, anthropologists of crime have revealed the importance of ‘crime talk’ — that is, 
the discourses through which state authorities, media, and groups of citizens create and 
negotiate the concepts of crime and the criminal.6 These groups use such talk to constitute 
and legitimate themselves and promote conformity and moral solidarity. Pre-modern 
 
2 Statistics South Africa Victims of Crime Survey 2017/18 (2018) at 78. 
3 See for example Christopher Stone ‘Crime Justice and Growth in South Africa: Toward a Plausible 
Contribution from Criminal Justice to Economic Growth’ (2006) Economic Growth Working Papers 
at 9. 
4 Republic of South Africa Department of National Treasury Key Budget Statistics 2019 (2019) 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/National Budget/2019/review/KeyBudgetStatistics.pdf. 
5 Tim Hope & Richard Sparks ‘Introduction: Risk Insecurity and the Politics of Law and Order’ in Tim Hope & 
Richard Sparks (eds) Crime Risk and Insecurity: Law and Order in Everyday Life and Political 
Discourse (2000) 4. 
6 Jane Schneider & Peter Schneider ‘The Anthropology of Crime and Criminalization’ (2008) 37 Annual Review 
of Anthropology 1. 
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Europe’s public spectacles of punishment evolved through the ‘cowboy melodrama of the 
nineteenth-century dime novel,’ into a twenty-first century cornucopia of cops-and-robbers 
news and/or entertainment.7 Fictional crime talk has been refined to meet almost any 
aesthetic preference.8 
Ostensibly non-fiction crime talk can be equally fanciful and bound up with 
individual outlook. Indeed, public perceptions of crime prevalence can be extremely, even 
humorously out of keeping with other, more systematic measures.9 Surveys often find that 
perceived trends in crime have little in common even with the crime experience trends 
captured in those same surveys.10 Public innumeracy, powerful media narratives and 
incentives, and various cognitive biases play important roles. But the key reason why popular 
impressions of crime prevalence can depart from more reliable sources is that impressions of 
crime are partly cognitive responses to processes of communication, but also unconscious 
emotional reactions to a range of observations and values. Feelings of insecurity reflect 
feelings of malaise, vulnerability, and helplessness that can have many origins11 — including 
about the nation-state overall12 and the immediate spatial environment.13 They stand as proxy 
for other insecurities about social and cultural change, especially around race.  
Little surprise, then, that they have been so formative in South Africa. The white 
settler society was built around its fear of the barbarous native (always in uncomfortable 
 
7 Gregg Barak ‘Chapter 1: Media Society and Criminology’ in Gregg Barak (ed) Media Process and the Social 
Construction of Crime: Studies in Newsmaking Criminology 2 ed. (2011) 5. 
8 The range and exactness of crime fiction sub-genres available is such that discerning book buyers on 
Amazon.com can for example narrow their search to only those police procedurals involving lesbian 
protagonists, only those hard-boiled detective stories with a military theme, or only those mysteries 
featuring British detectives and involving a romantic theme. As of 4 March 2019 these options 
numbered 178, 362 and over 2000 respectively. 
9 See for example Margaret Vandiver & David Giacopassi ‘One Million and Counting: Students’ Estimates of 
the Annual Number of Homicides in the US’ (1997) 8 Journal of Criminal Justice Education 2. 
10 Megan Govender ‘The Paradox of Crime Perceptions: SAPS Crime Statistics Victims of Crime Surveys and 
the Media’ (2013) 46 South African Crime Quarterly. 
11 Mark Elchardus, Saskia De Groof & Wendy Smits ‘Rational Fear or Represented Malaise: A Crucial Test of 
Two Paradigms Explaining Fear of Crime’ (2013) 51 Sociological Perspectives 3. 
12 Mabel Berezin ‘Secure States: Towards a Political Sociology of Emotion’ (2002) 50 Sociological Review S2. 
13 John R Hipp ‘Resident Perceptions of Crime and Disorder: How Much Is ‘Bias’ and How Much Is Social 
Environment Differences?’ (2010) 48 Criminology 2. 
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juxtaposition to the need for its labour). Later, crime talk contributed to a vision of 
protectionism and Afrikaner upliftment, as well as the strict separation of the ‘races’ — in 
other words, in the very conception of Apartheid.14 In the final years of Apartheid, it became 
increasingly difficult to accept the long-held illusion of the powerful, dangerous and 
omnipotent police state.15 Crime talk, tightly entangled with more overtly political talk about 
national security, took on an apocalyptic character. 
After 1994, there came a whole new project of institutionalising norms, values and 
procedures into a legitimate nation-state for all who live in it. The sense of flux and 
uncertainty inevitably saw expression in feelings of insecurity.16 As is typical in contexts of 
rapid change, crime talk quickly assumed a ‘nostalgic and conservative… politically 
reactionary, tone,’17 with lasting consequences for policy.18 Crime talk, both explicitly and 
flimsily disguised, now stands in for talk about the success of racial reconciliation, the 
viability of post-Apartheid democracy, and even the legacy of colonialism.19 At every level, it 
is a valuable commodity in the marketplace for private security services and equipment — 
and the marketplace of political discourse.20  
Not only does crime itself matter, but the ways in which we talk about crime matters. 
It has real consequences. It should be guided wherever possible by the best available data. 
This speaks to the need for ‘public scholarship’, which seeks to connect academic scholarship 
with policy communities and civil society.21 Criminology, with its ‘field of enquiry 
constituted in significant part by its close proximity to government and the institutions of 
 
14 Dirk van Zyl Smit ‘Adopting and Adapting Criminological Ideas: Criminology and Afrikaner Nationalism in 
South Africa’ (1989) 13 Contemporary Crises 3 at 241. 
15 Thomas Blom Hansen ‘Performers of Sovereignty: On the Privatization of Security in Urban South Africa’ 
(2006) 26 Critique of Anthropology 3 at 280. 
16 Berezin op cit note 12. 
17 Hope & Sparks op cit note 5 at 5. 
18 Gail Super Governing through Crime in South Africa (2013). 
19 Jean Comaroff & John L Comaroff ‘Figuring Crime: Quantifacts and the Production of the Un/Real’ (2006) 
18 Public Culture 1. 
20 Hope & Sparks op cit note 5 at 1. 
21 Julie Tieberghien & Mark Monaghan ‘Public Scholarship and the Evidence Movement: Understanding and 
Learning from Belgian Drug Policy Development’ (2018) 15 European Journal of Criminology 3. 
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social control’ is an area whose practitioners have understandably been particularly 
‘concerned to participate in, and make effective contributions to, the realm of politics and 
practical affairs’.22 In this field, the ivory tower is never too far from the street corner, the 
town hall, and the dinner table. It can and must challenge popular wisdom and bring nuance 
to the generic, by means of its capacity for both theoretical depth and methodological rigour.  
But this dissertation is decidedly not about the disjuncture between, on the one hand, 
clumsy and politicised popular understandings of South African crime, and on the other hand, 
rarefied scholarly ones. On the contrary, it reveals the extent to which scholars have failed to 
establish such a distinction in addressing questions of crime causation. The South African 
criminological field has flourished in some spheres, such as in its reflections on modes of 
crime control and on its own roles within them. But it has been markedly unsuccessful in 
bringing its theoretical depth and methodological rigour to bear in the explanation and 
understanding of crime itself. The scant analysis along such lines by those who might self-
identify as ‘criminologists’ is often indistinguishable from the general musings of a layperson 
with a passing interest in seeming knowledgeable about a subject of popular interest.  
Among all the other ways of thinking about crime, however, what should be 
distinctive about criminological thinking is that it engages explicitly with existing knowledge 
and seeks to accumulate new knowledge in a way that is systematic and can withstand 
scrutiny on not only logical and normative grounds, but also empirical ones. The point here is 
not to invoke intellectual snobbery, but rather humility. Regardless of the status of their 
source, statements not based on rigorous empirical observation should be regarded as little 
more authoritative than guesswork. So it is that this dissertation takes up the question of the 
relationship between South African criminologists and the empirical. Ironically, its own 
empirical contribution is far more modest than its analyses on the levels of meta-theory, 
history, and critical appraisal. 
 
 
22 Ian Loader & Richard Sparks Public Criminology? (2011). 
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South Africa’s aetiological crisis 
This dissertation speaks directly to what has been described as the ‘aetiological crisis’ of 
post-Apartheid criminology.23 ‘Aetiology’ (alternatively the archaic ‘ætiology’ or the 
preferred American spelling ‘etiology’) refers to the investigation and attribution of 
causation. Bill Dixon made this diagnosis of crisis based on his observation of the 
discipline’s tendency to avoid primary criminology — to focus on crime control rather than 
attempt to answer questions about crime itself, which has left it unable to give satisfactory 
accounts of why levels of crime and violence are (still) so high.  
It is this conversation about the history, nature, and imperatives of the South African 
discipline of criminology that this dissertation joins. This discussion is typically framed as 
being about who or what the discipline is for. Instead, this dissertation frames it as a question 
of how we know about the thing(s) we seek to know. It expands on the concept of 
aetiological crisis by asking several questions: 
• What is the nature of this crisis? 
• How can we account for it? 
• How severe is it? 
• What can be done about it? 
The core argument is that the aetiological crisis in South Africa should be understood 
and addressed as arising from an empirical crisis, which in turn arises from a dilemma of 
crime prevalence measurement. This dilemma is in some respects inherent to the task of 
primary criminology,24 but its origin and manifestation are also uniquely crippling and 
revealing in the South African context. These are exceptionally aggravating local 
circumstances for a generic challenge.  
It is common for texts on the structural aetiology of crime in South Africa to treat the 
magnitude, nature, or trend of that crime as common sense and so well-established that any 
attempt at empirical support would be absurd. An introductory paragraph typically describes 
the object of explanatory interest in terms as alarming as they are vague. Levels of crime 
and/or violence are invariably presumed to be very high and usually increasing. Often these 
 
23 Bill Dixon ‘The Aetiological Crisis in South African Criminology’ (2013) 46 Australian and New Zealand 
Journal of Criminology 3. 
24 Some may prefer the term ‘fundamental criminology’. See Bill Dixon ‘In Search of Interactive Globalisation: 
Critical Criminology in South Africa’s Transition’ (2004) 41 Crime Law and Social Change at 328. 
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are conflated, as if anything bad must be increasing, or as if any suggestion of improvement 
is inconceivable and indefensible. Worse, many also take a quick swipe at the very notion 
that there is any prospect of or utility in trying to establish a more solid empirical base. See 
the following two examples. 
 
Sexual violence in particular has spiralled, with survey after survey suggesting 
that South Africa has higher levels of rape of women and children than 
anywhere else in the world not at war or embroiled in civil conflict. This claim, 
and the statistics that support it, are often angrily contested, with the result that 
yet more data are collected and yet more quantitative analysis is undertaken by 
yet more reputable organisations and institutes. All emerge with the same grim 
findings, which are regularly reported in the mainstream media: at least one in 
three South African women can expect to be raped in her lifetime; and one in 
four will be beaten by her domestic partner… Unfortunately, while there is no 
doubt that sexual violence has always been prevalent in South Africa, there is 
also no avoiding the fact that the first ten years of the new state have seen a 
dramatic increase in sexual assaults on women, children and men.25 
 
[W]e do know that we compare extremely badly with countries in the 
Western world, even the notoriously violent United States, which has a murder 
rate of seven to eight times lower than that of South Africa…I do not want to 
get sidetracked here into a discussion about statistics because these have been 
analysed thoroughly and intelligently by a number of crime commentators, 
especially those associated with the Institute for Security Studies and its allied 
journal, SA Crime Quarterly. Suffice it to say that South Africa has an 
appallingly high murder and violent crime rate. This I am taking as a starting 
point. We have no way of knowing whether we compare favourably with 
countries like Nigeria, but does that matter? It makes comparative analysis 
extremely tenuous, but that does not mean that questions about our own crime 
levels are any less urgent.26 
 
Here, in quick succession, we are told that the crime phenomena under respective 
discussion are bad, are getting worse, have always been bad, are worse than in other places, 
but also can’t meaningfully be compared to other places, are well-established, but are also 
unknown and perhaps unknowable. But these are distinct claims, suggesting quite different 
research questions and possible explanatory theories. Such tangles succeed in establishing the 
 
25 Helen Moffett ‘‘These Women They Force Us to Rape Them’: Rape as Narrative of Social Control in Post-
Apartheid South Africa’ (2006) 32 Journal of Southern African Studies 1 at 129–32. 
26 Clive Glaser ‘Violent Crime in South Africa: Historical Perspectives’ (2008) 60 South African Historical 
Journal 3 at 335. 
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importance and urgency of these authors’ work and placing their conclusions beyond 
defensible scrutiny, while exempting them from close empirical engagement with their 
precise object of explanation. The reader has little option but to take their word for it — with 
‘it’ being some indeterminate, indeterminable, but obviously appalling feature of crime.  
This dissertation argues that scholars have erred in thus far treating the question of the 
quantification of crime prevalence patterns or trends as trivial in either one or the other sense 
of the word.27 That is, trivial in the sense of being so obvious as to be barely worthy of 
explanation, or in the sense of being meaningless and uninteresting. Some have ignored quite 
the extent of the challenge, while others have taken it as licence to effectively renounce the 
empirical. Some have been too quick to accept state-defined ‘crime’ as their explanatory 
mandate, others too quick to reject it entirely. A few have sought to have their cake and eat it 
too — to spurn the notion that there can be any meaningful account of crime prevalence, 
while in the same text building their analysis on precisely such an account.  
The reason for all this is that the meaning and measure of crime involve fundamental 
ambiguities. There is a sense in which crime can be observed as entirely real, with real 
effects, following real patterns, and showing causal links with other phenomena and 
circumstances. There is also a sense in which crime is a political definition through which the 
powerful control access to resources, and in which its enumeration is entirely a function of 
the highly variable operation of the formal agencies of social control. South Africa is widely 
understood to be a high-crime context and is also the epitome of a society defined by social 
and racial conflict and oppression. As such, it presents an extreme case of the tension 
between the practical demands of a broadly realist epistemology and an inescapably critical 
and constructivist understanding of crime. This tension is not resolved by picking a paradigm. 
It is incurable, but it need not be terminal.28  
This dissertation engages in the slog required to square that circle, not with any 
expectation of finding a solution, but with the conviction that continuous engagement on this 
terrain offers substance to the discipline. Indeed, the ways in which we grapple with the 
ambiguities around conceptualising and observing our object(s) of inquiry — with the 
 
27 ‘Trivial’ comes from the Latin ‘trivium’ literally meaning ‘place where three roads meet’ – or a ‘crossroad’. 
This being an area regularly traversed and open to all came to mean commonplace or unremarkable. 
28 The recent novel coronavirus pandemic has offered laypeople an interesting parallel crash course in the 
dilemmas involved with disease epidemiology.  
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ontology and epistemology of crime — are the very substance of the discipline as an 
intellectual project. They are not inconvenient caveats to be noted in passing. They are the 
building blocks of primary criminological knowledge. They are the generators of its growth. 
This dissertation offers a novel account of the nature, origin, severity, implications, 
and possibilities of the aetiological crisis in post-Apartheid South African criminology. It 
extracts conceptual tools from the philosophy of social science to illustrate the nature and 
extent of the meta-theoretical dilemma of crime prevalence measurement. It draws from a 
historical and technical understanding to unpack the ways in which this dilemma has 
manifested in the context of crime scholarship in South Africa. It reviews contemporary, 
structural aetiological literature to demonstrate the resulting extent and inevitability of 
stagnation.  
In a conscious attempt to avoid the temptations of navel-gazing or devoting effort 
only to critique, rather than to building something, it explores why, whether and how crime 
statistics could be used to make defensible claims about long-term South African crime 
prevalence trends in a way that could prove theoretically productive. It brings together a 
dataset far more extensive than any other in existence. It develops and employs a technical 
methodology to render that data intelligible. It produces an empirical finding that exposes the 
magnitude of the deficiency of existing explanatory theory, but in so doing suggests a means 
by which future work might do better.  
It is not, however, an exercise in ‘crime science’ or an attempt to ‘replace politics 
with calculation’.29 It speaks rather more to the role that Loader and Sparks have described as 
that of the ‘democratic under-labourer,’ and builds from their premise that the production of 
knowledge about crime itself remains the primary task of the discipline. Its core analysis is 
not quantitative and it does not take the traditional form of quantitative empirical work — 
namely introduction, literature review, theory, methodology, results, analysis, and conclusion. 
On a final note, this dissertation offers a playful parallel to fictional crime talk. The 
appeal of the murder mystery genre lies in the extraordinary empirical access it affords into 
otherwise private, imagined lives. The detective is required and permitted to intrude. Her goal 
is to make causal statements that can withstand forensic scrutiny. But what holds the reader’s 
interest is the documentation of an idiosyncratic, imperfect empirical methodology. It is in 
 
29 Loader & Sparks Public Criminology? op cit note 22 at 135. 
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the minutiae of the process of obtaining and interpreting data that we gain knowledge about 
characters, contexts, and relationships that would otherwise remain hidden.  
 
Chapter overview 
Although each of the substantive chapters of this dissertation represents a distinct 
contribution to the discipline, based on a different mode of inquiry, their analyses develop 
cumulatively. Chapter two introduces the key concepts and related areas of existing literature 
that situate and give meaning to this topic. First is the notion of the explanation of crime. Of 
the countless questions that can be asked about crime, one type explores variations on the 
formative question of the discipline: Why does crime happen? This is the aetiological 
question. It implies an approach that can be called ‘primary criminology’, which pursues 
knowledge about the patterns, causes, and most effective responses to crime by means of 
some form of systematic empirical observation.  
Having established this foundational context, chapter two outlines existing arguments 
around the suggestion that contemporary South African criminology has retreated from this 
task of investigating the causation of crime. The discipline has been diagnosed as suffering 
from an explanatory crisis. The reasons for this crisis have thus far been framed in normative 
terms. In contrast, the suggestion in this dissertation is that the problem is empirical.  
Next, Chapter two distinguishes the idea of a primary criminology which directly 
engages the sociological imagination. It suggests a framework and introduces some heuristic 
tools to make sense of different levels of explanation. The macro level focuses directly on 
features of the structural environment and explores a causal relationship of some kind 
between some aggregate condition(s) and some feature(s) of crime in the aggregate. 
Finally, Chapter two lays the groundwork for the dissertation’s sustained discussion 
of the problem of aggregate crime prevalence measurement, particularly in the form of the 
official figures on crimes recorded by the police. These offer an unrivalled means of making 
reliable and specific claims about relative crime prevalence over time and/or space. However, 
they are deceptively slippery tools. In clumsy hands, they are far more likely to deceive than 
reveal. Employing them responsibly requires considerable skill in both theory and 
methodology. If nothing else, this dissertation is a demonstration of the value and complexity 
of that skill.  
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Chapter three integrates the concepts introduced in Chapter two into a meta-
theoretical analysis. It suggests that to be productive, structural aetiology logically entails 
meeting certain requirements. It draws from the philosophy of (social) science to suggest that 
the domains of comparison and evaluation of causal theory are precision and logical 
consistency, parsimony and scope, practical implications, empirical validity, and testability. 
This last is particularly important and arguably underpins the others. Testability, or a means 
of subjecting an explanation to empirical scrutiny, is a prerequisite of productive inquiry 
within a broadly positivist/empiricist paradigm. Because macro-level aetiology seeks to 
explain some aspect of crime in the aggregate, it must gain empirical purchase on crime in 
aggregate. This requires some defensible account of levels, patterns, or trends in crime 
prevalence. This is a very difficult, if not impossible, task. Its difficulty involves reconciling 
ambiguities around both the ontology (or ‘thingness’) and epistemology (or ‘knowability’) of 
crime. The ontology and epistemology of ‘crime’ offer serious challenges even in the best of 
circumstances.  
As Chapter three goes on to argue, official police-recorded crime statistics are the 
standard and superlative mechanism of crime prevalence measurement. They have been 
formative of and will remain core to the endeavour of structural aetiology. It has been 
suggested that the early research of the ‘great founders of criminal statistics’ during the 1830s 
largely established criminology as a modern social science.30 This massive pre-existing 
dataset allows for incomparable degrees of disaggregation in space and time. It would be 
foolish to dismiss it as a tool of discovery, as means to challenge popular wisdom and bring 
precision and nuance to the simple and the generic. Yet it is subject to major ontological and 
epistemological (and normative) disputes and uncertainties. Chapter three concludes that the 
twin necessity and impossibility of crime prevalence measurement, as demonstrated in the 
difficulties in using official police-recorded crime statistics, constitute a fundamental meta-
theoretical dilemma for criminological macro-aetiology. 
Chapter four builds on this to explore how the problem of crime prevalence 
measurement, as quantified in official crime statistics, has been both formulated by and 
formative of the development of the South African discipline of criminology. It places the 
abstract dilemma proposed in Chapter three in the South African historical context. The 
 
30 Ruth Ann Triplett (ed) The Handbook of the History and Philosophy of Criminology (2018) at 69. 
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dilemma has here proven crippling. Chapter four discusses how the extent and nature of the 
colonial and especially Apartheid states made for acute ontological and epistemological (and 
normative) ambiguities around the use and interpretation of crime statistics. South African 
scholars have had to contend with a historical scarcity of even minimally defensible 
criminological statistics. The best available data on offer in South Africa — the kind required 
to assess and refine explanations of crime in the aggregate — have never been up to the 
precious few tasks to which they have been put.  
The shortcomings of the available crime prevalence data are widely acknowledged by 
South African criminologists, but they have taken it as license to do one of two things: either 
dismiss the prospect of rigorous structural observation or proceed as if the empirical 
problems do not exist. For different reasons, none of the intellectual traditions that have 
shaped the discipline have had cause to grapple with South African crime statistics as tools of 
genuine aetiological inquiry. They have thus been allowed to lie largely fallow. The argument 
of Chapter four is that the discipline has been unwilling and/or unable to give coherent 
account of what is to be done with or about crime statistics. 
Chapter five brings the analysis up to date. It reviews contemporary South African 
macro-aetiological scholarship by means of the heuristic devices suggested in Chapter two 
and in the context of the requirements of primary structural aetiology, developed in Chapter 
three. It suggests that the aetiological crisis is far more severe and widespread than previously 
thought. But this crisis is not the result of any particular failing on the part of the cited 
scholars. Rather, it is the inevitable outcome of the dilemma of empirical testability in 
structural aetiology, as manifested in different ways by different explanatory approaches. 
There is no meaningful way to make empirical purchase on ‘crime’ as a general phenomenon, 
as well as on an inclusive account of its proposed macro-level determinants. The more 
inclusive and general a proposed explanation, the less likely it is to offer the prospect of 
logical clarity, and the more likely it is to end in a cul-de-sac of vague speculation. The more 
parsimonious and particular a proposed explanation, the likelier it is to be conceivably 
testable. Indeed, Chapter five concludes that the task of understanding ‘crime’ in South 
Africa is doomed to stalemate. It should be abandoned in favour of applying proper rigour in 
the development of clear causal claims about more limited phenomena.  
Chapter six offers an empirical demonstration of quite how far from trivial is the 
problem of crime prevalence measurement. To do so, it seeks to establish, as defensibly as 
possible, just one observation about long-term South African crime prevalence trends that 
14 
 
would seem to deserve and require explanatory effort. It pursues an explanandum sufficiently 
narrow and specific as to allow for conceivable testability but offers no explanans and no 
causal speculation. Among other things, its goal is to demonstrate the extent and inevitability 
of the uncertainties, tensions, and ambiguities involved in simply making a relatively 
defensible claim about long-term South African crime prevalence trends.  
It discusses one popular means by which the general phenomenon of ‘crime’ can be 
rendered more particular and testable: by restricting the analysis to recorded rates of murder. 
Their use considerably reduces but does not resolve the scale of the ontological and 
epistemological obstacles that constitute structural criminology’s empirical dilemma. Murder 
rates offer a uniquely robust quantitative tool to make relatively defensible statements about 
how much crime is happening where and when.  
As argued in Chapter six, murder, or intentional homicide, is arguably the ‘ultimate 
crime’.31 On a practical level, its ‘indisputable physical consequences manifested in the form 
of a dead body also make it the most categorical and calculable’.32 This makes its extent 
subject to corroboration from independent sources, such as population registers and 
especially mortuary records. This is why the United Nations and many others consider it a 
‘robust indicator of levels of security within states’.33 The recorded rate of murder has been 
selected as the primary or only dependent variable in the overwhelming majority of 
comparative crime research, of research into long-term crime trends, and of empirical tests of 
the most long-standing structural theories of crime.34 
The official murder statistics collected and disseminated by South African police offer 
scope for macro-aetiological testability at unrivalled scale. Putting them to such use 
nevertheless involves serious challenges. Chapter six demonstrates the painstaking methods 
required to collect raw figures of official police-recorded murders over the longest-possible 
time frame and at the lowest-possible level of geographic aggregation and combine them with 
 
31 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Global Study on Homicide 2013 (2013). 
32 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Global Study on Homicide 2011 (2011). 
33 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2013) op cit note 31. 
34 Marcelo F Aebi & Antonia Linde ‘Long-Term Trends in Crime: Continuity and Change’ in Paul Knepper & 




the population data necessary to produce the rates per capita that make them minimally 
comparable.  
It succeeds in producing a nearly continuous time series of annual, national-level, 
police-recorded murder rates from 1911 to 2019. This span of 108 years more than triples that 
of any published academic analyses. To allow for longitudinal analysis at a lower level of 
geographic aggregation than the nation, it was necessary to use Geographic Information 
System technology to digitally overlay recorded murder figures from each of the country’s 
police stations with population data from the national censuses of 1996, 2001, and 2011. The 
result is a set of murder rates per capita to track murder prevalence over the period 1994 to 
date on the smallest-possible level of geographic aggregation, which Chapter six argues is the 
municipal level. 
No attempt is made to put this large, new dataset to the test of any existing or 
proposed new causal theory, although it is intended that such use will follow. Rather, what is 
offered is a detailed demonstration of one half of how one may go about operationalising 
macro-aetiological propositions, as well as a single observation that would seem to require 
explanation. There was a large, unprecedented, and widespread decrease in murder rates from 
1994 to 2011. This is arguably the single most defensible statement that can be made about 
South African long-term crime prevalence trends.  
The seventh and concluding chapter offers summary and synthesis. It suggests that the 
large, unprecedented, and widespread decrease in murder rates from 1994 to 2011 is poorly 
explained by existing theory. Similar recorded crime rate declines in other countries, 
primarily the United States, have generated as many as 21 different proposed explanations.35 
The South African discipline’s failure to make reliable and specific claims about relative 
crime prevalence over time and/or space is such that it has been unable even to identify that 
which is relatively unequivocal and cries out for explanation.  
Bringing together the preceding meta-theoretical, historical, and empirical 
propositions, Chapter seven concludes that there is an unidentified void at what should be the 
empirical heart of South African criminology. The aetiological crisis in post-Apartheid South 
African criminology reflects a fundamental dilemma of empirical testability. The 
measurement of crime prevalence patterns and trends is far from trivial. It makes for a 
 
35 P Knepper ‘Falling Crime Rates: What Happened Last Time?’ (2015) 19 Theoretical Criminology. 
16 
 
chronic struggle to make defensible and specific claims about relative crime prevalence over 
time and/or space. This underpins all attempts at structural aetiology. The nature, origin, 
severity, implications, and possibilities of the aetiological crisis are far more complex than 
previously imagined. 
South African criminology requires far more humility and curiosity about the basis of 
its ‘knowledge’ about the patterns, causes, and most effective responses to crime. It must 
engage head-on the question of how to go about systematic empirical observation in the 
context of profound — and, here, particularly acute — ambiguity about the meaning and 
measure of crime. Its historical schisms have meant that the tools for productive primary 
criminology are scattered, with each of the intellectual traditions developing and hoarding 
their own share. This is to the detriment not only of the discipline, but also of the nation. 
Debates around what criminology is for remain important. What they need is to be 
complemented by a vigorous new debate about what criminology can, can’t, and should 




Chapter two: Context and justification 
This dissertation joins an already vibrant conversation about the history, nature, and 
imperatives of the discipline of South African criminology. It discusses the nature, origin, 
severity, implications, and possibilities for what has been described as its aetiological crisis. 
It does so by exploring the endeavour of the structural explanation(s) of crime, by means of 
official crime statistics. This first chapter introduces the five areas of existing literature that 
give meaning to this topic.  
It begins by situating it in the discipline most broadly and sketching out the place of 
primary criminology, or the aetiological question. Next, it presents the existing discussion of 
post-Apartheid South African criminology’s failure at this endeavour. The argument then 
returns to the abstract, to differentiate this dissertation’s response to this failure and to 
establish some heuristic tools for later analysis. This centres on explanation of the structural 
or macro-level, meaning the investigation of causal relationships between some aggregate 
condition(s) and some feature(s) of crime in the aggregate. The fifth and final proposed piece 
of the establishing framework is the idea that primary, structural aetiology may be pursued 
through quantitative methods. Numbers offer both advantages and considerable 
disadvantages in the description of crime in the aggregate. 
These key areas of scholarship provide the justification and conceptual scaffolding for 
this dissertation. However, each of the chapters that follow draws directly and indirectly on a 
range of other literatures to build and substantiate the arguments. 
 
Primary criminology 
Criminology has famously been described as a ‘rendezvous subject’, of bringing together 
around some notion of ‘crime’ a ‘great crowd of very diverse people meeting up and passing 
through, sometimes establishing fruitful exchange, sometimes merely rubbing shoulders in 
the crowded passages of textbooks and conferences’.36 Just one among the rich plurality of 
 
36 David Garland & Richard Sparks ‘Criminology Social Theory and the Challenge of Our Times’ (2000) 40 
British Journal of Criminology at 193. 
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modes of criminological enquiry (to the limited extent that it is possible or desirable to treat 
them as discrete) is what can be called ‘primary criminology’.37  
This branch is in the business of producing knowledge about the patterns, causes, and 
most effective responses to crime. Its focus is chiefly on law breaking, rather than law 
making or reactions to law breaking, or the many other analogous questions that may be of 
interest, especially within a postcolonial context.38 The questions it explores are variations on 
and direct spinoffs from what remains the formative question of the discipline (such as it is): 
Why do people commit crime? This is the aetiological question.  
Primary criminology has at various times and in certain intellectual spaces been 
disparaged, especially for its often-uncritical assumption that ‘crime’ is a distinct, objectively 
measurable and predictable phenomenon, and for its blithe acceptance of state definitions of 
‘crime’. Many have pointed out that the rhetorical, social, and official responses to acts may 
be more decisive in rendering them ‘criminal’ than their intrinsic nature and that the 
behaviour of the powerful is far less likely to attract such designations.39 Quantitative tools 
have come in for some of the harshest reproach. The stark injustice of state law making and 
enforcement under Apartheid has lent these critiques additional historical heat in the South 
African context, as elaborated in Chapter four. Other theoretical accounts (notably left 
realism) have sought to defend the value of empirical methodologies while speaking out 
against abstract empiricism,40 while also drawing attention to the contextual and social 
relations that construct the representation of crime.41 Causal explanation continues to be 
pursued by those of a variety of theoretical orientations.  
This pursuit may be said to branch into, on the one hand, the work of those who might 
consider themselves ‘theorists’, for whom empirical research is merely a handmaiden to 
 
37 Ian Loader & Richard Sparks ‘Criminology’s Public Roles: A Drama in Six Acts’ in Mary Bosworth & 
Carolyn Hoyle (eds) What Is Criminology? (2011) at 20. 
38 See for example Clifford Shearing & Monique Marks ‘Criminology’s Disney World: The Ethnographer’s 
Ride of South African Criminal Justice’ in Mary Bosworth & Carolyn Hoyle (eds) What Is 
Criminology? (2011). 
39 See for example Vincenzo Ruggiero Crime and Markets: Essays in Anti-Criminology Clarendon Studies in 
Criminology (2001) at 3. 
40 Martin D Schwartz & Walter S DeKeseredy ‘Left Realist Criminology: Strengths Weaknesses and the 
Feminist Critique’ (1991) 15 Crime Law and Social Change 1 at 52. 
41 Jock Young ‘The Tasks Facing a Realist Criminology’ (1987) 11 Contemporary Crises 4 at 337. 
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theory,42 and on the other hand of those who are hesitant to engage too abstractly and who 
tend to focus on more practical problems.43 This latter group often concentrate on specific 
locations or specific instances of their narrowly defined problem and may not explicitly 
formulate their research with reference to certain established theories or reflect on what their 
findings mean for more generalised theories.44  
Yet even the most empirical reports are informed by assumptions about human nature, 
the scope of human agency, and the nature of social relations. They are constituted by the 
kinds of questions selected, the forms and sources of knowledge sought, the analytical 
methods applied, and so on. Empirical work is necessarily the product of limited information, 
filtered through specific instruments of observation, and subjected to decisions and 
interpretations at various stages.45 All are given aim and coherence by tacit interpretive 
frames,46 which may well look a great deal like ‘theory’ as understood by at least some of the 
different models or philosophies of doing criminology.47  
As in social thinking more generally, several of what are sometimes called 
criminological ‘theories’ are primarily propositions of explanatory strategy and of 
epistemological, ontological, and methodological terrain.48 These are more properly called 
theoretical paradigms, frameworks, or frames of reference. They are matters of philosophical 
orientation, assertions of what aspects of the field require explanatory attention and of how 
one should go about forming those explanations. They are not necessarily in competition with 
one another and there should be no expectation of ‘falsification’ or movement towards 
consensus. Paradigms may sometimes be incommensurable to the point where it may be 
impossible to communicate between them, but their tensions may also contribute to fruitful 
 
42 Charles R Tittle ‘Introduction: Theory and Contemporary Criminology’ in Alex R Piquero (ed) The 
Handbook of Criminological Theory (2016) at 4. 
43 Paul Rock & Simon Holdaway ‘Thinking about Criminology: ‘Facts Are Bits of Biography’’ in Simon 
Holdaway and Paul Rock (eds) (1998) Thinking about Criminology at 4. 
44 Tittle op cit note 42 at 11. 
45 Andrew Bennett ‘The Mother of All Isms: Causal Mechanisms and Structured Pluralism in International 
Relations Theory’ (2013) 19 European Journal of International Relations 3 at 466. 
46 Rock & Holdaway op cit note 43 at 10. 
47 Tittle op cit note 42 at 1. 
48 Charles Tilly ‘Mechanisms in Political Processes’ (2001) 4 Annual Review of Political Science 4 at 21–22. 
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discussion.49 One common way these are categorised on the broadest level, for example, is as 
the classical school (which tends to see crime as the product of individuals’ free choice), the 
positive school (which understands crime as to a significant extent explained by factors 
beyond individual control), and the critical school (which stresses the ways in which crime is 
determined by the form and enforcement of the law itself).  
The term ‘positivist’ is perhaps most frequently used in a derogatory tone, to indicate 
‘mindless acceptance of existing political arrangements’.50 Its critics often ascribe to it a 
range of unpalatable assumptions and policy implications. Yet most of the standard 
aetiological theories in criminology operate from a more-or-less positive logic, whether 
biological, psychological, or sociological. This paradigm assumes that at least some criminal 
behaviours are meaningfully distinguishable from non-criminal behaviours and that these 
differences may follow measurable and generalisable patterns. It seeks ‘objectivity’ by means 
of the scientific method. The basis of positivism is a close relationship with the empirical. It 
stresses the idea that ‘intellectual disciplines can progress only to the degree that their 
knowledge is grounded in facts and experience’.51 It holds that answers to theoretical 
questions are less likely to derive from groundless speculation as from the scientific method, 
which is to say systematic empirical observation.52   
The term ‘primary criminology’ is preferred and used in this dissertation. This is 
partly to avoid positivism’s common — but by no means inherent — connotations of 
adherence to statistical association as the only basis of explanation, of theoretical and 
methodological naivety, and of conservatism. The empirical can just as easily disturb the 
status quo in knowledge or politics as it can clumsily reinforce them. It is also to emphasise 
the importance of the ‘moment of discovery’, not in opposition to but in support of the 
 
49 Lieven Pauwels ‘Analytical Criminology: A Style of Theorizing and Analyzing the Micro-Macro Context of 
Acts of Crime’ in Marc Cools et al. (eds) Contemporary Issues in the Empirical Study of Crime  
(2009) at 139. 
50 Michael R Gottfredson & Travis Hirschi ‘The Positive Tradition’ in Michael R Gottfredson & Travis Hirschi 
(eds) Positive Criminology (1987) at 9. 
51 Lawrence E Cohen & Kenneth C Land ‘Sociological Positivism and the Explanation of Criminality’ in 
Michael R Gottfredson & Travis Hirschi (eds) Positive Criminology (1987) at 43. 
52 John H Laub ‘Data for Positive Criminology’ in Michael R Gottfredson & Travis Hirschi (eds) Positive 
Criminology (1987) at 56. 
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‘institutional-critical moment’, and the ‘normative moment’ in criminology.53 There are 
realist approaches, which take crime seriously as both product and producer of injustice, of 
decidedly radical political orientation and nuanced epistemology.54 There is nothing 
inherently conservative or naively positivist about primary criminology. It is no more or less 
than the pursuit of the aetiological question — of whether and how the phenomenon of crime 
can be explained by some other phenomenon. 
 
South African criminology’s explanatory crisis 
The field of criminological research in South Africa is relatively small and young. Its first 
local text by that name was published in 1933;55 it was only introduced as an independent 
university subject in 1949 and the Criminological Society was only established in 1986.56 
Only nine university-linked departments of criminology offer undergraduate qualifications in 
criminology,57 and only 13 South African institutions offer the subject at undergraduate or 
postgraduate level.58 It has only a handful of dedicated local journals.59 Even so, it has a long 
and heated history of real and perceived ‘political, ideological and methodological wrangling’ 
about its origins, scope, and purpose.60 There is also a broad range of work that ‘engages 
crime and violence, and that emanates from researchers, organisation and departments that 
 
53 Loader & Sparks op cit note 37 at 125. 
54 John Lea ‘Left Realism: A Radical Criminology for the Current Crisis’ (2016) 5 International Journal for 
Crime Justice and Social Democracy 3. 
55 Van Zyl Smit Adopting and Adapting Criminological Ideas op cit note 14 at 232. 
56 Super op cit note 18 at 41. 
57 Christiaan Bezuidenhout & Anthony Minnaar ‘To Professionalise or Not?’ (2010) Acta Criminologica: 
Southern African Journal of Criminology CRIMSA 2009 Conference Special Edition at 11. 
58 Shanta Singh & Nirmala Gopal ‘Criminology in the 21st Century: ‘through the Eyes’ of Academics’ (2010) 
Acta Criminologica: Southern African Journal of Criminology CRIMSA 2009 Conference Special 
Edition at 15. This from a total of more than two dozen public universities alone. 
59 Chiefly: Acta Criminologica: Southern African Journal of Criminology, the South African Crime Quarterly 
(SACQ), and the South African Journal of Criminal Justice. 
60 Lillian Melinda Artz & Kelley Moult ‘Gnawing at the Edges of Criminology: Working Outside/In’ (2012) 
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are not traditionally considered schools of criminology’.61 ‘Criminology’ may once and in 
some places have been reasonably described as an ‘autonomous and self-standing discipline’, 
but its permeability is now so widely recognised that even the disinvention of its identity has 
become unfashionable.62  
As such, there are countless existing and potential voices, assessments, critiques, and 
disputes of possible value to this still fresh, rough tapestry of a discipline. The analysis here 
seeks to pull on just one, as-yet barely acknowledged loose thread. This is the question of 
whether and how South African criminologists have succeeded in establishing logical and 
empirical bases for the investigation of crime causation.  
A suggestion of the problem comes from Clive Glaser. His concern is not with the 
discipline of criminology, but with South African social historians (and, presumably, those in 
adjacent fields) who happen to have taken up the popular theme of criminal violence. The 
important causal mystery, for Glaser, is why levels of violent crime in post-Apartheid South 
Africa are so extremely, unusually high. He remarks that, despite the ‘relentless 
conversations, newspaper stories, analysis of crime data, there is curiously little in-depth 
discussion about causation… There is much off-the-cuff conjecture, much simplistic blaming, 
but little systematic research.’63  
The reason for this failure, Glaser seems to imply, is that ‘[t]here is, of course, a 
substantial denialist lobby which claims that South Africa’s crime is not unusual by world 
standards’.64 This statement stands alone as little more than rhetorical sneer. Indeed, Glaser is 
just as quick to repeat or offer his own convenient off-the-cuff conjecture. What Glaser does 
well to raise is the problem that historical and contextual explanatory breadth seem to come 
at the expense of depth. He notes the frequency with which the legacy of Apartheid is 
invoked but not detailed or elaborated. Such an argument is so all-encompassing as to be 
irrefutable. It amounts to ‘saying that violent crime has to be explained by South Africa’s 
 
61 Artz & Moult op cit note 60 at 9. 
62 Garland & Sparks op cit note 36 at 190. 




history’.65 He proposes that the sociological questions about crime be addressed through 
close examination of the ways in which inequality and youth socialisation have been 
experienced by individual perpetrators. 
The more substantial account and critique of causal analysis in South African 
criminology comes in Bill Dixon’s 2013 paper in The Australian and New Zealand Journal 
of Criminology, ‘The aetiological crisis in South African criminology’.66 Although based at 
the University of Nottingham, Dixon has 20-odd years of experience and publications on 
crime and policing in South Africa. In the 2013 paper (as well as an earlier version in South 
African Crime Quarterly),67 Dixon notes Anthony Altbeker’s compelling account and 
explanation of South Africa’s ‘crisis of crime’,68 and explains that he aims instead to ‘draw 
attention to, and attempt to account for, a closely related aetiological crisis in South African 
criminology’.69 This object of critique he takes to encompass ‘any and all work on South 
Africa that is concerned with crime, the means of controlling it and the process of 
criminalization, and is based on a systematic appraisal of relevant evidence while engaging 
with a wider literature on the subject(s) at hand’.70 
The notion of aetiological crisis is drawn from Jock Young’s earlier criticism of 
‘mainstream’ Anglo-American theorists who struggled to explain why (contrary to prevailing 
theories on the role of social conditions) major improvements in social welfare in the second 
half of the twentieth century could be matched by rising crime levels. As Dixon puts it: 
 
According to Young, the aetiological crisis in British post-war criminology — 
eclectic, pragmatic and wedded to both positivism and correctionalism — was at its 
deepest in the 1960s. A more radical criminology soon emerged in response to the crisis 
but, by the mid-1980s, ‘the Thermidor’ had set in with the emergence of a ‘new 
administrative criminology involving a retreat from any discussion of causality’ 
(Young, 1986: 4). And so, writing in 1986, Young felt able to claim that, ‘we have now 
 
65 Glaser op cit note 26 at 339. 
66 Dixon The Aetiological Crisis op cit note 23. 
67 Bill Dixon ‘Understanding ‘Pointy Face’: What Is Criminology For?’ (2012) 41 South African Crime 
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68 Antony Altbeker A Country at War with Itself: South Africa’s Crisis of Crime (2007). 
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a criminology that has well nigh abandoned its historical mission of the search 
for the causes of crime’ (Young, 1986: 4).  
In this paper I suggest that, since the end of apartheid, something rather similar 
has occurred in South African criminology. In much the same way as ‘mainstream’ 
social democratic criminology was confounded by the coincidence of inexorably rising 
crime rates with growth in real incomes, slum clearances, improved educational 
attainment and the expansion of social services in post-war Britain, so have those 
criminologists who looked forward to a new, democratic South Africa been nonplussed 
by the persistence of high levels of violent crime in a country freed from the economic, 
social and cultural fetters of racist autocracy.71  
 
The question that South African criminologists have so damningly failed to address, 
says Dixon, is why levels of violent crime have remained so ‘stubbornly high’, or 
‘consistently high’, since the end of Apartheid in 1994. Failure to come to terms with this 
unexpected and inconvenient empirical observation has meant a retreat from thinking about 
crime causation. He reviews several contemporary texts of South African criminology to 
demonstrate how rarely and perfunctorily they engage in causal analysis.  
He ascribes this reticence to explore the causation of crime and violence to a number 
of factors, namely: the ideological commitment of many of South African criminologists to 
the reform of Apartheid policing and the institutionalisation of democratic values; their 
struggle to come to terms with the disappointment that this process has not been the panacea 
for crime; their failure to shift the racial composition of the discipline, and therefore both 
their particular reluctance to add fuel to the fires of afro-pessimism and their practical 
difficulties in doing good qualitative work with most marginalised populations; and finally 
the difficulty of sustaining cool, scholarly contemplation in the hot climate of a highly 
politically contentious issue.72 For these reasons, South African criminologists have become 
leery of the Lombrosian or scientific project of understanding crime itself, instead focusing 
on the governmental or administrative one of understanding the reactions to crime. 
As remedy, Dixon proposes that productive aetiological enquiry focus on the life 
courses of perpetrators, matching the rich context of human life with a thorough account of 
history. He suggests that we should work not so much to understand crime as to understand 
the criminal, who appears fleetingly in Altbeker’s work as little more than a mysterious 
 
71 Ibid at 320. 
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villain with a ‘pointy face’.73 The charge of developing individual-level understandings of 
crime has since been admirably taken up by others, who have provided compelling detail on 
the operation of cycles of trauma and violence.74 To the extent that such approaches explicitly 
locate their understandings of these micro-processes within macro-conditions, they are an 
invaluable contribution to structural aetiological thinking. This appears, however, to be about 
the extent to which Dixon’s argument has resonated with other scholars. His core critique has 
gone largely unanswered. 
One revealing exception is found in the work of Sarah Henkeman, who shares 
Dixon’s concern for the blind spots of South African criminologists, but argues for the need 
for trans-disciplinary approaches and methodologies.75 She takes issue with Dixon’s (and 
others’) focus on criminal justice rather than social justice, and with recent acts of individual, 
physical violence rather than the underlying trans-historical, racial, cultural, structural, and 
psychological violence on the part of privileged people and institutions globally. This would 
seem to offer precisely the kind of explanation warned against by Glaser. Worse, 
Henkeman’s critique appears naive to a great deal of structural aetiological theory within 
even ‘orthodox’, Anglo-American criminology.  
But what is most telling in Henkeman’s response to Dixon is its suggestion that the 
discipline’s explanatory crisis should be understood as arising from a conceptual, but more 
essentially normative, failing. The failure of South African aetiologists is rooted in their 
individualist, control-oriented perspective, as well as their culture of denial, which delinks the 
‘present manifest violence of historically oppressed people from the different forms of 
violence perpetrated by historically privileged people (by erasing the past)’.76 The reason 
‘pointy face’ has remained so mysterious is that ‘pale face’ refuses to acknowledge his own 
place in trans-historical violence. In a similar vein, others have suggested that the geographic 
and historical origins of the typical explanatory theories may make them inappropriate for 
 
73 Dixon Understanding ‘Pointy Face’ op cit note 67. 
74 Chandré Gould Beaten Bad: The Life Stories of Violent Offenders (2015). 
75 Sarah Henkeman ‘‘Pale Face’/’pointy Face’: SA Criminology in Denial’ (2013) 45 South African Crime 
Quarterly. 
76 Ibid at 7. 
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application in an African context.77 The problem, Henkeman and others suggest, is that we 
aren’t asking the right kinds of questions with the right frameworks. 
This is the typical terrain of South African criminological dispute — the grounds of 
norms, politics, identity, and conceptual approach. Local journals and conferences feature 
frequent discussion about which questions should be asked, by whom, in which forum, using 
which theoretical framing, and to what end. These are important, unavoidable matters for 
contestation,78 especially in a context where discussions on crime are so deeply entangled 
with the legacies of abusive power relations. But they can only take us so far. Rarely is an 
explanation assessed, logically and empirically, on its own terms. It is frankly astonishing 
how seldom proposed explanations are scrutinised for whether they are satisfactorily 
supported by their proposed (or any) empirical evidence. This may be because the field is so 
fragmented, yet still so small that collegiality demands sidelong confrontation, and because 
there remain so many fresh questions to take up. Other accounts are developed in the course 
of this dissertation. What seems clear is that the South African discipline mirrors the pattern 
observed elsewhere — that findings are seldom cumulative.79 There is a sense of voices 
talking endlessly past each other. 
As indicated by its title, it is chiefly Dixon’s diagnosis of an explanatory crisis within 
South African criminology to which this dissertation responds. It does not, however, do so in 
the way Dixon recommends — by getting to intimate grips with the narratives of individuals 
involved with crime. Whatever its considerable advantages (not least methodologically), this 
is an incomplete and inadequate conceptual compromise. The sheer scale of crime in South 
Africa cannot reasonably be reduced to a sum of individual stories, however thoughtfully and 
thoroughly they might invoke the wider social and historical context. Neither is it satisfactory 
that we should be forced to abandon criminology’s formative direct engagement of its 
sociological imagination. This dissertation thus extends in quite the other direction. 
 
 
77 Bezuidenhout & Minnaar op cit note 57.  
78 Stanley Cohen ‘Crime and Politics: Spot the Difference’ (1996) 47 The British Journal of Sociology 1. 
79 Roger Matthews ‘Beyond ‘So What?’ Criminology: Rediscovering Realism’ (2009) 13 Theoretical 




Within the primary mode of analysis, a theory’s internal logic is structured inter alia by its 
core level of explanation. The overarching question of why people commit crime can be 
framed as either: 1) Why do certain individuals commit the crime that they do? Or 2) Why do 
certain groups or areas see the aggregate levels of crime that they do? The question of why 
individuals commit crime is distinct from that of why certain places or times differ in terms 
of their aggregate levels of crime.80 Arguably the former has received more theoretical and 
empirical attention within the discipline than the latter.81 Structural criminological 
perspectives are based on the premise that crimes are not just idiosyncratic individual acts, 
but also social acts that exhibit certain patterns across social space,82 and that these social 
patterns merit investigation. 
Explanations at the aggregate or macro-level and at the individual or micro-level have 
fluctuated in relative popularity within the discipline over time.83 They are not a neat 
dichotomy but rather points of emphasis within a continuum all the way from the level of 
genetic factors, through biological, psychological, proximate environmental, neighbourhood 
socio-economic, broader shared socio-political, all the way to possible causal processes at the 
world system level (or even to theology).  
Theories operating at different levels of explanation can sometimes seem to pass one 
another like ships in the night,84 yet structural explanations often rely on explicit or implicit 
statements about processes at the individual level, while individual explanations may often 
refer to the ways in which group structures shape the contexts within which individuals 
 
80 Judith R Blau & Peter M Blau ‘The Cost of Inequality: Metropolitan Structure and Violent Crime’ (1982) 47 
American Sociological Review 1 at 114. 
81 Eric P Baumer, María B Vélez & Richard Rosenfeld ‘Bringing Crime Trends Back into Criminology: A 
Critical Assessment of the Literature and a Blueprint for Future Inquiry’ (2018) 1 Annual Review of 
Criminology at 40. 
82 Paul Nieuwbeerta et al. ‘Neighborhood Characteristics and Individual Homicide Rates: Effects of Social 
Cohesion Confidence in the Police and Socioeconomic Disadvantage’ (2008) 12 Homicide Studies 1 
at 91. 
83 Travis C Pratt & Francis T Cullen ‘Assessing Macro-Level Predictors and Theories of Crime: A Meta-
Analysis’ (2005) 32 Crime and Justice at 375. 
84 Ross L Matsueda ‘Toward an Analytical Criminology: The Micro-Macro Problem Causal Mechanisms and 
Public Policy’ (2017) 55 Criminology 3 at 493. 
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operate.85 Indeed, the problem of how to link contexts and behaviours, constraints and 
actions, at the structural and individual levels is fundamental to sociological thinking.86 
Failure to align conceptual and empirical levels of analysis can lead to such logical errors as 
the fallacy of composition (which incorrectly ascribes the features of the whole to some or all 
of its parts) and the fallacy of division (which incorrectly infers from the parts to the whole).  
A useful tool to structure an understanding of levels of analysis is a causal diagram, a 
tool that has become increasingly popular in a range of fields for its capacity to help 
summarise and communicate knowledge and assumptions about the problem in question. One 
model of this kind is designed to lay out the macro-micro-macro relations of structural 
explanation.87 It is colloquially known as ‘Coleman’s boat’88 (or sometimes the Boudon-
Coleman diagram).89 See the following diagram, which shows the proposed macro-level 
causal relationship at dotted line four as substantiated in terms of the solid lines one to three. 
 
 
85 Ronald L Akers Criminological Theories: Introduction and Evaluation 2 ed. (2012) at 5. 
86 Allen Liska ‘The Significance of Aggregate Dependent Variables and Contextual Independent Variables for 
Linking Macro and Micro Theories’ (2009) 53 Social Psychology 4 at 292. 
87 James S Coleman Foundations of Social Theory (1990). 
88 So named for its upside-down trapezoid shape which others have instead likened to a bathtub.  
89 Mario Bunge ‘Mechanism and Explanation’ (1997) 27 Philosophy of Social Science 4 at 454. 
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Figure 1 Generic macro-micro-macro scheme of sociological explanation 
 
This is of course a simplification of inevitably multi-level and overlapping social 
processes, involving constellations of contexts and behaviours rather than a single and 
universal linear pathway of direct causation. It can be modified in various ways to better 
capture some of these complexities.90 For example, more arrows (including with arrowheads 
on both ends) can be added between existing nodes to indicate reflexive relationships, or 
additional nodes can be introduced to indicate prior causal conditions (causes of causes) or 
parallel processes or interactions at intermediate levels of aggregation. 
The argument it is often employed to capture is that in order to explain a proposed 
macro-level causal relationship, one must account for the relevant way(s) in which the macro-
level condition operates onto the micro-level, the way in which the micro-conditions translate 
into micro-behaviours, and the way in which this operates back up to the observed macro-
level effect. This is based on the assumption of at least a weak version of methodological 
individualism, which holds that all social phenomena are in principle explicable only in terms 
of individuals.91 Methodological holists instead posit that certain collective phenomena are 
greater than the sum of their parts and can exert meso- or macro-level causality in their own 
 
90 For the general case see for example Daniel Little ‘Explanatory Autonomy and Coleman’s Boat’ (2012) 74 
Theoria. For a specific recent example see Amy E Nivette ‘Legitimacy and Crime: Theorizing the 
Role of the State in Cross-National Criminological Theory’ (2013) 18 Theoretical Criminology 1. 
91 See for example Jon Elster ‘The Case for Methodological Individualism’ (1982) 11 Theory and Society 4; 




right.92 Use of such diagrams may also imply that proper explanations must be mechanistic, 
that they should detail the ‘cogs and wheels’ of the causal process.93 This has in recent 
decades been a controversial point in the fields of political science and analytical sociology.94  
Coleman diagrams have played a more limited but similar role in criminology — in 
attempts at that grand ambition of theoretical integration,95 and to move beyond the dominant 
risk-factor approach that simply lists the countless variables that have been shown to be 
associated with crime and delinquency.96 They may be best-known in the work of Wikström 
and colleagues.97  
The use of these diagrams in this dissertation is not to make a case for methodological 
individualism, imply a position on the nature of causal inference, or suggest that all structural 
explanatory theories must be reducible to a mechanistic model of dependent and independent 
variables. They are employed here chiefly as heuristic device, to help reveal the logical 
structure of theories with macro-level components and thereby provide a basis of comparison 
and evaluation. This is unusual but not without precedent.98  
Such a model is useful, for example, in making sense of typical differences in 
emphasis among the social sciences. The first arrow is often considered the most critical 
focus of sociological enquiry, as it ‘selects from the whole cosmos of social complexity those 
specific aspects of an individual’s situation that make the difference when it comes to the 
understanding of social action and the resulting macro-sociological outcomes as mere 
derivations’.99 Grand theorists of various disciplines often concern themselves largely with 
 
92 See Little op cit note 90. 
93 Peter Hedström & Petri Ylikoski ‘Causal Mechanisms in the Social Sciences’ (2010) 36 Annual Review of 
Sociology 1. 
94 Zenonas Norkus ‘Mechanisms as Miracle Makers? The Rise and Inconsistencies of the ‘Mechanismic 
Approach’ in Social Science and History’ (2005) 44 History and Theory at 348. 
95 Matsueda op cit note 84.  
96 Hedström & Ylikoski op cit note 93.  
97 For example Per-Olof H Wikström & Kyle Treiber ‘Social Disadvantage and Crime’ (2016) 60 American 
Behavioral Scientist 10. 
98 Ralph B Taylor ‘Communities Crime and Reactions to Crime Multilevel Models: Accomplishments and 
Meta-Challenges’ (2010) 26 Journal of Quantitative Criminology 4. 
99 Hanno Scholtz ‘Rational Choice Theory in Sociology’ (2015) 14 Comparative Sociology at 591. 
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discussions on the level of line four, of the relationships between large-scale social processes. 
Psychological approaches operate primarily on the level of line two, or the ways in which 
individual contexts and experiences shape individual behaviours. Line three, or the link from 
individual actions to macro-outcomes, is often of particular interest in political science, for 
example in examining how individuals’ formation of social movements translate into national 
political outcomes.100 
Specific causal theories can also be visually differentiated by means of such diagrams. 
This is particularly useful because a single popularly posited macro-level relationship is 
typically subject to a range of major explanatory models. Many, for example, have sought to 
account for a relationship between aggregate levels of poverty and aggregate levels of crime, 
for example within a country, city, or neighbourhood. One approach stresses the ways in 
which poverty determines the perceived relative risks and rewards of criminal versus non-
criminal behaviour, which incentives individual actors then respond to by means of more-or-
less rational choices.101 Another approach focuses on the impact of poverty on parenting 
practices, and in turn the impact of this childhood socialisation on adults’ capacity to exercise 
self-control in the face of criminal temptation.102 Another suggests that poverty places 
individuals in the position of being unable to fulfil their aspirations through legitimate means, 
and that the resultant emotional frustration can in some cases lead to criminal innovation or 
rebellion.103 Yet another approach argues that poverty gives rise to disorganised social 
controls and spaces, which therefore fail to discourage rule-breaking.104 These can be visually 
compared as follows. 
 
 
100 Edwin Amenta et al. ‘The Political Consequences of Social Movements’ (2010) 36 Annual Review of 
Sociology 1. 
101 There are countless examples but one influential text of this economic approach is Gary S Becker ‘Crime and 
Punishment: An Economic Approach’ (1968) 76 Journal of Political Economy 2. 
102 Michael R Gottfredson & Travis Hirschi A General Theory of Crime (1990). 
103 Robert K Merton ‘Social Structure and Anomie’ (1938) 3 American Sociological Review 5. 
104 Jeffrey D Morenoff, Robert J Sampson & Stephen W Raudenbush ‘Neighbourhood Inequality Collective 
Efficacy and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban Violence’ (2001) 39 Criminology 3. 
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Figure 2 Coleman diagrams of theories of a relationship between poverty and crime 
 
 
To reduce a theory to a simple diagram must inevitably result in caricature. This is 
even more so as the established criminological theories have given rise to diverse literatures 
of alternative formulations and refinements and disputes. However, to the extent that a given 
explanation addresses structural factors — that is, asks what it is about a certain collective 
(such as society, country, city, or neighbourhood) that explains its levels of crime (rather than 
just what it is about an individual that explains their crime behaviour) — it is proposed that 
these diagrammatic simplifications can help reveal its internal logic. 
The heyday of South African macro-level, primary criminology was under Apartheid, 
when for example it was typically said that increases in crime rates among ‘the Bantu’ were 
best explained by modernisation and the resultant social disorganisation,105 whereas those in 
the coloured community were caused by the strain of their intermediate place in South 
 
105 Robert C Williamson ‘Crime in South Africa: Some Aspects of Causes and Treatment’ (1957) 48 Journal of 
Criminal Law Criminology & Police Science 2; GM Retief ‘Social Disorganisation Crime and the 
Urban Bantu People of South Africa’ in James Midgley, Jan H Steyn & Roland Graser (eds) Crime 
and Punishment in South Africa (1975) at 47–56. 
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African society,106 and those of the Asian community were caused by the inherent conflict 
between Asian and Western cultures.107 Understandably, such approaches — often 
ahistorical, based on rigid determinism and politically expedient differences between 
enforced group identitities — have become unpopular in the modern South African context.  
The result is that we are left with precious few theoretical tools to defensibly ask 
questions about why certain communities, places or times may differ in terms of their 
aggregate levels of crime. These questions, however, are the constant and inevitable subject 
of public debate. They form the background of even qualitative, deeply theoretical, explicitly 
anti-positivist descriptions of the South African condition. They also underpin attempts at 
crime prevention. People and policymakers will never stop asking why crime happens in the 
ways, places, and times that it does. This task, however difficult, cannot be abandoned. Not 
everyone need take it on, but someone certainly does. That those of more theoretical, 
thoughtful, nuanced persuasion should treat it with disdain is indefensible. A criminology that 
cannot say anything of value in terms of structural aetiology is a poor one. 
 
Quantitative criminology 
A unifying theme in this dissertation is the question of whether and how we can know about 
the crime-related things we wish to know about. One key premise is that numbers can be a 
productive means of making sense of aggregate causal processes. The maxim, ‘if you can’t 
measure it, you can’t understand it,’ may take it too far, but few within a broadly 
positivist/empiricist paradigm would quibble with, ‘if you try to measure it, you may better 
understand it’.  
This is more than a matter of methodology. Numbers are never as objective, neutral, 
or complete as they seem, but rather socio-political and cultural artefacts that have 
transformed how we think about social problems.108 This hasn’t always offered an 
uncomplicated or uncontentious improvement. Understanding causation requires that we 
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compare aspects of our world with other worlds to identify which are the differences that 
matter. For example, the assertion of a positive causal relationship between poverty and 
crime can be understood as an assertion that, all else being equal, a world with less poverty 
would be a world with less crime.   
These counterfactuals may be imaginary. The wonder of quantification, however, is 
that it makes the world divisible into parts, which can then be compared with each other. The 
more tightly constrained the means by which this is done, the greater confidence there can be 
that you have indeed held all else equal and identified the relevant differences. This is known 
as external validity. It is why double-blind, randomised, placebo-controlled trials are so 
favoured in the development of knowledge about medicine and the human body. 
Experimental methods may stamp a sense of uncertainty onto causal mechanisms and 
processes we still do not really understand.109 They may well fail to capture exactly the 
counterfactual worlds that we would like, especially in the context of complex human 
societies over time.110  
But, to return to the example, it is only in somehow measuring both poverty and crime 
that we can observe their variation and come to such conclusions as that places and times 
with more poverty are, on average, likely to have significantly less crime. Quantitative 
measurement makes it possible to move from broad impressions to specific descriptions of 
differences. If two things do not vary together in some systematic way, if there is no 
observable (positive or negative) correlation, there can be no reasonable inference of 
causation.  
This dissertation takes up the idea of an aetiological crisis in South African 
criminology by considering the question of how to measure crime — of whether and how we 
can say with reasonable confidence that one time or place has more crime than another. There 
will be a great deal more discussion of this. Suffice to note here that the statistics collected by 
the state apparatuses that respond to crime are the typical instrument of aggregate crime 
prevalence measurement, to the point where they can be said to have given birth to the 
discipline. Their use is controversial. They risk turning diverse, messy human experiences 
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into abstract numbers, but can also do the opposite — turn the abstract and uncertain into 
something that seems certain and personal and real.111 Crime statistics are data. Putting them 
to use in the development of knowledge requires taking coherent account of their 
uncertainties and ambiguities. 
Some South African scholars have suggested that there is little use in attempting to 
understand or even so much as describe patterns or trends in crime, and that it would be more 
productive ‘simply to accept that, however we look at it, levels of crime in the new, 
democratic South Africa remain stubbornly and unacceptably high’.112 Others make this point 
more implicitly, by deflecting from any discussion of trends or patterns (especially declines) 
onto the assertion that levels are (still) very high.113 This dissertation takes the position that 
such approaches both indicate the extent of and perpetuate the aetiological crisis in post-
Apartheid South African criminology. Recorded patterns and trends in aggregate crime 
prevalence deserve and require close analysis. 
 
Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has established the place and state of debates about the post-Apartheid South 
African discipline of criminology’s crisis of structural explanation. Among the many 
approaches to scholarly thinking about crime, the question of why crime happens is just one 
— but, arguably, first. So, it is called here primary criminology. It emerges from a positivist 
or empiricist paradigm, which assumes that at least some criminal behaviours are 
meaningfully distinguishable from non-criminal behaviours and that these differences may 
follow observable patterns. Knowledge about these patterns, borne of systematic empirical 
observation, can generate knowledge about the causation of crime. 
A very few scholars have suggested that contemporary South African criminology 
may not be doing particularly well at this task. This problem does not appear to have been of 
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much interest to others. To the extent that it has been engaged, this has been on normative 
and conceptual terms. It has been suggested that the hesitation to seek to explain crime is a 
feature of denialism and/or disillusionment around the severity of the country’s crime 
problem, the demands of post-Apartheid criminal justice system reform, and the fraught 
political and racial context. The solutions thus far proposed relate to theoretical paradigm and 
unit of analysis. It has been suggested that individual perpetrator narratives must be located 
within detailed historical context or that criminal violence must be understood as just one 
aspect of a system of violence that is trans-historical, cultural, and structural. 
As justified in this chapter, the approach taken in this dissertation is different. Its 
terrain is not the normative, but the empirical. Rather than frame the aetiological crisis within 
debates about what criminology is for, it takes seriously the nature and logical requirements 
of the structural aetiological question. This requires investigation of what it is that a macro-
level causal theory should be able to do. Primary, structural inquiry seeks to establish 
possible causal relationships between aggregate conditions and crime in the aggregate. It can 
do so only by means of systematic empirical investigation. As discussed in the chapter that 
follows, this requires satisfactory resolution of the tension between the importance and 





Chapter three: A meta-theoretical dilemma 
This chapter draws from the philosophy of social science to demonstrate that the aetiological 
crisis is a fundamental and empirical one. It proposes that causal theories can be usefully 
differentiated on the bases of their: precision and logical consistency, parsimony and scope, 
testability and empirical validity, and practical or policy implications. This conceptual mode 
of inquiry yields a vocabulary, a set of metrics, and heuristic tools to give structure to 
Chapters three and four’s systematic accounts of the discipline’s approaches to aetiology. The 
present chapter develops a loose typology of four explanatory strategies, defined by 
approaches to scope of explanandum and parsimony of explanans.  
The core argument is that, on a meta-theoretical level, a key prerequisite of the 
productivity of any causal theory is testability — or a means of telling, subjecting it to 
meaningful empirical scrutiny. It is only in raising a simple and general premise beyond 
platitude that South African criminology’s crisis of explanation can be understood and 
addressed. The evaluation, and therefore development and refinement, of structural 
criminological explanation requires the ability to make defensible and testable claims about 
aggregate crime prevalence patterns and trends.  
This poses a serious problem, because crime prevalence patterns and trends are in fact 
very difficult, if not impossible, to know and describe with any confidence, even in the best 
of circumstances. This dilemma of crime prevalence measurement is in some respects 
inherent to the task of primary criminology and therefore foundational to the aetiological 
crisis. The theoretical and practical tools required for crime prevalence measurement are far 
from trivial. They require contending with the challenges of both the ontology (or 
‘thingness’) and epistemology (or ‘knowability’) of crime. The standard tool of the testing of 
macro-criminology, the official crime statistic, is incomparably useful in giving account of 
aggregate levels of crime. Unfortunately, as this chapter describes, it is also deeply fraught 
with uncertainties, distortions, and potential misunderstanding. 
The dilemma of crime prevalence measurement speaks to the construction and 
meaning of causal explanation in the social sciences, the ways in which a discipline develops 
knowledge, the relationship between the theoretical and the empirical, and the unstable 
conceptual foundations of the discipline of criminology. The intrinsic tension it represents 
has no prospect of universally satisfactory resolution, but this chapter proposes that it is only 




The case for empirical testability in primary criminology 
It is often said that there are ‘too many’ theories in criminology, that these rather impede than 
release intellectual and practical progress, and that the effect has been ‘a million modest little 
studies that produce a million tiny conflicting results,’ rather than an accumulation of 
coherent knowledge about the causes of crime.114 Although many agree on the need to 
abandon lines of theoretical inquiry that have proven to be unproductive and to work to refine 
or combine those insights that have withstood scrutiny, the discipline lacks any firm rules as 
to how those assessments should be made — and ‘no committee of criminologists has yet to 
be appointed with the mandate and power to render binding judgments on which theories 
should live and which should die!’115 
Because of its usually ‘implicit and vague explanatory standards, its largely verbal 
mode of theorizing, and its highly complex object of study,’ social theory is particularly 
susceptible to the more general ‘illusion of depth of understanding: we tend to overestimate 
the detail, coherence, and depth of our understanding’.116 This can make it difficult to 
determine whether any particular theory is satisfactory to whatever standard we may hope to 
hold it. A significant proportion of peer theoretical evaluations may derive from matters of 
taste, akin to artistic judgements.117 Political sentiments and background assumptions 
certainly often play a large role.118 What convinces one reader may not convince another. 
Even when explaining the same phenomenon, some theories may be concerned with 
proximal, contemporary factors, while others focus on distal, developmental ones. The result 
is that even explicitly causal theories may often not be competing but complementary. This 
does not mean that all should enjoy equal scholarly esteem. Moreover, some theories do in 
fact make competing, mutually inconsistent claims about similar variables. This raises the 
 
114 Thomas J Bernard & Jeffrey B Snipes ‘Theoretical Integration in Criminology’ (1996) 20 Crime and Justice 
at 302. 
115 Francis T Cullen, John Paul Wright & Kristie R Blevins ‘Taking Stock of Criminological Theory’ in Francis 
T Cullen, John Paul Wright & Kristie R Blevins (eds) Taking Stock: The Status of Criminological 
Thought (2008) at 2. 
116 Hedström & Ylikoski op cit note 93. 
117 Marvin E Wolfgang, Robert M Fig & Terence P Thornberry Evaluating Criminology (1978) at 7. 
118 Cullen, Wright & Blevins op cit note 115 at 8. 
39 
 
question of how to adjudicate between different theories — how do we know whether a 
theory is any good, or at least any better than another? 
Within the positivist/empiricist paradigm, a theory is a statement that explains the 
relationship between two or more observable phenomena. Few (if any) of the standard 
primary criminological theories meet the exacting criteria proposed by various classic 
scholars for a social science definition of theory — for example, that they comprise a clearly 
defined descriptive conceptual scheme to label phenomena, a set of propositions about the 
relationship between two or more variables, that they are falsifiable, and that they provide 
grounds for prediction.119 Yet those causal theories that have stood the test of time do tend to 
be reducible to sets of logically interrelated propositions — known as the explanans — about 
the relationships between variables, where the variable to be explained — the dependent 
variable or explanandum — is some aspect of ‘crime’, however that may be defined and 
delimited. To explain something ‘is to provide information that justifies the claim that the 
explanans explains the explanandum’.120 To put it another way, the explanation is what 
makes the explanandum expected.  
The variables have been described as the bricks and the propositions as the mortar that 
holds a theory together.121 The domain of this type of theory is relationships, and a list of 
purportedly correlated variables no more constitutes a theory than a stack of bricks forms a 
building.122 Moreover, naming is not explaining. Simply labelling a given phenomenon ‘as an 
instance of a particular category without providing an explanation of why the phenomenon 
occurred’ is a form of circular argumentation.123 A causal theory requires a theoretical 
rationale — a proposed explanation — for the relationship between certain variables.124 This 
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relationship must be in some sense causal, whether strictly and implying hard determinism, or 
probabilistically and implying a type of soft determinism.  
There are various common-sense accounts of how to tell a ‘good’ theory from a ‘bad’ 
one. See the following example. 
 
A good theory is abstract. It’s logically consistent. It’s simple, has a broad 
scope, and it doesn’t take you in circles. It’s testable and empirically valid. Good 
theories generate good hypotheses, and with good data we may be in a position to better 
understand a particular phenomenon.125 
 
This chapter proposes that theories can be usefully differentiated on the basis of their 
precision and logical consistency, parsimony and scope, practical implications, empirical 
validity, and testability.126 These criteria are not beyond dispute and they are certainly not a 
simple checklist. Their thresholds remain subjective. They do, however, point to some of the 
typical components of theoretical evaluation within a broadly positivist paradigm. These may 
be said to lie with either internal or external measures.127  
 
Internal evaluation: logical precision and coherence, parsimony and scope 
First, to be analytically useful, theory at the very least requires relatively coherent exposition. 
It is useful only to the extent that its concepts, assumptions, and arguments can be deduced. 
This makes it possible to determine whether its propositions are logically stated and 
internally consistent. There is limited value, for example, to an explanation that relies on 
circular reasoning (for example, ‘Crime is caused by a lack of empathy; lack of empathy is 
evidenced by the commission of crime.’), in which the criminal behaviour ostensibly being 
explained precedes in time its proposed cause (for example, ‘Crime rates rose in the 
industrialised world during the 1960s because of the proliferation of the Internet.’), or in 
which no even superficially plausible mechanism can be proposed to account for the 
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relationship between the two factors (‘Crime rates rise when Mars is in retrograde, for 
reasons I decline to specify.’).  
Precise formulation also makes it possible to determine a theory’s primary level of 
explanation. As discussed in the previous chapter, the question of why individuals commit 
crime is distinct from that of why certain places or times differ in terms of their aggregate 
levels of crime. Coleman diagrams can help clarify the logical structure of theories with 
macro-level components. They can also help reveal what each predicts in specific 
circumstances, whether this is different from what is predicted by competing theories, and 
what kinds of observations may be expected to contradict it, a concern we will return to in the 
discussion of external components of evaluation below.  
Loosely related to the question of level of explanation are the interrelated matters of 
scope and parsimony, which refer to the range of phenomena ostensibly being explained and 
to the range of factors or mechanisms proposed to account for them.128 Theories differ in how 
inclusive or exclusive they are in their proposed explanatory factors (the comprehensiveness 
of the explanans) and the scope of the set of phenomena being explained (the specificity or 
generality of the explanandum).129 Self-control theories, for example, propose to explain all 
deviant (but not necessarily illegal) acts by means of this one concept. This neatness may 
account for their enduring popularity.130 Other theories may seek to explain only property 
crime, or only the age-structure of crime, only violence against women, and so on. I propose 
a loose typology of four explanatory strategies, defined by approaches to scope (how general 
or particular a range of crime phenomena each has taken as explanandum) and parsimony 
(how inclusive or exclusive each has been in its selection of explanans), as shown on the 
following diagram graph.  
 
128 Akers op cit note 85 at 7. 
129 Hedström & Udehn op cit note 120 at 29. 
130 Tibbetts op cit note 126 at 7. 
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Figure 3 Model explanatory strategies by scope and parsimony 
 
A theory that seeks to account for a very narrow range of cases or phenomena by 
means of a lengthy and complex set of propositions is limited in both scope and parsimony. 
In the traditional philosophy of science, it would be considered inferior to a theory that can 
explain a broad range of phenomena with relatively few terms and statements. Yet there may 
be value in each of these explanatory approaches. 
There are trade-offs to be made. The social world isn’t necessarily simple or regular, 
so parsimony comes at the expense of comprehensiveness and generality comes at the 
expense of specificity. Theories on the highest level of generality — on the level of the great 
‘isms’, such as historical materialism — may help make sense of large swathes of social 
phenomena but prove poor tools for developing clear hypotheses and predicting outcomes in 
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a specific case of interest.131 The quest for generality poses the risk of explaining everything 
but predicting nothing.132 On the other hand, theories that seek to provide a comprehensive 
account of causal influences for a very particular and narrowly-defined phenomenon may be 
of limited use in explaining other cases. A long and complex set of proposed causal 
influences can also make it difficult to determine what empirical outcome is expected under 
particular circumstances. 
Again, this four-fold typology is inevitably a simplification. Most of the established 
Anglo-American criminological theories are what Merton might approvingly describe as 
theories of the middle range; they are neither grand, all-encompassing accounts of social 
systems or behaviours, nor simply the abundant, day-to-day working hypotheses of research 
on particular cases, but isolations of a few explanatory factors to explain ‘important but 
delimited aspects of the outcome to be explained’.133 They are statements about how some 
selection of factors may influence some selection of crime phenomena.134  
Typical examples are seen in the variants of strain, control, and social disorganisation 
theories. The causal factors they propose are not as neat and singular as the one or two 
macro-level variables seen in the second and third explanatory types (such as economic 
inequality, firearm policies, or the prevalence of a single cultural norm), but a somewhat 
broader cluster or composite of theoretically related variables. Their explanatory scope tends 
to be broader than a single crime type, a handful of pepetrators’ behaviours, or the nature of 
crime at a particular moment in time and/or space, but also narrower than the overall 
prevalence and distribution of all crime everywhere or in an entire country.  
A final note on parsimony is instructive: 
An often-overlooked aspect of parsimony is that it refers to the total number of 
theoretical propositions that are required to explain a given finding rather than the 
number of propositions of what might be considered the core of the relevant theory... 
The criterion of parsimony refers to the conjunction of a theory and the background 
assumptions that are needed to explain an empirical finding, not to the theory alone. … 
Thus, when evaluating theories on the basis of their parsimony, it does not suffice to 
 
131 Bennett op cit note 45 at 467. 
132 Gawronski & Bodenhausen op cit note 123 at 14. 
133 Hedström & Udehn op cit note 120.  
134 Decker op cit note 121. 
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count the number of propositions that may be regarded as the core of a given theory…, 
but the entire set of propositions that is required to capture a given finding.135  
 
This is a critical element in the evaluation of theories of crime causation in South 
Africa. Some of the popular explanatory approaches are appealing in their apparent 
parsimony and broad scope, but in fact rely on several important background assumptions. 
These assumptions relate particularly to the ways in which theory can be subjected to external 
evaluation. 
 
External evaluation: testability, empirical status, and policy usefulness 
Theoretical comparison based on logical consistency, parsimony and scope, and by means of 
a clear account of levels of analysis, form part of the first mode of theoretical evaluation, 
which is to judge an explanatory model on its own terms, on the basis of its internal logic. 
Some argue that this is the most, or indeed only valid mode of critique, since there is no way 
to access or interpret ‘reality’ other than as determined by theoretical perspective, and 
therefore that to subject a theory to external measures is simply to arbitrarily privilege other 
implicit theories.136  
But within the naturalistic frame of reference, in which theories are assertions about 
the relationship between observable phenomena, a fundamental feature of the theoretical 
endeavour is its connection with systematic observation. Those of even the most circumspect 
positivist or realist inclination would likely agree that what sets criminological explanations 
apart from others (such as journalistic, philosophical, legal, or religious approaches) is their 
claim to be empirically grounded.137 Debates in the philosophy of science on the question of 
how to distinguish between scientific and non-scientific statements (known as the 
demarcation problem), have commonly suggested that it is this — a basis in empirical 
 
135 Gawronski & Bodenhausen op cit note 123. 
136 See for example Bruce DiCristina ‘Durkheim’s Theory of Homicide and the Confusion of the Empirical 
Literature’ (2004) 8 Theoretical Criminology 1; David Garland ‘Durkheim’s Theory of Punishment: 
A Critique’ in David Garland & Peter Young (eds) The Power to Punish: Contemporary Penality and 
Social Analysis (1983). 
137 Tibbetts op cit note 126 at 2. 
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observation — that makes a theory ‘scientific’.138 To claim weight in the field of criminology 
is to lay claim on systematic empirical observation, rather than other possible principles of 
reasoning.  
The classic scientific theoretical feedback loop may begin with general theory and 
proceed to the testing and confirmation of hypotheses in particular cases (the deductive 
approach), or begin with specific observation and proceed to the formulation of general 
theory (the inductive approach). Causal theories often derive from attempts at ad hoc 
explanation of specific observed or perceived crime phenomena, which explanations are then 
developed into statements of specific logical expectations (hypotheses), to be applied and 
tested in other circumstances, in order to evaluate and revise the original explanations.139  
Such a process may in practice unfold imperfectly or not at all. It may be produced by 
those with however much disdain for scientism and acknowledgement of the degree to which 
observation is produced by theory and laden with researcher subjectivity. Yet what makes an 
explanation for crime distinctively ‘criminological’ is that it derives not just from principle or 
from the account of a single case, but makes use of somehow organised and systematic 
methods of observation and the evaluation of evidence, while engaging with the existing 
body of knowledge and debates on the subject at hand.140 Thus the second mode of 
theoretical evaluation reasonably moves beyond logic to consider data. 
This requires that a theory be in some way empirically accessible or testable, however 
indirectly. A given theory may not be satisfactorily testable at the moment of its 
development. Testability can change over time, for example as methods develop. But it is 
unclear what value there is to an empirical claim that cannot conceivably be submitted to 
empirical scrutiny and a good faith attempt to find an observation that confirms it — or, 
much better, contradicts it.  
A traditional criterion of a scientific theory is that it must be subject to falsification. 
According to this view, the objective of experiment (systematic observation) is to create 
situations in which a theory can be falsified. A theory is thus never confirmed — it merely 
 
138 Gawronski & Bodenhausen op cit note 123 at 4. 
139 Tittle op cit note 42 at 4. 
140 Dixon The Aetiological Crisis op cit note 23 at 3. 
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escapes falsification.141 This is enduringly controversial in thinking about social sciences, 
including criminology.142 It is widely accepted in the testing of specific hypotheses, but 
seldom applied in the evaluation of theories overall. 
Indeed, seldom can or do the results of empirical tests lead to the definitive proof or 
disproof of any social theory. Some theoretical propositions, even ostensibly causal ones, 
may be on such a high level of abstraction that they cannot meaningfully be reduced to 
concrete hypotheses about the relationships between measurable variables.143 More often, the 
difficulty is that theories consist of many parts, their abstract principles may defensibly yield 
many different specific hypotheses, their concepts operationalised through many possible 
variables, and their claims adjudicated through various methodologies. Empirical anomalies 
may be due to flaws in any number of these auxiliary assumptions, such as in instruments of 
observation, rather than in the theory’s ‘hard core’, essential propositions.144 Moreover, 
theoretical approaches often give rise to rich arrays of arguments and ideas, such that failures 
of empirical corroboration result not in ruin but simply in minor, cumulative adjustments.145 
Theories are more prone to evolution than rejection. 
Still, whatever one’s position on the traditional scientific principle of falsifiability, it 
seems reasonable to propose that empirical assessment should play some part in determining 
which of the ‘virtual embarrassment of riches’ in criminological theories are better than 
others.146 A criminological theory that does not give rise to any testable hypotheses, has been 
able to produce little or no positive evidence to support it, or has received substantial negative 
evidence across a range of methodologies, should rightly occupy relatively low regard in the 
community of scholars.147 
 
141 Jeffrey W Lucas ‘Theory-Testing Generalization and the Problem of External Validity’ (2003) 21 
Sociological Theory 3 at 247. 
142 Bernard & Snipes op cit note 114. 
143 Tittle op cit note 42 at 3. 
144 Bennett op cit note 45 at 464. 
145 Tittle op cit note 42. 
146 Travis C Pratt ‘Theory Testing in Criminology’ in The Handbook of Criminological Theory (ed) Alex R 
Piquero (2016) 37. 
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Here the internal and external domains of theoretical evaluation come together to a 
simple but important logical point. We have established that theories can be usefully 
differentiated based on their level of explanation and that those that operate at a macro-level 
take as explanandum some aspect of crime in the aggregate. This means that they must at the 
very least find defensible empirical purchase on whatever their proposed aggregate-level 
explanans and their explanandum of aggregate levels of crime. This explanandum need not be 
strictly quantitative. Some qualitative account of aggregate levels, trends, or patterns of crime 
prevalence may suffice. It may be broad and tentative. Operationalising any reasonably 
complex social phenomenon requires some compromise.  
However, some take on patterns and/or trends in crime prevalence is an essential 
component of theoretical testing and therefore of the credence with which a causal 
criminological theory should be treated. To use a slightly different parlance, there is limited 
value in a theory that has no conceivably coherent account of its dependent variable.  
Empirical assessment requires the ability to divide the matter of ‘crime’ into 
analytically useful parts, to examine its distribution and trends. Obvious questions are why 
some areas consistently show more of certain crimes than others, why certain demographics 
seem to experience different crime patterns wherever they are, why different areas may have 
taken different crime trajectories, why some crimes seem to have risen or declined 
nationwide, and so on. These are important components of a structural understanding of 
crime. That this point should warrant such explicit exposition would astonish natural 
scientists and even puzzle most social scientists. As we shall see in the next part of this 
chapter, however, it poses a serious challenge to macro-criminology. 
The final mode of theoretical evaluation expands judgement to the normative field 
and to the question of whether and how theoretical insights can be useful in guiding action, 
whether on the part of the state or others. This touches on that enduring debate within the 
discipline, which is the question of its purpose — of what or who criminology is for.148 An 
interest in why people engage in certain criminal behaviours need not imply a commitment to 
eliminating or reducing those behaviours, especially not at the hands of the state. 
Criminological theories are arguably more often used to legitimate than guide policy 
 
148 See for example Dixon The Aetiological Crisis op cit note 23; Henkeman op cit note 75. 
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action.149 Still, few aphorisms have been repeated more often than the claim that there is 
nothing as practical as a good theory. Theories may not only expand knowledge for its own 
sake but point to leverage points for effective interventions.150 Albeit to the chagrin of some, 
there has historically been a close alignment between the academic discipline of criminology 
and the state project of crime control or reduction. There is an immediate policy-relevance of 
criminological explanation, such that translation into policy can reasonably be considered a 
criterion of criminological aetiology. 
The first part of this theoretical chapter has argued that primary criminological 
explanations can be usefully differentiated on the extent to which they are logically 
consistent, are coherent in their grasp of levels of explanation, provide a reasonable balance 
between parsimony of explanans and scope of explanandum, can produce testable 
predictions, are shown to have some empirical support, and can give rise to useful policy 
implications. It has also produced a loose typology of four explanatory approaches (defined 
by generality and parsimony). These criteria all echo throughout the dissertation. 
The most important argument so far, however, is that causal theories can reasonably 
be evaluated based on their testability. There is little value to an explanation that offers no 
means of subjecting it to meaningful empirical scrutiny. Given that we are concerned here 
with structural criminological explanation, this logically entails the ability to make defensible 
and testable claims about aggregate crime prevalence patterns and trends.  
 
The challenges of macro-criminological testability 
This second part of this chapter places the problem of crime prevalence in the context of both 
the ontology (or ‘thingness’) and epistemology (or ‘knowability’) of crime. It argues that 
crime prevalence patterns and trends are in fact very difficult, if not impossible, to know and 
describe with any confidence, even in the best of circumstances. As the chapter that follows 
this will demonstrate, the South African case presents far from the best of circumstances.  
 
 
149 Rob Canton & Joe Yates ‘Applied Criminology’ in B Stout, J Yates & B Williams (eds) Applied 
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The ontology of crime, or whether ‘crime’ is a ‘thing’ 
The first inherent challenge of crime prevalence measurement is the matter of ontology. 
Ontology refers to the study of being or existence. Among other things, it asks the question, 
‘What is a thing?’ In this context, it asks whether crime is a ‘thing’ and whether there is a 
meaningful distinction between ‘crime’ and ‘not crime’. In other words, it asks whether there 
is logical validity to ‘crime’ as a category. Attempts to measure or explain crime must to 
some extent assume that this is so. But the matter of whether and how ‘crime’ can be 
defensibly theorised and delineated is not so simple.  
A superficial approach to such a distinction is to define crime as conduct proscribed 
by law and liable to attract punishment.151 So one may say that ‘crime’ is simply that which 
the geographically and legally relevant authority deems as such in its criminal law. There are 
many reasons why this may not satisfy for the purposes of causal inquiry. Most fundamental 
is the problem that the core element of ‘crime’ is not intrinsic to an event; it is necessarily a 
product of both behaviour and rules.  
Whereas most lawyers ‘will tend, on the basis of their judicial fictions, to regard 
criminal law as a function of deviant behavior,’152 the criminologist’s inevitable rejoinder is 
that deviant behaviour is a function of the content and application of criminal law. A 
categorical and objective dichotomy between ‘criminal’ and ‘non-criminal’ is a judicial 
fiction which is neither logically nor empirically tenable. Those who become known as 
criminals may reasonably be said to have only two things in common:  
a) They (are supposed to) have committed deviant behavior of a kind that 
happens to be punishable by penal law in their particular society at that 
time; 
b) They have been caught and convicted because of a long chain of partly 
random, partly selection decisions on the side of police, prosecutors and 
judges.153  
This ontological contingency translates into epistemological obscurity. The meaning 
and existence, and therefore inescapably the measure, of ‘crime’ or ‘the criminal’ are socially 
 
151 Canton & Yates op cit note 149 at 4. 
152 Catharina Irma Dessaur Foundations of Theory-Formation in Criminology: A Methodological Analysis 
(1972) at 14. 
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constructed.154 There is no rule-breaking without relevant rules, and no relevance to rules 
without actual or potential rule-breaking. To measure crime is therefore to grasp features of 
both actor and reactor. As with other social statistics, there can exist no ‘real’ crime rate, 
independent of social reaction.155 As crime ‘problems’ take on social and institutional 
prominence, they inevitably grow or recede in the ways we could measure them.156 In Kenya, 
for example, offences involving tourists — which is to say, predominantly offences against 
tourists — are a distinct category in national police-recorded crime statistics.157 This isolation 
of alleged human behaviours has been identified as a distinct crime problem, likely through 
some combination of a handful of high-profile cases and administrative inertia. South Africa 
has no such crime type on its systems and therefore has no existing statistics to offer in 
comparison. Another local example is seen in recent debates about whether farm murders are 
a distinct phenomenon deserving of quantification and strategic prioritisation. Attempts to 
theorise the ontological reality of crime are time-worn but indefinitely ongoing.158 
A related concern with a legalistic definition of crime is that law as codified by the 
state may represent not a society’s moral consensus or the ‘objectively’ most harmful 
activities, but the culmination of the interests of the powerful. Failure to problematise the 
origin and socio-political functions of criminal law may be not only ideologically 
unacceptable but to misunderstand the phenomenon entirely. The South African historical 
case makes this particularly clear. To apply the scientific method to exploring the causation 
of violation of the Apartheid Natives (Urban Areas) Act, without reflecting on the political 
nature and fundamental injustice of such legislation, presents an absurdity. The delineation 
and categorisation of crime is a product of what is valued by the powerful within a society. 
With some exceptions, such as in the prosecution of organised crime, crime can refer only to 
the intentional behaviour of individuals. This may serve to erase larger-scale, collective 
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wrongs. The lens of crime falls short of grasping long-term, state-approved, structural 
violence against black people during colonial and Apartheid rule.159 
A dichotomous, legalistic definition of ‘crime’ presents logical and practical 
difficulties for comparison. In both their letter and their application, laws vary between 
contexts and change over time. What is ‘crime’ in one place and time is ‘not crime’ in 
another. For example, the fact that Swedish statistics on the number of rapes known to the 
police are three times the European average has been largely ascribed to differences in law 
and institutional counting rules.160 An act which is criminal today may be non-criminal 
tomorrow; one which is criminal here may be non-criminal a kilometre away; it may readily 
be designated as criminal if conducted by one individual but less so by another. As example, 
what happens on the rugby field every weekend would earn serious legal penalty in the 
parking lot. The problem of legal fluidity over time is particularly acute in the South African 
case, with its widescale legal reforms over the last century. So is the problem of the unequal 
application of the law.  
A final problem with the ontology — or ‘thingness’ — of crime is that the boundaries 
of criminal law are broad. They may be so broad that the conduct they encompass is too 
diverse to have much in common in terms of causation. A violent assault borne out of strong 
momentary emotion may be only trivially related to a systematic conspiracy to commit tax 
evasion. The causal process proposed for sexual assault will likely be very different to that 
proposed for online media piracy. Whatever self-control and rational choice theorists may 
suggest, these differences may be such that it makes little sense to group these activities into 
an analytical category at all.161  
Even superficial observation suggests that all crimes are not alike in prevalence trend. 
Officially recorded national police statistics show entirely different trends for different crime 
types. For example, the following graph shows that during the same period that recorded 
vehicle theft declined by about two-thirds, recorded aggravated robbery fluctuated, while 
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recorded drug-related crime rose over five-fold (with a sharp decline to 2018/19 as a result of 
the change in the legal status of cannabis). 
 
Figure 4 RSA recorded national rates per 100 000 of vehicle theft, aggravated robbery, 
and drug-related crimes 
 
Source: Data from South African Police Service and Statistics South Africa.162 
Taking these figures at face value, it would be absurd to attempt simultaneous 
description or analysis of trends or patterns in these three crime types alone, to say nothing of 
the 20-odd others on which the South African Police Service regularly releases statistics. 
Popular crime talk seldom concerns itself with such distinctions. News reports routinely 
make such claims as that ‘crime in South Africa is at an all-time high’,163 with no hint that 
recorded vehicle theft rates are at their lowest point in at least 24 years (indeed, despite the 
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total number of officially recorded crime incidents being at their lowest point in at least a 
decade). 
Less forgivably, the post-Apartheid South African discipline of criminology has done 
little better. It is common to read of high or rising levels of crime without any hint that there 
may be disparate patterns or trends within that broad, over-arching category, which is in fact 
a matter of numerous precise and evolving legal distinctions. Police agencies draw these 
distinctions very differently in different countries. Causal theories that are crime generic, 
‘attributing changes in crime to changes in the number or motivation of offenders…are 
unable to adequately account for the trajectories of specific crime types’ that may well go 
against the trend.164 
Many of the ontological ambiguities introduced above translate into epistemological 
ones. That which is indeterminate cannot but be indeterminable. ‘Crime’ is only and entirely 
that which is officially so designated in a given context. This goes well beyond semantic 
circularity. Any purported measure of crime prevalence is also inevitably a measure of the 
underlying social, cultural, and legal structures that create it.165 There is no conceptual 
distinction between, and therefore no way to practically distinguish between, that information 
which is a feature of ‘crime’ and that which is a feature of the institutions that constitute the 
meaning and measure of ‘crime’.  
This has major implications for analysis that seeks empirical purchase on the 
prevalence of crime. Observed patterns and trends in officially recorded crime prevalence 
may primarily reflect differences in those official institutions, especially where the penal law 
prohibits behaviour that is very widespread. In contexts in which penal law is used to enforce 
partisan ideological norms, they can reveal little more than what kinds of behaviour or people 
adherents of that ideology aim to eliminate166 — or, even, what they wish to be seen acting 
against. The epistemological problems with crime go even deeper.  
 
 
164 Aiden Sidebottom et al. ‘The East Asian Crime Drop?’ (2018) 7 Crime Science 6 at 2. 




The epistemology of crime, or whether crime is knowable 
The second inherent challenge of crime prevalence measurement is the matter of 
epistemology. Epistemology refers to the study of knowledge. It asks the question, ‘How do 
we know?’ In this context, it asks whether crime prevalence can be meaningfully discerned or 
figured out. In other words, it asks whether statements about crime prevalence can 
conceivably be logically justified as ‘true’, rather than guess or opinion. Again, attempts to 
explain crime must to some extent assume that this is so. But the matter of how ‘crime’ can 
be defensibly determined empirically or quantified is also not so simple.  
One core difficulty with gaining empirical purchase on ‘crime’ is that it constitutes 
not a corporeal item or easily observed natural phenomenon, but a certain subset of human 
behaviour during a particular moment. It is a (largely decentralised and unorganised) activity 
that may be fleeting, may leave little obvious physical trace, and may well be subject to 
intentional subterfuge. It is not a matter of a tree falling in the forest with none around to 
hear, but of a tree quietly felled and removed in the dead of night in a forest of continually 
varying size and location, by a person with a strong incentive to prevent the event or their 
involvement from coming to light.  
It has been empirically well-established that ‘there is a tremendous amount of 
undetected criminality among otherwise respectable citizens’.167 Crime tends not to be a 
socially-acceptable behaviour that happens in plain sight. This makes direct observation 
difficult. A fieldworker with a clipboard is unlikely to observe a reasonably-representative 
sample of the crimes that occur on their assigned street block, regardless of how long they 
may sit on the corner. As with research on human sexuality, there is also reason to take a 
great deal of care in interpreting the data provided by direct participants, as well as popular 
estimations. 
Research has shown that public perceptions of crime prevalence are often entirely 
inconsistent with other, more systematic measures.168 Without the application of rigorous 
theory, method, and scepticism, scholars are no less subject to the various social and 
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cognitive biases that lead laypeople to over- or under-estimate the absolute and relative 
frequency of events or sizes of groups by factors of ten or more.169 
Expansive, impressionistic accounts of the magnitude, nature, or patterns in crime 
should therefore be met with scepticism. The explanations they yield are also fated to be 
equally expansive and impressionistic. Such accounts have their place in new, exploratory 
areas of research. But it would be surprising indeed if there could be any single coherent 
account for the absolute and relative levels, the trends over time, the precise nature, and the 
distribution of any complex human behaviour. ‘Any crime’ is simply not the same thing as 
‘lots of crime’, ‘more crime than in another place’, ‘rising crime’, ‘a shift from one kind of 
crime to another’, and so on. It is only in being quite clear in what requires explanation, 
describing it in detail, dividing it into potentially useful parts, comparing it between different 
times and places, that ‘crime’ becomes analytically accessible. 
This need not be strictly quantitative. It is both a loss and an error to reduce the 
‘richness, vitality and excitement of the subject [of crime]…to a series of dry numerical 
calculations that manufacture a spurious precision’.170 A great deal of quantitative 
criminology is rightly accused of making a fetish of numbers, as substitute for theoretical and 
conceptual clarity.171  
Yet, since the late eighteenth century in Europe and America, the categorisation and 
enumeration of people, places, and phenomena has become a tool of governance and 
science.172 Quantifying and statistically describing deviance of various kinds helped unlock 
them from frameworks based on assumption about human nature or the supernatural,173 into 
ones based on scientific principles.174 Quantitative measures allow for unrivalled clarity and 
detail in the definition and description of variables. This makes them strong contenders for 
useful causal analysis. Structural criminology, with its interest in the prevalence of crime in 
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the aggregate, makes use of two key quantitative tools: victimisation surveys and official, 
police-recorded crime statistics. Both are interesting in what they reveal about the 
epistemology (or knowability) of crime. They show that not even the best methodologies can 
rid data on such a sensitive and complex subject as crime of ‘poorly behaved measurement 
errors’ that can easily lead to incorrect inferences.175 
 
Victimisation surveys 
One means of aggregate crime prevalence measurement is the use of a public survey which 
asks people about their experience either as perpetrators, or more commonly as victims, of 
crime. Victimisation surveys were developed in the US in the 1940s and further popularised 
in the UK in the 1980s as a means of gathering information directly from the victims of 
crime.176 Among other things, victimisation surveys typically ask people how many of 
various crime types they have experienced in a certain reference period. This makes their 
results a candidate for defensible claims about aggregate-level patterns and trends in crime 
prevalence. 
Victimisation surveys were conducted in South Africa before 1994, but tended to 
focus on small geographic areas, have small sample sizes, and massively overrepresent white 
respondents.177 This practice of victimisation surveys of particular communities or population 
segments has continued since 1994,178 although scholarly interest has waned. Surveys with 
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samples purporting to reflect the entire national population have also become increasingly 
regular and rigorous,179 to the point where Statistics South Africa now surveys 33 000 
households annually on a rolling basis.180 
The advantage of such survey measures is that they can help avoid some of the 
differences between and distortions introduced by criminal justice systems. Their greatest 
disadvantage is that they are labour-intensive and expensive, and even so will almost 
invariably be based on a sample rather than the whole population of interest. This makes 
them sensitive to a range of possible sampling errors.181 To get an accurate sense of the 
prevalence of rare crimes may require exceedingly large sample sizes.182 An additional 
difficulty with incorporating the victim survey data into interpretations of the police crime 
data is that their reference periods have only overlapped as of 2014. The victim survey also 
only interviews those over the age of 16, whereas younger children may well be victimised 
and report this to the police. 
Regardless, surveys must be understood to represent the crime situation as perceived, 
remembered, and retold under certain conditions by a sample of people of interest. This 
suggests numerous necessary caveats for their use. For one thing, the theorised explanandum 
of aggregate crime levels may correspond poorly with lay conceptions. Respondents are not 
legal scholars and have been demonstrated to hold definitions of ‘crime’ that are at odds with 
the letter of criminal law.183 In South Africa, this is seen most clearly in the apparent 
difficulty of getting respondents to grasp the distinction between residential burglary and 
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residential robbery.184 It has also been suggested that exposure to physical violence has 
become so common as to render more minor assaults too trivial to recount to fieldworkers.185 
Those who live in conditions of chronic insecurity may well find it difficult to give account 
of every relatively minor criminal incident.186  
Respondents’ memories may be unreliable for other reasons, especially around 
traumatic events. In a process known as ‘telescoping,’ it is common that victims remember an 
event as being more recent than it was.187 Such surveys are therefore often understood to 
result in major overestimations of the prevalence of some crimes.188 For other crimes or in 
other situations, survey measures of prevalence are understood to result in underestimation. 
People may be hesitant to talk about traumatic experiences (or their own offending) to a 
stranger or in a public place. On the other hand, surveys conducted within the home may 
make it difficult to disclose experiences of crime at the hands of family members or intimate 
partners. The complexity of emotional responses to and perceptions of sexual crimes make 
them particularly prone to under-reporting in typical crime prevalence surveys. 
The numerous possible distortions of survey measures of crime prevalence need not 
necessarily discount them as tools of aetiological testing. Taking measure of ‘crime 
prevalence’ by means of ‘voluntary recollection and disclosure of perceived crime 
experiences among a sample of the population’ requires only the subtlest and most defensible 
conceptual sleight-of-hand. Indeed, victimisation surveys are sadly underutilised in this role 
in South Africa. 
This is partly due to their fairly short history. The earliest victimisation survey with 
any even tentative claim to national representation was conducted in 1997. In the 20-odd 
years since then, they have passed through various institutional hands and been subject to 
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numerous methodological revisions. The sampling and the format of survey and questions 
have offered some minimal consistency only as of 2012, perhaps even 2016.189 This makes 
them a promising but as yet limited tool for describing crime prevalence trends over time.  
An additional constraint involves the practical challenge of their necessary scale. 
Statistics South Africa’s annual victims of crime survey is designed to produce accurate 
estimates primarily at the national level. It attempts accuracy to the provincial level but 
cannot do so for rarer crimes.190 The extent of unexplained year-on-year fluctuation in some 
of its provincial results suggests further caution.191 Disaggregation to the district level can be 
presented within reasonable error only for the most frequent of crimes, so most figures are 
presented on a geographic level only as small as the province.192 For rarer crimes, even the 
less populous provinces pose problems for sampling. This has the effect of stirring together 
the experiences of people living in the townships with those of middle-class suburban-
dwellers,193 blurring out important spatial and other variation. 
Clear, albeit occasional, errors in interpretation also bode ill for their rigour. For 
example, the statement that ‘more than half of households in South Africa experienced 
housebreaking/burglary,’194 radically misrepresents the survey’s result that about 4 per cent 
of households, or ‘more than half of those households in South Africa that experienced any 
crime, said that this crime has been housebreaking/burglary’. 
In short, South African victimisation surveys do not yet offer the means to defensibly 
track crime prevalence trends over a period even so long as a decade or on a scale even so 
large as a province. The sample survey methodology is poorly suited to give accurate 
measure of relatively rare events. These surveys are less often used to estimate crime levels 
and more often to corroborate patterns seen in other data and to obtain other information like 
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on reporting decisions and perceptions of the police.195 Divergence between survey data and 
official crime statistics is common and a fascinating subject of study in its own right.196 We 
will return to this below, to demonstrate the extent of the epistemological challenge presented 
by the use of official crime statistics. 
 
Official crime statistics 
Statistics on crimes known to the police have been collected from about the nineteenth 
century in Europe, and from about 1913 in South Africa.197 These figures offer some major 
advantages as a measure of crime prevalence. First, they represent not a sample of the 
population (as in a survey), but ostensibly the full population of those who reported a crime 
to the police. Another important advantage is that they are being collected by the police 
anyway in the course of their duties. But this is also their disadvantage. The crime counts 
recorded by the police are an administrative and law enforcement tool that prospective 
aetiologists can at best attempt to repurpose for measurement of crime.198 The case docket is 
an administrative and investigative tool, not designed for crime prevalence research.199 For 
example, it may only record the most serious crime in a given incident, or may list many 
victims in the same docket.200 But this is the least of it. 
As the very first, nineteenth century commentators already knew well (but as critical 
criminologists delight in periodic rediscovery),201 these statistics are inherently and 
tremendously flawed in their capacity to reflect the ‘truth’ about crime prevalence. In the 
words of Adolphe Quetelet, pioneer of the earliest analysis of French crime statistics, ‘our 
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observations can only refer to a certain number of known and tried offences, out of the 
unknown sum total of crimes committed’.202 This is the case everywhere. The problem is 
even more acute in developing countries, however, which often have uneven institutional 
presence and limited statistical capacity. Few developing countries have the statistical 
capacity to produce official police crime data of sufficient quality for much analysis.203 A 
small number of highly industrialised countries thus remain the focus of almost all 
criminological theory and analysis, especially quantitative.  
South Africa’s official police-recorded crime statistics have enjoyed considerably 
more use than victim survey data as a tool of aetiology. Even so, their analysis has been so 
limited that it could be said in 2010 that they had not been employed in empirical tests of 
such classic criminological theories as social disorganisation.204 The discipline has for 
various practical and ideological reasons been unable to put them to productive use. 
The general epistemological challenges involved are daunting. Crime statistics are the 
outcome of adjudication by a highly partisan institution with broad informal scope for 
discretion and strong interests in producing certain results. Police discretion in official 
recording practices, whether proper or improper, plays a major role.205 Evidence abounds that 
the socio-demographic profile of victim and suspected perpetrator are key determinants of the 
operation of that discretion.206  
The police are decidedly not independent parties with a theoretical interest in the 
epistemological validity of the crime figures they collect and disseminate. There has thus 
been concern about data manipulation from the very first.207 Police performance management 
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introduces incentives for data manipulation at every level.208 The police are mandated to 
prevent crime, which in effect means that they are required to reduce the number of crimes 
recorded in their jurisdiction, be that the station area, cluster, province, or country.209 South 
African Police Minister Bheki Cele for example made the following statement in September 
2019. 
 
One problem with the murders that are not recorded is the high number of 
people murdered by people they know. All those are registered as murder. But we are 
going to try and come up with different codes [to register cases]. Because it’s difficult 
to police… It has really pushed up the numbers.210 
 
Here we have the head of an organisation publicly volunteering the information that 
he intends to manipulate its data in such a way that it can be exculpated for those things that 
it considers difficult. This is a particularly blatant example of how performance management 
places pressure on and may distort methods of police crime data collection. There is also 
admittedly anecdotal but widespread evidence that the police can be reluctant to open 
dockets, try to ‘downgrade’ reported incidents to the least serious crime possible, or 
sometimes outright destroy dockets before electronic capture.211 This is a common practice in 
law enforcement organisations everywhere.212 It has lent all crime statistics a justified air of 
suspicion.213 
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There are major variations in all the relevant parties’ inclinations and capacities to 
detect an incident of possible criminality, identify it as possibly criminal, deem it worthy of 
official attention, and substantially accurately report and officially record it. A given 
incident’s appearance in official statistics is subject to numerous and powerful social and 
institutional factors that winnow down the proportion of all criminal acts that make it into 
those statistics. The ones that don’t make it into the statistics constitute the dark or hidden 
figure of crime. This is commonly likened to that unknown proportion of an ice-berg that is 
hidden below the water line, which may be far larger than the visible tip. 
There is no legal requirement for ordinary people to report most crime types to the 
police. Statistics South Africa’s national victims of crime survey suggests that fewer than half 
of all incidents of assault and a third of all incidents of theft of personal property are reported 
to the police.214 The extent of underreporting for sexual crimes is unknown but believed to be 
large.215 That for car theft is fairly small, likely due to the socioeconomic status of those who 
own cars, as well as the requirements of insurance companies.  
For most crime types, the official numbers recorded by the police should at best be 
considered a lower bound of the ‘real’ prevalence of crime. Fraudulent claims may 
compromise even this. It is not at all easy to distinguish between legitimate and fraudulent 
claims, as evidenced by the proliferation of antifraud units in private insurance companies 
and their acknowledgement of the subjective and blurred lines between ‘hardcore’ fraud and 
mere exaggeration.216 Rather than law, it is too often social and institutional norms, officer 
caprice, and legally irrelevant (but socio-demographically unsurprising) victim characteristics 
that determine whether a case like rape ever makes it into a docket.217 
This is crucial. The measurement errors in crime statistics are non-random in 
distribution.218 They introduce systematic distortions around many other variables in which 
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we may well take an aetiological interest. When we observe, for example, that in a given 
period more house burglaries have been recorded at a relatively well-resourced police station 
in a wealthy urban suburb than at another, more rudimentary police station in a rural, 
subsistence-based community, we must account for the impact of these different socio-
economic and institutional profiles on the completeness of the respective official records 
before we can risk speculation on their impact on the actual incidence of crime. To put it 
mildly, this is no easy task.  
Unfortunately, South African victim survey data do not currently disaggregate well 
enough to give reliable quantitative account of these disparities. But analyses of recorded 
crime rates that fail to account for such large differences in reporting behaviour will 
inevitably be seriously misleading. They are akin to analysis that takes at face value the 
gendered and racialised patterns of measures of intelligence. 
Cross-national evidence shows that there is little or no correlation between police 
recorded crime rates and the victimisation rates reported in random surveys.219 What the 
police say about crime prevalence and what the citizens say about their experiences when 
asked directly by independent parties are very different. See, for example, the following 
graph, which compares countries according to the percentage of respondents to the 
International Crime Victims Survey who indicated that they had been victims of crime once 
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Figure 5 Total crime by countries according to the International Crime Victims Survey 
(the percentage victimised once or more) and police figures (total recorded crime per 
100 000 population) 
 
Source: Reproduced from Van Kesteren, Van Dijk, and Mayhew.220 
 
As already discussed, victimisation surveys are not without their flaws, and likely 
introduce their own non-random measurement distortions,221 but the scale of the discrepancy 
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between official police data and survey data should give one considerable pause. Here are 
two data points, based on two different methodologies, that purport to quantify the same 
underlying phenomenon but show no correlation whatsoever. This casts doubt on the validity 
of at least either, but perhaps both. The recorded crime statistics are subject to numerous, 
powerful, hidden variables. They may well be tremendously misleading, especially for some 
crimes. Their scholarly use has been in inverse relation to that scholar’s familiarity with the 
context of policing. The person with the very least faith in them is likely the officer at the 
charge desk. 
Among those researchers who fully grasp the extent of these measurement problems, 
one of two strategies is typically selected.222 The first is the use of victimisation survey data, 
which can avoid some of the pitfalls introduced by differences in legal definition, victim 
inclination to report, and police inclination to record.223 As discussed above, the South 
African victimisation data do not yet offer the means to defensibly track crime prevalence 
trends over a period longer than a few years or on a scale smaller than the province. The 
second strategy is to restrict analysis to the recorded rate of murder. This is based on ‘the 
conviction that with murder, as opposed to other forms of criminality, definitions are 
reasonably stable; that because of the seriousness of the crime, people will report incidents to 
the police (failing which the police will happen on a corpse and a docket will, in any event, 
be opened); and that the police will record these accurately’.224 Even murder statistics, 
conventionally regarded as the most accurate and reliable, can lead to illegitimate conclusions 
when the data limitations are not understood and respected.225  
Crime statistics remain, however, the primary measure of the very core of the 
endeavour of macro-aetiology. They offer unparalleled ease and economy in access to a 
massive pre-existing dataset, constructed largely voluntarily by victims and an existing 
workforce trained in the continuous verification, classification, and recording of the precise 
object of explanatory interest. Their scale makes them uniquely appropriate for 
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disaggregation in space and time. Only crime statistics make it possible to make such 
differentiations as between ‘lots of crime’, ‘more crime than in another place’, ‘rising crime’, 
‘a shift from one kind of crime to another’, and so on. They make it possible to divide crime 
in the aggregate into potentially useful parts and render it analytically accessible. They are by 




Using a meta-theoretical lens, this chapter has begun to explore the nature and logical 
requirements of causal theory. It has drawn from the philosophy of social science to suggest 
certain criteria for differentiating and evaluating such theory. These metrics are precision and 
logical consistency, parsimony and scope, testability and empirical validity, and practical or 
policy implications. Drawing on the concepts of scope of explanandum and parsimony of 
explanans, it formulated a loose typology of four explanatory strategies. 
Most crucially, the first part of this chapter proposed that an essential component of 
aetiological theorising is testability, which in the case of macro-criminology requires the 
ability to make defensible claims about aggregate-level patterns and trends in crime 
prevalence. Testability — or the potential to bridge the conceptual and the empirical — is an 
essential requirement for the refinement and development of aetiological theory. On the 
broadest meta-theoretical level, this contention lies at the core of this dissertation. The testing 
and evaluation of macro-level causal theory requires addressing the problem of crime 
prevalence measurement. 
The second part of this chapter described some of the ontological and epistemological 
challenges of the measurement of crime prevalence. Victimisation surveys and official, 
police-recorded crime statistics offer deeply distorted measures of ‘real’ crime prevalence. 
Crime statistics are the best tool of epistemological access to the explanandum in primary 
criminology. Yet they are also almost impossible to put to such use. There is simply no good 
way to determine how much crime is happening. This means there is no good way to test 
structural, primary criminology. Together, these propositions present a dilemma: determining 
a defensible measure of aggregate crime prevalence is inherently both essential (or at least 
very important) and impossible (or at least very difficult). There is a tension between the 
importance and impossibility of describing patterns in crime prevalence.  
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This tension in how we conceive the basis of knowledge is not restricted to 
criminology. Other fields of (at the very least) social science have their corollary dilemmas of 
testability, ontology, and epistemology. In fact, it is precisely in their histories and methods 
of grappling with these dilemmas of data that fields constitute themselves, organise and make 
sense of their theoretical rifts, and ultimately produce something that can defensibly be 
described as knowledge. Psychology and psychiatry, for example, have created a vast and 
widely acknowledged arena of analysis concerning the reality and formulation of their 
diagnostic criteria. Historians are ever and acutely aware of the extent and implications of 
their epistemological limitations.  
Criminologists in South African have paid lip service to at least the second half of our 
testability dilemma but have been unwilling or unable to do the messy work required to 
defensibly resolve it. As chapters four and five will demonstrate, these apparently abstract 
theoretical constraints form the invisible scaffolding of the discipline. It is between these 
horns that South African criminology has been caught and has stagnated. The following 
chapter will show why the South African discipline of criminology has thus far been so 




Chapter four: The dilemma in context 
This chapter demonstrates the origin and severity of the tension between the necessity and 
difficulty of empirical testability in South African criminology. It weaves together three 
modes of analysis: theoretical, descriptive historical, and technical. It is structured along a 
loose chronology of those aspects of South African policing institutions that have had a 
bearing on this dilemma of empirical testability. Interweaved with this is a simplified take on 
Van Zyl Smit and Dixon’s schema of the discipline’s different intellectual traditions, with 
emphasis on the inherent constraints that account for the failure of each to make productive 
use of measures of crime prevalence, particularly in the form of official police crime 
statistics. The post-Apartheid successors of these ideological schisms have made some but 
limited progress. This chapter also begins to take account of the ongoing methodological 
challenges of the use of the statistics. Despite major recent improvements, there remain 
numerous challenges to putting the post-Apartheid criminological statistics to use.  
All told, this chapter establishes why the general meta-theoretical dilemma of 
criminological testability has proven here to be quite so crippling. The ambiguity of the 
Apartheid state’s dimensions, the segmentation of its subjects and objects of social control, 
and the inherent injustice of its systems of ‘justice’ have meant that South African 
criminologists have faced even greater hurdles than those seen, for example, in Anglo-
American contexts. We have long been aware of the measurement distortions around the 
official crime data.226 We have had to contend with a historical scarcity of even minimally 
reliable criminological statistics, in a context that made their use irrational and indefensible.  
The legacy of Apartheid policing has necessitated that official crime prevalence data 
be approached with both theoretical depth and methodological rigour that none have had the 
incentive to combine. The cumulative effect has been that South African aetiological enquiry 
has made little sound use of crime prevalence data and has rarely moved beyond apocalyptic 
grandstanding and generalisation to explore the detail of how much crime is demonstrably 
happening where and why.  
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Complications of twentieth century SA criminological statistics 
Those who might have sought to use official South African criminological statistics for 
aetiological inquiry — to ask some variation of the question ‘why this much crime here and 
now, rather than there and then?’ — will quickly have run into numerous difficulties. South 
Africa’s would-be quantitative criminologists have never had much of value to work with, 
while their critics have always had a great deal. This section explores how the nature of the 
country’s policing organisations in twentieth century constrained the usefulness of official 
crime statistics.  
These factors represent a difference in degree rather than a difference in kind to those 
seen in other countries, or indeed in other disciplines entirely. All South African quantitative 
research under Apartheid was compromised by the state’s disinclination to produce the 
necessary data on the majority of South Africans, by the political divisions in academic life, 
and by ‘the hostility to quantitative, empirical research among many social scientists, who 
preferred either theory-driven or qualitative research strategies’.227 Analyses of class and/or 
race in Anglo-American contexts require similar caveats to the ontological and 
epistemological reality of crime. In the South African context, however, these constraints 
have been so blatant as to cripple empirical inquiry throughout the course of the development 
of the field of criminology. 
 
Early policing jurisdictions and focus 
Although some piecemeal local statistics are available earlier, there was no single state 
structure with dominion over anything approximating the current national borders prior to the 
twentieth century. It was only after the 1910 unification of the four previously separate Cape, 
Natal, Transvaal, and Orange River colonies into the Union of South Africa, that the various 
colonial police forces (the Transvaal Police, the Orange Free State Police, the Natal Police, 
the Cape and Kimberley Urban Police Forces, the Cape Mounted Police and the Rural Police 
of the Cape Province)228 were gradually amalgamated into the new South African Police 
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(SAP), Headquartered in Pretoria.229 This was followed by numerous rounds of attempts to 
standardise policing presence and practices, including crime recording. 
The early years of the SAP saw unsteady jurisdictional incorporation, as well as 
disruptions following the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. By 1916, for example, 
although it claimed to ‘[have] charge of the whole of the Union’, this was ‘with the exception 
of the Province of Natal (where its activities were [only] those in connection with the work of 
Criminal Investigation and the Water Police controlling the Harbour and Docks of Durban), 
and the North Western Districts of the Cape Province,’ in turn with the exception of 
Kimberley.230 Its staff establishment of 5328 ‘Europeans’ and 2244 ‘Natives’ was judged 
considerably under strength and was seriously depleted by the many who joined active 
service.231 The population was predominantly rural and unaccustomed to centralised control. 
This limited geographic coverage and institutional capacity meant that the crime figures 
recorded during these early years were decidedly restricted. Only in 1921 did the SAP 
introduce a system whereby all stations were required to send regular (monthly), detailed 
records of cases to Pretoria.232 
Even so, the fledgling state had generally limited statistical capacity, as well as an 
uneven and still poorly defined mandate for its police. This meant that the SAP’s statistics in 
the first half of the twentieth century would reasonably have been met with scepticism even 
by casual and uncritical contemporaneous consumers. All were certainly not equal in the eyes 
of the law. There was question, for example, about whether farmers whose servants had 
deserted should be required to go to the ‘trouble and expense of travelling many miles to 
make a sworn statement before a J.P. [Justice of the Peace]’ or whether the police should be 
‘given discretion in this matter and be allowed to accept bail after effecting arrest’ under the 
Master and Servants Act.233 As in all policing models of a colonial persuasion there could 
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never be any pretence that South African colonial policing served a common moral 
consensus. 
Racial classification had major significance, not only politically and socially, but also 
legally. So it was that the early statistics were obsessively concerned with the ‘races’ of the 
victims and alleged or suspected perpetrators. For example, indecent assaults were 
meticulously differentiated as ‘White men on White women’, ‘White men on Col. women’, 
‘Col. men on White women’, ‘Col. men on Col. women’, or ‘Male on Male’.234 The 
‘nationalities’ of persons convicted were similarly differentiated as ‘British Born’, ‘S African 
British’, ‘Other Colonies’, ‘Other Nationalities’, ‘Kaffirs’, ‘Asiatics’, or ‘Other Coloured’.235 
Punishments, of course also differentiated by race, included the death sentence and 
indentured hard labour.236  
Racist laws had existed throughout, but the segregationist policies of the first half of 
the twentieth century — such as the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 and the Native 
Administration Act of 1927 — served further to weaponise the racial and spatial margins of 
citizenship.237 It went without saying that the SAP existed primarily for the protection of the 
personal and business interests of the white population. The core driver of economic and 
geographic change, the mining industry, was itself intensely violent, with pervasive 
‘supervisory abuse, collective violence between groups of employees, and the depredations of 
criminal gangs based in the mining compounds’.238 The security, rights, and very subjecthood 
constituted by colonial claims for/of a monopoly on the legitimate use of force were 
indistinguishable from violence and disenfranchisement. 
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This pattern only became clearer after 1948. Through the Department of Statistics and 
Central Statistical Service (predecessors to Statistics South Africa), the Apartheid state 
expanded its statistical capacity. Yet this was inevitably in ways that were explicitly 
politicised and racialised.239 Statistics demarcated and reinforced the various myths of 
Apartheid, such that demographic data was erratic and of poor quality. Censuses, for 
example, tended to focus predominantly on the white population.240  
The Apartheid state tried to legitimate itself by literally ‘dis-counting’ much of the 
population.241 It was deeply invested in obscuring and creating ambiguity in its ontological 
and epistemological boundaries. The result was that it was not always clear where the SAP 
had meaningful presence and for which areas and populations it considered itself responsible. 
Blacks were granted only limited official recognition and rights in white-designated cities and 
towns. Black-designated, primarily rural areas were increasingly placed under a separate 
political regime under nominally traditional authority. 
Under the doctrine of ‘separate development’, based on the unilateral decision that the 
country’s black population consisted of a group of separate ‘nations’ to be governed 
separately but as subordinate to the white,242 these policies were expanded and consolidated 
— most notably with the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, the Promotion of Bantu Self-
government Act of 1959, the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Acts of 1970 and 1971, and the 
series of Acts related to the ‘independent’ status of the Transkei (1976), Bophuthatswana 
(1977), Venda (1979) and Ciskei (1981). 
These nominally independent states (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei 
— also known as the TBVC states), as well as the non-independent or ‘self-governing’ 
entities (Gazankulu, Lebowa, QwaQwa, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, and KwaZulu), covered a 
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considerable area of the country and housed a much larger and highly contested proportion of 
its population. The following map indicates their extent before their dissolution in 1994. 
 
Figure 6 Map of ‘homelands’ in South Africa at the end of Apartheid, before 
reincorporation 
 
Source: Wikimedia Commons.243 
 
The creation of these ethnic ‘bantustans’ saw whole regions ostensibly transferred 
from the direct administrative responsibility of the SAP to hastily-established new police 
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forces that were poorly trained and managed,244 under-resourced and under-staffed as 
compared to the SAP, and notoriously brutal towards and dubiously legitimate in the eyes of 
their ‘citizens’.245 Their political ambiguity made for complex relationships with the SAP. 
Certain functions were to varying degrees devolved to local police, but these structures were 
‘carefully monitored and manipulated by the South African government to prevent any 
homeland from becoming a threat to the perceived interests of the Republic’.246  
In policing as in other spheres, the bureaucracy was balkanised, making for 
inconsistent, irregular and chronically scattered statistical information, which was particularly 
inadequate for ‘non-whites’.247 The ontology and epistemology of the state itself became 
ambiguous, with different state structures not necessarily corresponding in their interpretation 
of their jurisdictions. South West Africa, now Namibia, was yet another jurisdictional and 
statistical grey area. Borders were subject to frequent re-categorisation, re-delimitation, and 
legal and moral contestation. The legal position of gambling — criminal in SA but easily 
accessible with just a short trip across a bantustan ‘border’ — shows up how profit could be 
made from this ambiguity and plausible deniability. 
In the bantustans there was little incentive for transparency or pretence at democracy, 
so crime record keeping occupied a low institutional priority in these areas. Little or none of 
their records of recorded crime have survived. Patronage and state-sponsored terror were 
widespread.248 This saw parallels in black urban communities in white-designated areas, 
where the SAP operated primarily as a counterinsurgency force. It formed dirty tricks units 
and committed heinous crimes, seldom leading to the prosecution and punishment of the 
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officers involved.249 Even given this impunity, it naturally had little incentive to keep 
accurate record of such incidents. Many aspects of black urban life were criminalised and 
staggering numbers of black men were incarcerated, usually for short terms, for ‘violating 
residency, alcohol, labour and tax ordinances’.250 The SAP engaged with black communities 
less as individual bearers of rights to safety than as large, confrontational collectives.251 It 
enjoyed little popular legitimacy among the black majority.252 In black urban communities, 
where levels of crime and violence were already understood to be high,253 many turned to 
alternative tools of justice, like street committees and ‘community courts’.254 Such 
vigilantism was at times sanctioned by the state for its own political ends.255 Very few of the 
crimes committed in predominantly black areas would ever have been reported to the police 
and been recorded in official statistics. Localised victim surveys suggested that there were 
major racial differences in crime reporting, and that the extent of underreporting in black 
urban communities was very high.256 In the late 1980s in Mamelodi, for example, only about 
40 per cent of households that had been victim to house burglary said that they had reported 
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this to the police.257 More rural communities were even less likely to report their crime 
victimisation experiences to the police.258  
Even for legally unambiguous white-designated areas, work with official quantitative 
data was hardly more feasible. Crime statistics were seldom disaggregated below the national 
level. This shallow nature of the data made only the most basic analysis possible,259 to the 
point where a visitor in 1992 wondered whether the state ‘wish[ed] to preclude rational 
consideration’ of its crime problems.260  
The SAP faced serious difficulties with understaffing and staff literacy and training.261 
The need for more boots-on-the-ground required compromise in the competence of 
recruits.262 It has been said that perhaps about 10 per cent of its personnel in the 1980s were 
focused on ordinary crime detection and investigation.263 Far more were concerned with 
enforcing a raft of petty Apartheid laws or quelling political ‘unrest’. Ordinary crime fighting 
and detection resources were overwhelmingly concentrated in ‘white’ areas, which were far 
from the worst affected by crime.264 
The state’s mentality of constant national siege introduced additional constraints, such 
that it was difficult to get a tolerably adequate quantitative picture of crime and criminal 
justice. The ‘total onslaught’ on a fragile national security was alleged to aim for no less than 
‘the violent overthrow of the South African democratic state, and the destruction of Christian 
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values and the capitalist economy’.265 This crude vision of fragile order versus anarchy meant 
that a wide range of criminal justice activities were considered ‘beyond the threshold of 
legitimate public concern,’ a thin line was drawn between criticising the police and 
subverting the ‘national interest’, and police institutions were legally shielded from certain 
forms of surveillance.266 Researchers could for example be prosecuted for reporting ‘falsely’ 
on prison conditions.267  
Finally, there was the complication that the state sought wherever possible to 
criminalise black political behaviour.268 The distinction between political and ‘ordinary’ 
crime was obscured by all the actors and it all depended on who was doing the defining.269 
The tumultuous ‘transition’ period introduced particular difficulties, as crime and disorder 
became extraordinarily politically complex. The phenomenon of activists engaging in crime 
and criminals claiming political motivation was such that it led to the coining of the term 
‘comtsotsi’ or comrade tsotsi.270 Transition-era violence was messy, hard to characterise, and 
often saw political conflicts diffuse into ‘generational conflict between radical youth and 
traditional elders, disputes over chiefship succession, crime, economic rivalry (as in the so-
called ‘taxi’ wars) and cycles of vendetta-like clan conflict’.271 Even explicitly political 
conflicts, such as between the African National Congress and Inkatha Freedom Party, could 
be markedly ambiguous.272 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s attempt to separate 
politics and crime for purposes of political reconciliation meant it failed to engage the 
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complex nature of especially late Apartheid criminality.273 For many years it was particularly 
difficult to draw a meaningful distinction between politics and crime. 
In short, the SAP enforced racist laws in blatant alignment with white supremacy and 
had little legitimacy among the black majority. Its mandate and jurisdiction were ambiguous 
and variable. It had limited capacity, irrationally allocated. It operated covertly, viciously, 
and with impunity. All this under conditions of — and while actively fomenting and 
muddying — complex and unruly violent conflict.  
This was the nature of twentieth century South African policing. This was the context 
that would-be quantitative criminologists had to contend with in the use and interpretation of 
official crime statistics. Although other contexts show similarities in kind, few can match 
quite the degree of the distortion this inevitably had on recorded crime statistics. The 
following section details how the discipline’s different intellectual traditions responded to 
this context in their conception and use of crime statistics. 
 
Ideological responses and constraints  
The stories that a discipline tells about itself — the conceptual and historical maps that 
participants have of their own work relative to that of others, especially those that came 
before — are important and inevitably contested.274 Rather than a neat chronology of the kind 
suggested in introductory undergraduate classes, the evolution of criminology has tended 
more often to look like ‘an untidy meander…of pluralism, diversity and hybridity,’ with the 
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result that there is never just one, but rather a number of ‘competing, ready-made and, 
perhaps, rather self-serving accounts of what we think has happened’.275 
In his seminal texts on this subject, however, Dirk van Zyl Smit has recounted the 
history of South African criminological thought as forming within three major intellectual 
traditions: Afrikaner nationalism, legal reformism, critical criminology.276 Developing on this 
framework, Dixon proposed that transitional and post-transition South Africa had seen the 
development of a fourth strand, which he termed ‘democratic administrative criminology’.277 
This section makes use of these distinctions, slightly simplified and in a different order for 
purposes of readier contrast. Its novelty is that it outlines how each has approached the 
question of what can or should be explained by crime prevalence data, especially in the form 
of criminological statistics. It argues that, and demonstrates why, each has failed to 
productively employ criminological statistics as tools for genuine aetiological inquiry. 
 
Afrikaner nationalist criminology 
The first strand of South African criminological thinking was a positivism arguably little 
different from that being practised at the time in the North.278 Here it was founded in the 
1930s out of interest in the social and economic impoverishment of Afrikaners, and their 
related deviance and criminality.279 The depression years saw growing scholarly and popular 
concern with the problem of poor whites. The causal theories favoured by this tradition were 
both social and biological. The crimes committed by whites were ascribed to their poverty, 
which in turn was blamed on the failures of capitalism, while those of ‘non-whites’ were due 
to their cultural but also genetic inferiorities.280  
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Criminological statistics played a major role in the construction of these problems. 
They were frequently quoted as evidence of the hardship of poor whites and of the inherent 
pathology of the coloured and ‘Bantu’ groups.281 Indeed, although others have disputed 
whether a handful of academics should be credited with the power to bring about 
Apartheid,282 it does seem plausible that the ‘science’ of crime numbers played some part in 
the foundation of a national vision of protectionism and Afrikaner upliftment, as well as the 
strict separation of the ‘races’.283  
With Apartheid, this brand of racialised, social and biological positivism became the 
official criminology, shaped the development of university curricula and thus came to lead 
‘mainstream’ criminological thinking into the 1970s and 1980s.284 An uncritical, utilitarian 
positivism became the dominant criminological framework,285 as developed into the sub-
categories of police science and penology.286 
Its empirical research agenda during this long period was limited, seldom straying 
beyond belabouring its formative conservative theoretical assumptions, as its primary 
concern was the justification of the status quo. There was no incentive to foreground the stark 
discrepancies in the nature of policing provided to different sectors of the population. There 
was every incentive to present an image of the police as protectors of a unified moral 
community in the face of misguided liberals or malicious radicals. 
As communism became a global bogeyman, the anti-capitalist elements of earlier 
Afrikaner nationalist criminology were de-emphasised.287 Its worldview became more 
unambiguously consensus based. That is, it ‘assumed that the South African society is a 
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cohesive integrated unit where all share the same values and norms, or should, and those who 
don't are seen as dissidents or deviants because they threaten order’.288  
With the intellectual discrediting of racial ‘science’ and the Apartheid ideology, this 
strand of criminology moved away from essentialising racist explanations,289 towards a 
diluted version, ‘with the old offensive racial allusions edited out.’290 Middle-range American 
criminological theories came to dominate. The framing now became about social and 
economic conditions, and especially the impact of modernisation and the resultant social 
disorganisation. Now it was not so much that ‘the Bantu’ was inherently criminal, but that his 
rapid movement from tribal, rural life to an urban environment with European cultural values 
was responsible for weakened social controls, anomie and therefore high rates of 
delinquency.291 Apartheid and ‘separate development’ could now be seen as a kindness, to 
protect ‘the Bantu’ from his own inability to adapt to city life. Incidentally, this led to social 
disorganisation perspectives becoming enduringly unpopular on the left,292 except, for some, 
to the extent that they were later absorbed into ‘transition theory’ explanations of South 
African crime.293  
To account for ‘Coloured’ delinquency, a greater emphasis was placed on strain 
theories, in which crime was a response to blocked opportunities to succeed at European 
cultural goals.294 This allowed for some scope to blame the state for having placed these 
groups in such difficult and criminogenic conditions,295 but an easy response was that it 
signalled a need only to more effectively soak up excess labour, in order to preserve the state 
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and social structure.296 Again, these arguments were supported by ready appeal to 
criminological statistics.297  
The more openly racist, Afrikaner nationalist brand of this unselfconsciously 
positivist brand of criminology declined by the 1980s and has died off (at least in public, 
scholarly expression) in post-Apartheid South Africa. Its intellectual successors, many still 
based at the historically Afrikaans universities, have (as predicted)298 succeeded in 
reinventing themselves as purveyors of atheoretical, ‘politically neutral’ technical criminal 
justice expertise.299 Their societal outlook remains largely consensus-based, such that they 
have a tendency to a traditional ‘law and order’, punitive stance.  
These, still, are ready users of the official criminological statistics. Quantitative 
analysis, largely produced by scholars based at the University of South Africa (UNISA) and 
the University of Pretoria, continues to be published — although its popularity does appear to 
have waned in recent years.300 Their interest, however, is for the most part managerial. It is in 
the practicalities of improving the criminal justice system’s capacity to deter crime rather 
than in ‘debating metaphysical questions to which there are no sure answers’ — such as the 
fundamental reasons why some people, places, or times see more crime than others.301 This 
ideological tradition treats aetiology as at best a handmaiden to law and order.  
Moreover, much of this work fails to account for the extent to which these statistics 
fall short of an objective or ‘accurate’ measure of crime. It does not engage with the 
epistemological and ontological challenges outlined in the previous chapter. It implicitly 
erases the structural in favour of the individual, except where there is political value in 
emphasising the plight of certain sub-populations (such as white farm owners). It tends to 
read crime statistics at face value, as an authoritative record of ‘true’ crime prevalence. As 
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such, its claims seldom survive much scrutiny, for reasons that were suggested in the 
previous chapter but that will become clearer in the following section. 
A consensus perspective on crime — one which takes as given the notion that crime 
signifies that which society as a whole deems acceptable and unacceptable behaviour302 — 
has never gone down as easily in the so obviously socially divided South African context. Its 
critics have never had to work too hard. 
 
Critical criminology 
The University of Cape Town’s Institute (later, Centre) of Criminology was a pioneer in the 
development of the second very loose grouping, which grew - from especially the 1980s -  
out of shared radical sympathies (often based on the work of critical British 
criminologists).303 This tradition was explicitly counter-hegemonic and focused on the role of 
socio-political structures304 and exposing existing wrongs and state crimes.305 Its critique of 
the positivist approach centred on the absurdity of quantifying or explaining South African 
crime without accounting for Apartheid, black disenfranchisement and oppression, and state 
violence.306 The consensus perspective simply could not withstand the obvious reality that 
there was no prospect of moral consensus under Apartheid. There could be no obfuscation of 
the oppressive nature and operation of the law as a product of elite interests.  
Spotting the difference between crime and politics may be impossible at the best of 
times.307 Under Apartheid, even more obviously than in other contexts, the law was so 
manifestly the product of illegitimate power. Indeed, the formation and basis of the Union of 
South Africa and the Apartheid state were acts of lawlessness and injustice on a massive 
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scale, built on unconstrained violent oppression and repression.308 This focus on state 
lawlessness meant that critical criminologists were interested more in the mechanisms of 
crime control than in crime itself.309  
To the extent that it concerned itself with measures of ‘ordinary’ crime prevalence, 
the radical tradition used them to expose the criminogenic nature of colonial economic and 
power structures and the policies of the Apartheid state. For example, the rise in criminal 
street gangs in Cape Town was ascribed to the social devastation wrought by the Group 
Areas Act.310 But for the most part, it had no use for official assessments or measures of what 
was or wasn’t criminal. These scholars held to a thoroughly instrumentalist criminology, in 
which South Africa’s criminal justice institutions were best understood as tools for the 
defence of the Apartheid order.311 This, as well as their keen understanding of the political 
nature and drastically unequal distribution and operation of Apartheid law enforcement, made 
official statistics hopeless as a source of crime prevalence knowledge for critical 
researchers.312  
As in other contexts, this led to the accusation that, in casting offenders as the victims 
of state and society, they were insensitive to the rights and needs of victims of crime.313 This 
criticism, however, has had little local sting. The left realism that reinvigorated quantitative, 
theoretically- and empirically-rigorous aetiological inquiry in the UK in the 1980s failed to 
find lasting purchase in the South African context.314 Critical scholars in low crime contexts 
have also succeeded in using empirical data on crime prevalence to challenge law-and-order 
rhetoric.315 But high crime levels seem to have placed both boldly constructivist and other 
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empirical work on crime prevalence beyond the suitable purview of critical scholars in South 
Africa.  
Here the critical approach carried (and continues to carry) such an obvious moral and 
logical weight that it had little reason to seek compromise. Instead, critical theorists tended to 
‘associate empiricism — in all of its forms — with administrative, uncritical, utilitarian 
criminology’.316 As labelling theory and various other radical sociological theories attest, 
there is no reason why critical scholars should be disqualified from the task of aetiology. 
They tend, however, to hold to an epistemic (but by no means intellectual) humility not 
shared by the positivists. Critical criminologists have exceedingly good conceptual tools to 
problematise the process of the production and wielding of official knowledge about crime.   
Post-transition, this tradition has remained wary. It continues to hold up selected 
crime statistics as a mirror to state and structural injustice.317 More than any others, however, 
it remains aware of their problematic nature, preferring to investigate their social and political 
construction, functions and reactions rather than what might be gleaned from their content.318 
It prioritises qualitative, narrative-based research with a focus on the structural.319 
The socioeconomic structure of post-Apartheid South Africa continues to make 
critical approaches irresistible. The radical reflex is only too easy. Unfortunately, such an 
approach is not useful for unravelling causality.320 It has in fact inhibited such use by those 
researchers who might do so thoughtfully. Critical scholars present an image of a South 
African state awash in a ‘stream of stats’ that it dissects as an increasingly technicised mode 
of social control.321 Such a description may resonate in Northern contexts or in comparison 
with the data drought of the past, but here seriously overestimates the sophistication of the 
South African technocratic machinery around crime.  
 
316 Artz & Moult op cit note 60 at 3. 
317 Henkeman op cit note 75. 
318 For example Jean Comaroff & John L Comaroff The Truth about Crime: Sovereignty Knowledge Social 
Order (2017). 
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Even the most senior decision-makers within formal city safety structures lack access 
to such basic knowledge as how many residents there are in each of the police station areas 
within their municipalities.322 Many were surprised to find that the areas to which resources 
had been targeted were not in fact the ones recording the highest crime prevalence, once 
population size had been accounted for. None can give accurate account of each station area’s 
profile in terms of age or gender distribution, level of unemployment, and so on. Few have a 
good sense of how the crime situations in various station areas have developed over the long 
term, or how this might relate to changes in other factors. The state itself lacks the resources 
and skills to make sensible governance use of its crime statistics. 
The crime statistics and their associated analytical tools remain remarkably crude and 
are arguably at least as underutilised in governance as they are in scholarship. Yet the moral 
weight of the conflict perspective remains such that in South Africa there has been little 
pressure for more critical scholars to attempt close and thoughtful engagement with the 
aetiological question. 
 
Legal reformist and democratic administrative criminology 
The third major intellectual tradition in South African criminological history is that which 
Van Zyl Smit described as legal reformism. Dixon’s later addition of democratic 
administrative criminology shares its characteristics in terms of the use of crime prevalence 
data, so the two are combined here. 
The loose grouping of legal reformists, dominated by lawyers, has historically ‘sought 
to make the existing system work more humanely but also more efficiently...[using] the 
findings of ‘value-free’ empirical research and the intervention of professional social 
workers.’323 This included more conservative and liberal-humanitarian elements,324 but all 
arguably in fairly limited conflict with the dominant ideology of the South African state.325 
Its interest was in formal equality before the law, initially primarily for whites, but later also 
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for other racial groups.326 It tended to understand crime more as matter of individual 
pathologies than as features of social or economic relations.327  
The technical work of legal reform took on a larger and more important role leading 
up to and immediately after 1994.328 It has continued largely unchanged in post-Apartheid 
South Africa, with the activities of a new generation of activist lawyers, now emboldened by 
the legal and normative strength of constitutionalism.329  
This intellectual tradition has used criminological statistics where convenient as tools 
for criminal justice system reform, rather than for meaningful investigation of the causes of 
crime. A recent case in point is that of the Social Justice Coalition, which has linked its 
campaign around the unequal distribution of police resources to statistics on the unequal 
distribution of murder.330 
Closely related to this, there has emerged in post-Apartheid South Africa the tradition 
of what Dixon has described as ‘democratic administrative criminology… with its 
institutional roots in the statutory research councils, the large non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) working in the criminal justice sector and some of the more entrepreneurial 
academic research institutes’.331 This sector has absorbed many who might previously have 
considered themselves reformists or critical researchers, who could not justify remaining on 
the side lines of the patently urgent project of institutional reconstruction,332 especially now 
that the fight against crime was likened to ‘a fight to entrench human rights,’ as the 
culmination of the struggle’s moral project.333 They now find themselves more or less uneasy 
bedfellows with the managerialists with more conservative roots.  
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Some see value in this shift out of academic obscurity, in the evolution from 
‘conventional criminology (an international-focused science) to a contemporary practical 
field,’ which enhances ‘service delivery within the criminal justice, corporate and private 
sectors’.334 Others are sceptical of this ‘policy work’ and its alignment with the law and the 
legal system.335  
This sector’s relationship with criminological statistics is close — it tends to be the 
loudest voice in their annual public dissection — but unusually fraught. On the one hand, it is 
sensitive to ideological critique and is sure to hedge any discussion of the statistics’ content 
with some important context on their limitations. On the other, it has little time or funding for 
‘the more contemplative, even speculative, work of theoretical deconstruction.’336 Its 
relationship with the state is close, although often conflicted. This offers the promise of 
unrivalled policy influence but introduces constraints, not least of which is considerable 
pressure to concentrate on the ‘operation of the criminal justice system, mechanisms of crime 
control and processes of criminalization at the expense of explaining crime itself and 
understanding the lives of those accused of committing acts defined in this way’.337 Its 
interests overlap with those of legal reformists, in that its objective is often to use the crime 
statistics primarily as a lever of state engagement and progressive influence, rather than as a 
genuine instrument of discovery.338  
Of course, the police and various other organs of the state also seek to use crime data 
as both means and end of management. Interestingly, Statistics South Africa seems set on 
becoming their public face, guarantor and chief analyst,339 with as yet unclear practical and 
political implications. There are also others who ‘do criminology’ in other spaces, notably 
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health faculties.340 Other actors — often economists — have also dabbled, with their own 
ideological and pragmatic interests and usually with an inadequate grasp of the ways in which 
these statistics fundamentally differ from others.  
In sum, there have been and remain three broad streams of scholarly criminological 
thinking in the South African context. The first has made liberal use of criminological 
statistics but has done so in ways that were tightly constrained to serve a morally and 
intellectually bankrupt end and which continues to underestimate their flaws and distortions. 
The second has for the most part rejected them out of hand. The third has had some limited 
use for them but does not concern itself with understanding the structural causes of crime and 
has had to content itself with markedly shallow, state-centric analysis. The result is that this 
resource has been allowed to lie largely fallow for these ends. 
The South African context has made radical critique too easy and more orthodox 
quantitative methodological development too difficult. Broadly positivist theoretical 
development has been overestimated, outpaced, and obstructed by its more morally powerful 
critics. As the following section describes, it remains very difficult to make sense of the 
official criminological statistics.  
 
Post-Apartheid policing and recording practices 
The spatial and moral geography of the post-Apartheid state has become far less contentious. 
The police no longer — or, rather, to a less formal and lesser extent — function as the 
‘frontline enforcers of racial legislation’, and they have undergone a series of major 
organisational transformations ‘to achieve greater racial and gender representativeness, and to 
improve relationships with previously repressed communities’.341 The criminal justice system 
as a whole has seen countless changes in jurisdiction, institutional orientation, and law.  
Since 1994, state statistical practices have been progressively rationalised and 
improved. Practical progress in the usefulness of the official crime statistics since 1994 has 
 
340 Artz & Moult op cit note 60. 
341 Kynoch op cit note 238 at 71. 
91 
 
been considerable.342 Recorded crime statistics are now regularly released for each of 20-odd 
major crime types and for each of the over 1 000 police stations nationally. The bantustans 
were included in the crime statistics from 1994 and the new South African Police Service 
(SAPS) was amalgamated in 1995. The bureaucracy slouched from balkanised to behemoth. 
An electronic case administration system (CAS) was introduced to facilitate 
performance monitoring and case-flow management. It was slow to catch on. Early data 
capture capacity and practices were poor, such that in 1997, the Minister for Safety and 
Security appointed a Committee of Inquiry into the Collection, Processing and Publication of 
Crime Statistics. It was led by Dr Mark Orkin, Head of Statistics South Africa and later CEO 
of the Human Sciences Research Council. The Orkin Committee’s 1998 recommendations to 
the minister led to the implementation of numerous measures. The CAS system was 
reorganised and streamlined, police stations received hundreds of additional computers, 
training programmes and manuals were developed, and thousands of staff trained to do the 
necessary typing and analysis.343  
A temporary moratorium on the release of crime statistics was announced in 2000, 
while the system overhaul was in progress. Crime statistics were publicised again as of 2001, 
but the system continued to be improved over the following year. It is thus only as of about 
2003 that there has been a reasonable measure of methodological consistency in the 
generation of South African crime statistics. However, the institution has maintained its 
closed stance and suspicion of external monitoring. Requests for more rapid or detailed crime 
statistics continue to be deflected by reference to ‘the moratorium’. 
High crime has led to police work being framed as ‘war’. This sense of a crime crisis 
has not fostered a rigorous, technocratic approach. What it has encouraged is the privatisation 
of security provision, which in turn further undermines the ontological and epistemological 
realities of crime. As people come to rely increasingly on private security, their expectations 
of the police are reduced and blurred.  
There have been progressive reforms, but there have also been ‘avalanches’ of 
corruption, brutality, and a widespread perception of the police as ‘lazy, scared and self-
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interested’.344 The use of police in factional battles within government has compromised 
public faith. The mass killing of strikers by the police at Marikana in 2012 was also one 
among many examples of police incompetence and callousness. Violent use of force and the 
use of torture on the part of police officers to extract information or confessions from 
suspects are commonplace.345 There has been populist xenophobia, with foreign nationals 
routinely experiencing harassment, assault, and robbery by police and South African 
citizens.346 This sort of thing is unlikely to be reported.  
 
Continued unevenness of policing and expectations 
Moreover, as the refrain has it, the Apartheid legacy lives on. South Africans retain highly 
negative perceptions of the police, even as compared to those in other African countries that 
are far more constrained in terms of resources and training.347 On the other hand, there does 
appear to have been some improvement in police-community relations after 1994, with a 
growing proportion of at least some crime types being reported to the police, to the point that 
recorded increases in crime prevalence may well have been a statistical illusion.348 
The quality and character of state services, including policing, also remain highly 
uneven. There remain irrationalities in resource distribution, with historically white-
designated areas (which in many cases remain predominantly white) allocated more officers 
than are justified by the relative severity of their recorded crime problems. In the ‘poorest 
areas, especially burgeoning informal settlements and much of rural South Africa,’ state 
policing remains ‘largely absent’.349 This feeds community justice or vigilantism. 
This was demonstrated in the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry, which also 
described the breakdown in relations between the police and community in this 
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socioeconomically deprived and highly crime-ridden area. The Commission pointed to the 
area’s ‘difficult history’, the ‘widespread perceptions that SAPS does not respond promptly 
to calls for assistance, and does not investigate crime properly or at all,’ widespread 
perceptions of police corruption, and so on.350   
Variation in inclination to report crimes to the police is large. Gender, race, and 
location are all demonstrably important determinants of reporting. The South African national 
victims of crime survey reveals, for example, that white crime victims in South Africa are 
about 40 per cent more likely than black crime victims to report a theft of personal property 
to the police, and that victims of housebreaking in the Western Cape are about 70 per cent 
more likely to report the incident to the police than those in the Eastern Cape.351 It is thus 
very difficult to determine to what extent apparent trends or differences in crime prevalence 
as measured by official recorded police statistics reflect real trends or differences in crime 
prevalence or rather trends and differences in various communities’ inclination to report their 
crime victimisation experiences to the police. 
 
Disaggregation and spatial boundaries  
The publicly released crime statistics are still not disaggregated in the most obvious, 
analytically useful ways. They provide no detail on the victims’ or perpetrators’ ages, 
genders, or population groups. Statistics disaggregated in these ways have been vital in 
helping make sense of recent crime trends in the United States and elsewhere.352 Population 
group (or ‘race’) was dropped from the official crime statistics in 1992. Reluctance to 
reintroduce it is understandable, but it has had the unfortunate effect of making it very 
difficult to respond convincingly to deeply politicised popular myths about the racial 
dynamics of crime.353 
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The crime statistics are also grouped into broad legal categories, such as robbery with 
aggravated circumstances, obscuring such differences as that one incident involved ‘a person 
who is robbed of R10 at knifepoint outside a neighbourhood bar,’ while another involved ‘an 
R18 million highway-heist of cash in transit in which six security guards are killed.’354  
South African crime statistics also fail to provide any detail on the alleged crime’s 
exact (or even, for the sake of anonymity, approximate)355 location,356 date or time.357 This 
although the tendency in crime analysis elsewhere has been to move to ever finer spatial 
resolutions, as evidence mounts that crime is often extremely concentrated in 
neighbourhoods.358 As managerial tools, such highly geographically focused technical 
approaches have rightly been accused of stripping place from context and fetishising the 
dreaded ‘hot spot’.359 Yet as analytical tools, supported by technical tools, they can enable 
incomparably rich layering and integration of multiple dimensions of context.360 The degree 
of spatial aggregation in crime analysis is also theoretically important, as for example 
neighbourhood-level explanations may be unsuitable for processes that are in fact driven by 
just a couple of street segments (or chronic offenders).361 The dearth of good spatial research 
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in South African crime analysis is especially unfortunate, given the extent of socio-spatial 
segregation.362   
An even more critical obstruction to productive crime analysis in South Africa is the 
difficulty of linking the SAPS data with any other datasets that could offer aetiological leads. 
The geographical boundaries of the South African Police Service’s police station areas do not 
correspond with the boundaries of any other official authority or existing source of other 
potentially relevant data. A policing system that is still relatively nationally centralised has 
precluded much incentive for horizontal data co-ordination. Police station area boundaries cut 
arbitrarily across the boundaries of Census districts, suburbs, electoral wards, municipalities, 
and even provinces. This means that linking recorded crime numbers with socio-
demographic, political, health, economic or any other data requires highly technical skills and 
the use of Geographic Information System technology. 
See, for example, the following map. It shows how the City of Johannesburg’s 
Hillbrow police station area cuts across very different neighbourhoods (including the 
crowded inner-city of Braamfontein and the wealthy suburb of Upper Houghton). Some 
demographic, political and other data is available on the level of each of the areas outlined in 
blue or in green — but none for the police station area’s area in red.  
 
 
362 Breetzke op cit note 263 at 300. 
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Figure 7 Map showing Hillbrow police station area (red) with overlapping ward 
boundaries (green) and suburb boundaries (blue) 
 
 
Not only is there poor correspondence between SAPS data and other datasets, but 
those other datasets are often as contentious as the crime statistics. Obtaining defensible 
population data alone is a challenge. Statistics South Africa conducts a census but only once a 
decade. Subsequent population estimates are subject to numerous assumptions and in any 
event do not disaggregate to small enough geographic areas to meaningfully capture 
demographic shifts. The rapid urbanisation and growth of South African cities poses a serious 
challenge for demographers. Moreover, there have been improvements in rigour that make it 
difficult to find consistency between different census years. Each census thus represents a 
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significant methodological shift. How exactly to account for such shifts can be 
controversial.363 
Only a handful of analysts have grappled with the myriad practical challenges around 
South African data sources and boundaries to attempt longitudinal crime rate analysis at sub-
national level.364 Unsurprisingly, these have tended to be those with keen appetites for 
technical and quantitative challenges, rather than those with rich theoretical interests. Each 
appears to have begun the task from scratch (often in apparent ignorance of earlier attempts) 
and most have reported their methodology in terms too broad to allow for ready replication. 
There has thus been no accumulation of experience or refinement of method. Repeating the 
data-linking task over different years introduces additional complications, because of the 
length of time and boundary inconsistencies between census years.365  
Given the ease and frequency with which (high) levels of crime and violence in South 
Africa are ascribed to such deeply historical factors as the legacy of colonialism, Apartheid, 
or transition, it is striking how seldom and cursorily the long-term features in analyses. 
Impressionistic review with some historical depth is rare enough,366 but quantitative work has 
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an even stronger tendency to short-termism. Bona fide367 exceptions are time series with 
spans from 1955 to 1990,368 from 1975 to 1993,369 and from 1968 to 2003.370  
But South Africa is a large and infamously divided country, with crime rates that are 
likely very unequally distributed. A finer spatial grain of analysis was previously impossible 
(except for those few stations which featured in occasional Parliamentary questions,371 or by 
means of conviction statistics,372 which present an even greater interpretive challenge than 
most police-recorded crime statistics). For the years since 1994, however, station-level crime 
figures have been released on an ongoing basis, and it should finally be possible to look a bit 
more closely. 
Popular interest in releases of South African police crime figures seems to go little 
beyond percentage changes in a year-on-year comparison to the most recent. Media and 
scholarly analysis may sometimes extend as far as the last decade. There exists no single, 
publicly and easily accessible set of data that spans much greater a time frame. One key 
reason for this is that each official police statistical release contains the figures for only the 
ten years that precede it. The previous release is deleted from its website when it uploads the 
next one, although some figures continue to be reflected in annual reports, which are 
accessible online only as far back as 2008.373  
In fact, it seems that the SAPS itself keeps no official record of its historical crime 
statistics much prior to this date. In March 2017, a Promotion of Access to Information Act 
(PAIA) request was submitted to its National Deputy Information Officer for electronic, 
machine-readable records of station-level crime statistics for the years 1994/95 through 
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99 
 
2004/05. The official, eventual, and final police response was that their ‘masterfile’ contained 
figures dating only as far back as 2006, although ‘other members’ might have older 
records.374  
The Institute for Security Studies, the paragon of democratic administrative 
criminology, currently provides invaluable access to the longest publicly-available time-
series of station-level crime figures from 2004, for a current total of 16 years.375 Its website 
also has national and provincial crime figures for the years 1994/19 through 2003/20.  
There is no readily available way to access station-level statistics prior to 2004 or at 
any level prior to 1994. This despite the highly politicised question of how crime levels in 
post-Apartheid South Africa compare with those under Apartheid or before. This is critical 
for macro-aetiology, because different theoretical understandings can predict very different 
causal relationships if investigated in cross-section or in time series.376 Empirical tests in the 
United States have decades of refinement in, for example, attempting to capture the 
difference between static and dynamic measures of cities’ structural characteristics — i.e. 
how much crime is due to the overall level of a given macro-condition versus how much due 
to changes in that condition.377 
 
Chapter conclusion 
Whereas the previous chapter introduced some of the epistemological and ontological 
challenges with aggregate crime measurement in general terms, this chapter has demonstrated 
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how these have played out in the South African context. Their extent has been such that the 
criminological statistics have rarely been closely examined. 
In different ways, each of the main intellectual traditions within the discipline have 
constrained close engagement with these issues. Positivists have had very little of value to 
work with but have lacked the inclination to acknowledge and account for the implications of 
this deficiency. Critical scholars have had a great deal of value to work with, so have lacked 
the inclination to engage with the quantitative in any but the most general terms. So it is that 
few have succeeded in defensibly dividing the matter of ‘crime’ in the aggregate into 
analytically useful parts, to examine its distribution and trends. Furthermore, this blind spot 




Chapter five: A discipline in dilemma 
This chapter combines the heuristic tools developed in the second and third chapters with the 
contextual knowledge in the fourth to conduct a stylised categorisation and evaluation of that 
post-Apartheid academic literature on macro-level crime causation in South Africa that takes 
an implicitly positivist approach (that is, that assumes that criminal behaviour can to a 
meaningful extent be explained by observable phenomena external to the individual).  
It makes two key arguments. The first is that the discipline has been hamstrung by its 
failure to properly engage with its dilemma of empirical testability. Some have erred in 
considering crime prevalence to be obvious, and others in considering it unimportant. Failure 
to acknowledge the scale of the twin challenges of the importance and the difficulty of crime 
prevalence measurement has inevitably led South African macro-aetiology to stagnation. 
These epistemological and ontological snags are greater than any have yet acknowledged. In 
seeking insulation from reproof, scholars have precluded progress. Escape from stagnation 
will require a shift towards vulnerability. 
For purposes of demonstration, this review takes a novel format. Rather than trace 
certain theoretical streams chronologically or contrast them conceptually, it takes an 
additional step back to look at the explanatory strategies within which various theoretical 
positions and/or research methodologies have functioned. It employs the typology of four 
explanatory strategies proposed in chapter two, defined by approaches to scope (how general 
or particular a range of crime phenomena each has taken as explanandum) and parsimony 
(how inclusive or exclusive each has been in its selection of explanans). Each has featured 
both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, as well as a range of theories. A recent 
model text is presented as example of how each has tended to unfold in post-Apartheid South 




Figure 8 The model types of explanatory strategy 
 
 
These positions are ideal types — perhaps even parodies. Most texts engage in some 
hedging, seek a middle ground or combine elements of two or more explanatory approaches. 
Yet this chapter proposes that there is analytical value in this simplistic four-part model, as it 
helps reveal the core similarities and differences in challenges of testability. Moving beyond 
the discipline’s aetiological stagnation requires that we fully grasp these distinctions and 
thereby chart a path between the horns of the impossibility and the necessity of crime 
prevalence measurement to determine how crime statistics might be used to make defensible 
claims about long-term South Africa crime prevalence trends in a way that might be more 
macro-theoretically productive.  
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The chapter’s second key argument is that those explanatory approaches that have 
succeeded in producing novel and substantial results have done so by limiting their scope and 
parsimony to the realm of the testable. There is simply no meaningful way to gain empirical 
purchase on ‘crime’ as a general phenomenon, as well as on all its potential structural 
determinants. Far better to be selective in the scope of explanandum, as well as parsimonious 
in explanans. The more inclusive and general a proposed explanation, the less likely it is to 
offer the prospect of logical clarity, and the more likely it is to end in a cul-de-sac of vague 
speculation. The more parsimonious and particular a proposed explanation, the likelier it is to 
be conceivably testable. The task of understanding ‘crime’ should be abandoned in favour of 
applying proper rigour in the development of knowledge about a more limited phenomenon.  
 
Delimitation and structure 
This analysis addresses only that literature which exercises a ‘sociological imagination’ — 
that is, which locates its explanation within some understanding of the relationship between 
the individual and the wider society.378 More specifically, it focuses on that which purports to 
explain aggregate levels of crime in South Africa, either overall or in their distribution within 
the country, by means of some other aggregate level condition(s). This is work that more or 
less explicitly takes at least one macro-condition as primary explanans and suggests a causal 
relationship of some kind to the explanandum of macro-level crime conditions. 
This is a less ambitious undertaking than it would be in some other places. In the 
industrialised world (chiefly the United Kingdom and United States), the abundance of 
empirical criminological research is such that it has become popular to conduct regular meta-
analyses or systematic reviews to summarise and take stock of the available evidence on 
various aspects of and approaches to the aetiological question. This has even made it 
necessary to develop checklists of methodological quality to help inform the weighting of 
different studies in the combined statistical assessments.379 For example, one meta-analysis of 
the effectiveness of just one type of crime intervention (known as ‘focussed deterrence’), 
which had fairly strict criteria for inclusion in the review (including that the studies involved 
 
378 Dixon Understanding ‘Pointy Face’ op cit note 67 at 6. 
379 Joseph Murray David P Farrington & Manuel P Eisner ‘Drawing Conclusions about Causes from Systematic 




both before and after measures of officially recorded crime, and had to be either a randomised 
controlled trial or a quasi-experimental evaluation with comparison groups) identified 11 
such studies conducted in urban US settings in a period of just 12 years.380 These contexts 
produce a body of research that in sheer volume dwarfs that in South Africa. 
Not only this, but their empirical tests have the benefit of decades of refinement in for 
example attempting to capture the difference between static and dynamic measures of cities’ 
structural characteristics — i.e. how much crime is due to the overall level of a given macro-
condition versus how much due to changes in that condition.381 Structural empirical 
criminological enquiry at this level of refinement is in its infancy in South Africa. Anglo-
American theoretical concepts are often used to interpret domestic research findings, but 
seldom actually tested for their applicability or used to inform variable selection for empirical 
analysis ‘or to provide a clearer specification for the use of one or more statistical model’.382 
This despite the evidence that some typical causal culprits do not translate well between very 
different societies,383 and that there is likely limited value to be found in simply scanning the 
South African scene for things that look like the ‘shiny concepts’ developed by theorists in 
other contexts.384 
Even so, it would be impossible to provide an exhaustive account of all the academic 
work that discusses or touches on the question of the causes of any or all crime in South 
Africa. Over 600 articles were published between 1994 and 2013 in a single local academic 
journal, Acta Criminologica: Southern African Journal of Criminology, about half of which 
made some empirical claims.385 Although many of these are primarily about other crime-
 
380 Anthony A Braga & David L Weisburd ‘The Effects of Focused Deterrence Strategies on Crime’ (2012) 49 
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381 Chamlin op cit note 377.  
382 Gregory D Breetzke & Andre C Horn ‘Key Requirements in the Development of a Spatial-Ecological Theory 
of Crime in South Africa’ (2008) 21 Acta Criminologica: Southern African Journal of Criminology 1. 
383 For example whereas many cross-national studies have found a significant relationship between inequality 
and murder rates anthropologists have shown that that some extremely egalitarian societies have very 
high murder rates. In small nonindustrial societies inequality does not seem to be associated with 
levels of murder. Richard Rosenfeld & Steven F Messner ‘The Social Sources of Homicide in 
Different Types of Societies’ (1991) 6 Sociological Forum 1. 
384 Jonny Steinberg ‘How Well Does Theory Travel? David Garland in the Global South’ (2016) 25 The 
Howard Journal of Crime and Justice 4. 
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related issues (such as crime typologies, policing, corrections, rehabilitation, and so on), they 
likely draw on or refer to various aetiological theories. A good deal of empirical, theoretically 
grounded criminology is also done in other academic spaces or outside the academy entirely, 
as intimated in the previous chapter.386 Any account must necessarily be stylised and 
selective.  
This review draws only on that fraction of South African criminology which focuses 
explicitly on explaining rather than preventing, crime itself rather than existing or proposed 
reactions to crime. These are artificial distinctions but provide an entry point to a 
representation and assessment of the kind of aetiological theorising and research that the 
discipline has been producing. Some, especially those more embedded in the criminological 
field, attempt to sidestep explicit claims of causation. In most cases, however, and in the case 
of the texts discussed below, these are merely convenient semantic delusions. 
 
Assessing the model explanatory approaches 
Each of the four strategies, defined by scope of explanandum and parsimony of explanans, 
has strengths and weaknesses in its capacity to produce causal insights. Each has grappled 
and fared differently with the question of testability — that is, of how to gain purchase on the 
empirical. They are addressed in order of their declining popularity. 
 The first has fallen at the first hurdle, of giving useful empirical solidity to its 
independent variables. As such, despite their popularity, explanations of its kind have 
remained vague and unrefined, showing little or no progress over time. The second, in 
clearing this, reveals the larger challenges in making relatively defensible, comparable 
statements about how much ‘crime’ is happening where and when. This is partly because the 
more wide-reaching, generalisable data on offer in South Africa — the kind required to 
assess explanations of ‘crime levels’ overall or in distribution — are for the most part simply 
not up to the tasks to which they have been put.  
The scarcity of empirical evaluation of much of what is said about macro-level crime 
causation in South Africa is such that it has been difficult to develop precision in scope or 
even maintain logical clarity. Vague (albeit generally plausible) speculation remains the order 
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of the day. The approaches that have sought broad explanatory scope have had particularly 
limited success with testability. The key testability challenges of the four model explanatory 
strategies are shown below. 
 
Figure 9 Testability of the model explanatory strategies 
 
 
The following section demonstrates the extent to which each has treated macro crime 
prevalence trends and patterns as trivial. It also argues that there is a need to address directly 
the problem of testability in primary South African criminology, and that this can only be 
done by asking questions that limit their scope to the realm of the defensibly testable. The 




















































broader the proposed scope of explanandum and the more inclusive the explanans, the less 
prospect there is for the formulation of conceivably testable and refutable hypotheses.  
 
Strategy 1: Inclusive accounts of general phenomena 
The first explanatory strategy within our typology of post-Apartheid macro-aetiological 
South African criminology comprises those studies that aim to provide a more or less 
comprehensive account of the causal factors or processes at play in the causation of the 
general phenomenon of South African crime prevalence. It is favoured by those in that third 
intellectual tradition of legal reformist and/or democratic administrative criminology, but it 
would not be out of place in any introductory undergraduate textbook. Its explanandum is 
‘crime levels’ or ‘violent crime levels’ overall or in their distribution within the country; its 
explanans is a wide range of proposed causal factors.  
This appealing combination of both broad explanatory scope and inclusiveness of 
explanans have made this a popular approach in the South African context.387 Indeed, most of 
what gets written about the causes of crime and violence in South Africa seeks to explain 
why the country’s levels of crime and/or violence are high compared to other countries or 
compared to a more acceptable but undefined level. It tends to be implicitly on the national 
scale and cross-sectional. The testability pitfalls of this explanatory strategy are considerable. 
They are most fairly demonstrated with reference to one of its strongest examples. 
Between 2007 and 2010, a series of reports was produced by the Centre for the Study 
of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), commissioned by the Ministry of Safety and 
Security. These reports sought to explain whether and why South Africa seemed to 
 
387 See for example David Abrahams ‘A Synopsis of Urban Violence in South Africa’ (2010) 92 International 
Review of the Red Cross 878; Berg & Scharf ‘Crime Statistics in South Africa 1994-2003’ op cit note 
113; Louis Franklin Freed Crime in South Africa: An Integralist Approach (1963); Holtmann & 
Domingo-Swarts op cit note 113; Sibusiso Masuku ‘Prevention Is Better than Cure: Addressing 
Violent Crime in South Africa’ (2002) South African Crime Quarterly 2; Ingrid Palmary ‘Social 
Crime Prevention in South Africa’s Major Cities’ (2001); Pelser & de Kock op cit note 354; Martin 
Schönteich & Antoinette Louw ‘Crime in South Africa: A Country and Cities Profile’ (2001) 
Occasional Paper; Graeme Simpson ‘Explaining Endemic Violence in South Africa’ (1993) 
Weltfreidensdienst Quersbrief 3; HC van Zyl & A Theron ‘An Assessment of Some Factors 
Contributing towards the Climate of Violence in a Sociopolitically Changing South Africa’ (1995) 8 
Acta Criminologica: Southern African Journal of Criminology 1. 
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experience high levels of violent crime388 (as well as two related questions, namely why there 
is so much ‘acquaintance violence’ between people who are known to each other, and why 
there is such a high degree of violence in many criminal incidents).389 The goal was not to 
motivate for the superiority of any specific explanatory factor, but to show ‘what types of 
explanations should be regarded as of greatest relevance to the South African situation’.390  
Its conclusion, to paraphrase the final summary CSVR paper,391 was that ‘some of the 
factors which distinguish South Africa’ and help account for its high levels of violence are: 
1. The legacy of Apartheid and colonialism, specifically: 
a. Brutalisation and the culture of violence — a long history of urban violence and 
brutal treatment by the state and in labour practices. 
b. The impact of Apartheid on families and the education system — absent fathers, 
inconsistent primary caregivers, and problems such as alcoholism and violence. 
c. Racism — internalised feelings of inferiority and low self-worth. 
d. Firearms — the proliferation of firearms from local and regional conflicts in 
especially the 1980s and 1990s. 
e. Impunity in township areas — the entrenchment of criminal groups and criminal 
cultures due to Apartheid under-policing. 
2. Factors in post-Apartheid South Africa that reinforce the legacy of Apartheid, including: 
a. Inequality — SA has very high levels of inequality which takes a form that 
reinforces the psychological legacy of Apartheid. 
b. Other structural economic factors, including: 
i. Sophisticated capitalist consumer economy — providing numerous high- 
quality consumer goods as potential crime targets;  
ii. Sophisticated promotion of consumerism — driving a need for status and 
social credibility through possession of these goods;  
iii. Leadership of the black elite not providing a good example — fostering a 
perception that self-enrichment and corruption are pervasive and 
acceptable. 
c. State institutions not working evenly — the criminal justice and education 
systems are ineffective in addressing violent crime and in supporting positive 
youth socialisation. 
 
388 The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation ‘The Violent Nature of Crime in South Africa’ 2007 
162–63. 
389 Ibid at 6. 
390 Ibid at 162. 
391 The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation ‘Why Does South Africa Have Such High Rates of 
Violent Crime?’ 2009. 
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3. Other factors, including an unstable regional context — pushing people from other 
countries into SA, including ones seeking non-legal opportunities. 
 
These CSVR reports have been described as reflecting ‘mainstream conventional 
wisdom in academia in South Africa, and elsewhere, about why young men commit so much 
violent crime’.392 In fact, they likely represent the single most thorough exposition of the 
dominant macro-level explanatory approach of the discipline. This approach, as others have 
noted, amounts to the recitation of a series of likely factors — all of which are self-evidently 




The CSVR’s is a comprehensive list, incorporating theoretically unrelated features of 
bureaucratic history, culture, economic profile and development, political leadership, current 
bureaucratic functioning, regional conditions, and so on. The CSVR reports make no attempt 
to so much as speculate how these dozen-odd factors (and some others mentioned in earlier 
components of the series) should be ranked in importance. By implication, all are given equal 
explanatory weight. This attempt not to overlook any major, potentially significant factors 
was admirable in the context of its brief, but had the unfortunate effect of producing a result 
that was less argument than list. This would not be so much a problem if it didn’t seem to 
cement this list approach as the disciplinary norm.  
So it is common for papers within this mould to begin with an apocalyptic description 
of the severity of the national problem of crime or violence, with a caveat about the 
shortcomings of the data, followed by the assertion that a mono-causal explanation would be 
fruitless,394 and then a list of the proposed causes of South African crime and/or violence 
including: political factors, Apartheid, ethnicity, social change and greater expectations, 
 
392 Elrena van der Spuy & Clifford Shearing ‘Curbing the Filling Fields: Making South Africa Safer’ (2014) 625 
The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 1 at 188. 
393 Ibid at 195–96. 
394 Simpson op cit note 387.  
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economic factors, unemployment, poverty, and the family.395 Proponents of this strategy tend 
to avoid direct claims of causation, preferring to speak of conducive environments, 
vulnerabilities, distinguishing features, or risk factors. This apparent circumspection is a 
semantic illusion. Although self-conscious enough to thus recognise the shakiness of their 
ground, those who use these terms never give coherent account of how they meaningfully 
differ from causal claims.  
Each of the list items is generally accompanied by a paragraph or, at most, page of 
supporting text. There is often a sense of multiple theoretical traditions and concepts being 
invoked in rapid succession, with the minimum possible elucidation. This popular practice in 
South African criminological thought is an exercise in practical reasoning, ‘in which 
theoretical approaches are used in a somewhat eclectic and pragmatic manner in order to 
justify or make sense of current practices’.396  
The causal model of this type of explanation might reasonably be represented on a 
Coleman diagram as follows. 
 
Figure 10 Coleman diagram of CSVR causal model 
 
 
The shape of this causal model is wide-ranging in terms of its proposed causal macro-
factors and general in terms of its explanandum, but as such does not offer any detail on how 
 
395 Van Zyl & Theron op cit note 387. 
396 Van Zyl Smit Contextualising Criminology op cit note 279 at 1. 
111 
 
each or any of these factors might operate onto the individual level, proceed on the individual 
level over time, or aggregate back up to the macro-level. No single theoretical account could 
do so for such a diverse range of variables. The nodes at the individual level therefore remain 
unlabelled. The grey colour of the lines reflects the fact that there is in fact no empirical 
evidence provided to substantiate the proposed relationships. As we will return to below, it is 
hard to imagine how such evidence might possibly be sought. 
A variant of the ad hoc narrative list approach exemplified by the CSVR is one that 
uses quantitative methods to determine the ‘risk factors’ of crime.397 These risk factors 
constitute a less comprehensive list than those offered by more narrative and qualitative 
methods, as they tend to be derived from whatever the dataset that has already been selected, 
but remain theoretically eclectic at best. One paper, for example, notes that ‘some of the more 
prominent theories of offending’ to ‘bear in mind’ in interpreting its findings are biological 
theories, learning theories, social learning theories, and rational choice theories.398 This all-
inclusive theoretical review occupies a box filling less than half of one page. Its causal model 
takes a similar shape to that shown in the figure above, except that its macro-level dotted line 
might reasonably be indicated in black, as it does offer some empirical evidence for the 
existence (and possibly strength) of a macro-level relationship. 
But if positing the existence of a causal relationship between two macro-conditions 
does not constitute social theory, still less does superficially listing numerous plausibly 
relevant conditions together with some theoretical buzzwords. Few would deny that crime is 
caused by underlying political, social and economic factors, by structural shifts in community 
and social controls, and by fluctuations in opportunities, targets and motivations. Invoking all 
at once, however, is arguably more fruitless than selecting one for systematic observation.  
In order to make them function as useful analytical tools, it would be necessary to 
specify, for example, whether in discussing the role of economic deprivation the key causal 
factor proposed is absolute deprivation, relative deprivation (in wealth or income or 
 
397 See for example Patrick Burton, Lezanne Leoschut & Angela Bonora ‘Walking the Tightrope: Youth 
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consumption), the concentration of poverty, or economic segregation.399 Such concepts are 
difficult to untangle methodologically, but they are drawn from distinct theoretical 
frameworks, imply quite different processes at the individual level, and might lead to 
inconsistent empirical interpretations and subtly different policy implications.400 For each 
concept, there may be several measurement approaches, which should be selected so as to 
best reflect the relevant theoretical assumptions.401 Equally important is the selection of the 
level and unit of analysis.402 Poverty may be quite differently theorised and measured on the 
scale of the nation, the city, the neighbourhood, the family, and the individual.403 Depending 
on theoretical understanding, variables may also be expected to operate differently if 
investigated in cross-section or in time series.404 These myriad factors can be decisive in what 
a given general theory predicts in each specific set of circumstances.  
This is not to say that there is no value in lists. However, there is no prospect of 
specifying and tracing the way(s) in which each one of a list of a dozen or more macro-level 
variables operate onto the individual level, proceed within an individual life over time, and 
then aggregate to the macro-outcome. When an explanation amounts to a list of plausible but 
entirely unrelated theories and/or causal variables, there is no prospect of useful logical 
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clarity or a coherent account of levels of structural explanation. To be fair, the CSVR did 
provide some additional analysis for some items on its list in other papers in the series. Most 
do not. Most simply run through the list like a catechism, as if truth is a function of repetition.  
Another, considerably superior variant on this first explanatory approach of seeking to 
provide an inclusive account of the general phenomenon of crime is one that aims slightly 
more at a middle-range explanation. As discussed in chapter two, this is the domain of many 
of the orthodox criminological theories. Its prime examples in the South African case are 
those texts that explain crime by means of the conceptual clusters of the ‘Apartheid legacy’ 
or the ‘transition’ from Apartheid. These offer some superficial theoretical coherence in their 
explanans and are considerably narrower than the accounts offered by such as the CSVR. In 
their explanandum they have been less clear, but broadly have explored the (perceived) 
phenomenon of an increase in national crime rates in the years around and after 1994.  
Drawing extensively on earlier work by Mark Shaw, Louw argues, for example, for 
the causal role of the nature of the political transition, and in particular its ‘three related 
dynamics: the breakdown of community bonds and weakened social control particularly in 
black communities; the impact of political violence; and the acceleration of political, social 
and economic trends which had begun before the formal political transition in 1990.’405 Some 
more specific factors within these processes include the end of the State of Emergency in 
1990, the weakening of the state’s repressive capacity, the amplification of intra-community 
conflict and marginalisation related to the negotiation process, the abundance of firearms 
related to violent political contestation, the instability and rapid reorganisation within the 
criminal justice system, the weakened border controls, and the collapse of the rigidly-
enforced spatial, racial boundaries that had previously insulated some areas and confined 
some crime to those areas where it was less likely to receive official police recording 
attention.  
The ‘Apartheid legacy’ and ‘transition’ approaches do offer some superficial restraint 
in both explanans and explanandum, thus perhaps facilitating testability. However, the factors 
proposed still stretch over a considerable range of theoretical domains, including ideas about 
state repression, bureaucratic functions, social disorganisation, and crime opportunities. 
Indeed, most transition or Apartheid legacy theorists have arguably done little better than 
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slightly reduce the length of their lists of proposed causal factors. It is unclear what value 
there is implicitly pointing to any and all major changes around the 1990s as the causes of 
crime. They offer little prospect of developing clarity on exactly what causal variables, 
relationships and processes are being proposed or prioritised. 
As Glaser puts it in his critique of the ‘Apartheid legacy’ paradigm of explanation, 
such an approach is irrefutable: 
 
But that is also its biggest weakness: it is too all-encompassing. In 
effect, it is saying that violent crime has to be explained by South Africa’s 
history. But which part of the Apartheid legacy should we emphasise? Political 
violence? Harsh working conditions? Pass laws? The discrediting of the 
judicial system? The migrant labour system? The disruption of family life? All 
of these issues need to be dealt with in their own right. They are, of course, 
linked to Apartheid but they also have distinct trajectories. Invoking the 
Apartheid legacy without careful dissection offers us too much, and ultimately 
too little, by way of explanation.406  
 
The causal models of the ‘Apartheid legacy’ or ‘transition’ do little to show how each 
or any of these factors operate onto the individual level, proceed on the individual level over 
time, or aggregate back up to the macro-level. A related difficulty for much of the transition 
theory work of the 1990s is its failure to describe or define its core concepts in any detail. It 
neglected to draw on the extensive political science literature on democratisation, with 
instead an apparent assumption that ‘transition’ is a process ‘too well understood to require 
explanation, let alone analysis, and the supposedly criminogenic features of a “transitional 
society” too humdrum and obvious to need detailed description’.407  
To the extent that South African theorists have been clear about what they mean by 
transition and what causal mechanisms they consider most pertinent, there have been several 
different formulations, including:  
• Transition = Durkheimian process of modernisation → social disorganisation → more 
crime.408  
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• Transition = gap between collapse of repressive state control and creation of consensus-based 
social regulation → resort to self-help → more crime .409  
• Transition = weakened criminal justice institutions → failure to enforce law → more crime.410  
• Transition = period of widespread political violence → pervasive trauma and normalisation of 
violence → more crime.411  
Incidentally, there have also been some non-causal accounts, including: 
• Transition = improved relations between police and communities → increased reporting → 
more recorded crime.412 
• Transition = fairly arbitrary point in longer violent history → continuity → crime.413  
• Transition = coincides with neoliberal deregulation → private profiteering from ambiguities 
in sovereignties and norms → crime.414 
 
These may all at some point use the term ‘transition’, but they are very different 
arguments. They logically entail quite different predictions about crime patterns and 
trajectories. They could imply very different policy recommendations. To make sense of the 
proposed causal processes around transition, it would for example be necessary to specify 
which dimensions of transition (political, social, economic, or cultural) we are concerned 
with, at which phase of the process (pre-transition, transition, or consolidation), and the ways 
in which we account for unevenness in continuity and change.415 Such claims could and 
should then be developed and critiqued through some form of operationalisation and 
empirical evaluation, or risk being little more than just-so stories of crime causation.  
 
409 Simpson op cit note 387. 
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Unfortunately, this is seldom done. Much of the work along these lines has amounted 
to simply a slightly shorter list of causal factors or, especially in subsequent years, as 
examples of the practice of naming as explaining. Simply stating that the observed crime 
phenomenon is explained by transition or the legacy of Apartheid is akin to saying that it is 
due to the entire sociopolitical history of the country. This type of explanation is the bane of 
those who grade undergraduate criminology essays.  
 
External dimensions 
The problem with inclusive accounts of the general phenomenon of crime is that that this 
explanatory approach has seemed in the South African context not so often to open up and 
guide as to foreclose more rigorous investigation of the causal significance of each of the 
various items on their lists. Their inclusion in such a list suggests that they have been 
empirically established and are already well understood in the South African context, when 
this is seldom the case. Lists are made to stand in for, and give illusion of, the more detailed, 
exclusive, particular theoretical and empirical work they should be based on. In fact, list-
based explanation such as the CSVR’s tend to be light on citations. Those that are provided 
tend to be of Anglo-American theory textbooks or one or two small-scale local studies, but 
there is seldom any attempt to demonstrate an empirical link with crime levels in the South 
African context. The CSVR report, for example, supports its assertion of the causal 
significance of an alleged culture of ambivalence towards the law by citing just two papers, 
both of which were concerned only with organised crime groups in specific communities. 
This was the best that the CSVR researchers had to draw on. 
Further, as already mentioned, the weakness of explanatory approaches that seek to 
give inclusive accounts of general phenomena is that they are of no use in making clear 
predictions in specific cases.416 They explain everything but predict nothing.417 A long list of 
more-or-less unrelated usual causal suspects may be pleasingly complete as an ad hoc 
account of why South African has high levels of crime and/or violence, but it can explain no 
particular facts within or beyond that generality (such as why one part of the country might 
have higher levels of crime than another), let alone predict them. The proposed explanans 
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consists of too many moving parts that one would need to define and measure and study in 
interaction in order to give the explanation any predictive value.  
Each of its components might be subject to testing and assessment in isolation or in 
practical or theoretical selection, but in its entirety, an explanation of this form is impossible 
to subject to empirical investigation. There is no methodology, however mixed, that could 
simultaneously operationalise a national history of political violence (as binary yes/no or in 
spectrum?), the historical illegitimacy of state institutions, the enforcement of socially 
corrosive migrant labour policies, social and cultural modernisation, the nature of political 
and cultural leadership, the effectiveness of contemporary criminal justice institutions, (the 
presence, proximity, and/or severity of?) regional armed conflicts, gender norms, racism, 
socioeconomic inequality, global economic integration, firearm policy and enforcement, 
alcohol and other drug availability and consumption norms, and so on. This list constitutes an 
entirely ad hoc explanation that cannot conceivably be tested.  
This is crucial — there is no way to operationalise all or enough of the independent 
variables required to give such an explanation purchase on the empirical. They are too 
numerous and too diverse. They can’t be spelled out clearly in terms of levels of explanation 
and the logic of their specific proposed causal mechanisms, so they must inevitably remain 
vague and ad hoc. The problem of testability for these types of explanations stalls the 
traditional scientific feedback loop of inductive reasoning from empirical observation to 
theoretical generalisation, and deductive reasoning through specific hypothesis development 
and testing, etc. They are entirely unfalsifiable. Thus it is that effectively the same lists can be 
reproduced, with no appreciable refinement, in texts published in 1995,418 2001,419 2009,420 
and no doubt so on. 
On the other hand, the quantitative, risk-factors methodologies within this explanatory 
approach do succeed in operationalising their independent variables by limiting them to such 
quantifiable factors as age, gender, income, educational attainment, frequency of illegal 
substance use, attitudes towards violence, and so on. In this they transcend the problem of the 
 
418 van Zyl & Theron op cit note 387. 
419 Palmary op cit note 387. 




testability of the independent variable. However, they remain constrained by the difficulty of 
operationalising their dependent variable.  
Explanations of this first type are the ultimate low-risk strategy. Most readers will 
find something in it to agree with and it is unfalsifiable; no conceivable observation could 
disprove it. Its empirical implications (such as for other countries, places within the country, 
or trends over time) are impossible to divine or test. For example, the causal impact on crime 
of a national history of political violence and other Apartheid-related factors may conceivably 
be expected to dissipate over time; the causal impact of social/cultural modernisation or 
global economic integration may rise and then fall; racism and toxic gender norms may 
provide a constant causal pressure; changing firearm policies and regional conflicts could 
make for independent fluctuations.  
If South Africa’s levels of crime and violence were to fall precipitously and 
unambiguously, would this prove or disprove the CSVR’s explanation? This raises an 
additional difficulty, as not only does the inclusiveness of the explanans pose a problem for 
testability, but so does the generality of the explanandum. How might ‘crime levels’ or 
‘violent crime levels’ overall be usefully operationalised? That usual caveat about the 
shortcomings of the data hides a multitude of sins, as we will return to below in the section 
on the second major explanatory type. 
A final consideration for the value of this first explanatory type, which aims to 
provide a comprehensive, multi-theoretical account of the causal factors or processes at play 
in the causation of the general phenomenon of South African crime prevalence, is its use in 
guiding policy. As a basis for designing an entire policy framework from scratch, it is without 
peer. Indeed, it has been readily adopted. Drawing from this standard South African macro-
explanatory approach, the National Crime Prevention Strategy, for example, is ‘pragmatically 
eclectic’; it lists all the familiar factors and draws conceptual fragments as convenient from 
control, strain, opportunity, and structural theories.421 It is essentially a ‘check-list of almost 
every conceivable contributor to crime.’422 Kitchen sink theory has become kitchen sink 
policy. 
 
421 Dixon Introduction op cit note 274 at xxvi; Dixon Cloud over the Rainbow op cit note 112 at 33. 
422 Glaser op cit note 26 at 339. 
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This policy popularity may reflect the fact that suggesting that crime is caused by any 
and all socio-economic conditions arguably functions primarily as a tool for deflection. Thus 
the police are quick to meet every release of crime statistics with a reminder that broad 
societal ills are to blame.423 Every conceivable ‘social’ problem — urbanisation, alcohol, 
deprivation, a ‘culture of violence’, ‘culture of entitlement’ etc. — is lumped together to 
prove the inevitability of high South African levels of crime or violence.424 If crime is caused 
by everything, then there is little that the state or any other party can be expected to do about 
it directly, except perhaps make marginal improvements to the functioning of the criminal 
justice system.425 
Yet despite having been commissioned by the government and its results presented to 
the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Police, the CSVR reports themselves were not 
well-received among policymakers. Their response was that this was all very well but didn’t 
seem to tell them anything they didn’t already know or to offer useful guidance on what 
government could do about it. One of the study’s lead authors speculated that its lack of 
policy traction was due to the fact that aspects of its conclusions (such as its emphasis on 
poor policing and socioeconomic conditions) were politically uncomfortable and that its 
timing (released not long after the ANC ‘palace coup’ and resulting change in administration) 
saw it slip between the cracks.426  
This may be so, but another explanation is that the study’s recommendations were so 
wide-ranging. They numbered about 30 and stretched across nine pages of the report — four 
pages of its executive summary.427 The recommendations fell into five categories, namely: 
focusing and strengthening the criminal justice response to violent crime, adopting other 
safety measures, addressing the culture of violence and criminality, supporting positive and 
healthy child and youth development, and engaging in issues of social justice. Just the first of 
these five consisted of nine sub-points, for example including: 
 
423 Heidi Giokos ‘Crime Stats Reflect Societal Ills Says Popcru’ IOL September 2 2016 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/crime-stats-reflect-societal-ills-says-popcru-2063947. 
424 Pelser & de Kock op cit note 354. 
425 Super op cit note 18 at 42. 
426 David Bruce ‘Does Anyone in Charge Care about Violence?’ Sunday Times November 21 2010. 
427 The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation ‘Tackling Armed Violence’ 2010. 
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(c) Strengthening evidence-based crime investigation and prosecution: Efforts to 
strengthen the process of crime investigation and prosecution should seek to maximise the 
potential of the criminal justice system to effectively investigate and prosecute cases involving 
armed violence using evidence-based approaches. This includes improving support to police and 
prosecutors in relation to the use of different types of evidence including witness evidence, 
physical evidence and confession evidence. For instance, the increased use of DNA evidence 
envisaged in the draft Forensic Procedures Bill should be focused on suspects and convicted 
persons related to cases of armed violent crime. A critical issue here will also be a more 
sophisticated response to the problem of witness intimidation. … 
(e) Strengthening measures to ensure police integrity including strategies to identify 
corrupt police and to ensure effective investigations and disciplinary or criminal prosecution of 
police members implicated in corruption.  
(f) Use of stop and search tactics including vehicle stops and, in areas where there is a 
substantial problem of street robbery, the stop and search of pedestrians, in order to locate illegal 
firearms. 
(g) Clarifying police powers, and exploring potential police strategies, to address the use 
of knives or other instruments associated with sharp-force violence. 428 
 
This extraordinarily comprehensive set of recommendations might well usefully form 
the basis of a whole-of-government overhaul of criminal justice policy. But in many ways it 
amounts to, ‘Do all the things you are currently doing but do them better.’  
In summary, this first explanatory strategy within our four-fold typology is defined by 
its general scope of explanandum and the inclusiveness of its proposed explanans. It aims to 
give comprehensive account of the general phenomenon of crime prevalence. It has proven a 
popular choice in the South African context and is understandably tempting to those who 
have read widely and have a sense of the complexity and nuance of the problems at hand. The 
social world is complex and many or all of the items on such lists as the CSVR’s are indeed 
probably implicated in the causal webs of crime. A complete and fully satisfying explanation 
of crime in South Africa would likely need to incorporate them all. So, its key advantage is 
that it gives the impression of having left nothing out, of having fully explained the country’s 
crime problem in at least most of its undeniable complexity. This is explanatory warfare by 
carpet bombing.  
However, its theoretical inclusiveness means that it is ultimately unable to deliver 
logical clarity, to offer a coherent grasp of the particulars of the causal interaction of different 
levels of explanation, to seek or find empirical evaluation, or make predictions. Because it 
 
428 The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 56–57. 
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has no prospect of operationalising its independent variables, it inevitably remains an ad hoc 
list of probable but vague explanations, rather than an explanation in its own right. Any 
reasonably thoughtful layperson could generate a similar list on the basis of their general 
knowledge of the South African context. Lists and syntheses of the state of knowledge on 
various theoretically unrelated causal factors may well be useful to analysis or policymaking 
from scratch, but are of limited use in identifying specific strategic intervention points for 
policy attention.  
This first explanatory strategy is an unlikely source of any further productive 
developments. It under-simplifies. Regurgitating a list of concepts that have at some stage 
shown some explanatory relevance in Anglo-American contexts may remain valuable in 
shaping introductory texts but ultimately lead to an inevitable theoretical cul-de-sac. In 
seeking to deflect potential criticism, such an approach precludes potential progress. It has 
been fundamentally compromised by its tendency to implicitly treat the question of crime 
prevalence patterns and trends as trivial in the sense of being too obvious to require close, 
theoretically informed examination. 
 
Strategy 2: Exclusive accounts of general phenomena  
The second explanatory strategy within our typology comprises those studies that seek to 
explain a broad range of crime phenomena, such as crime prevalence or ‘crime levels’ overall 
or in their distribution, by means of a very limited range of explanatory factors. Unlike the 
first explanatory type, it does not aim to give a comprehensive account of the causal factors at 
play, but rather focuses on one or a small selection of causal factors that constitute a single, 
coherent theoretical concept. At its most extreme, it takes the form of quantitative models that 
purport to explain the level and distribution of all criminal behaviour (and indeed most other 
human behaviour) by means of a single behavioural principle (rational choice) and a handful 
of logically derived causal variables. In the South African context, this approach has been the 
unfortunately popular arena more of ‘economists’ than those who might call themselves 
‘criminologists’. 
The model text here is a recent working paper by Haroon Bhorat and others at UCT’s 
Development Policy Research Unit (DPRU), entitled: ‘The socio-economic determinants of 
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crime in South Africa: an empirical assessment’.429 In this study, the authors combined the 
official 2011 station-level crime statistics for the whole country with demographic data from 
the 2011 Census to investigate the association between reported crime rates and station area-
level unemployment and income and intra-station area inequality. For theory, it draws from 
the standard economic model of crime, in which ‘criminal behaviour depends on, amongst 
other things, the payoff from committing a crime successfully, conditioned by the likelihood 
of obtaining legitimate sources of income, together with this commensurate level of legal 
labour market income’.430 In this model, certain socio-economic conditions are significant for 
crime because they signal the relative returns to crime, or at least property crime. So, for 
example, the unemployment rate is predicted to be significant because it represents the 
expected returns to abstaining from crime. The rational agent weighs the expected returns to 
criminal acquisition against the expected returns to legitimate acquisition and, all else being 
equal, selects that which is greater. 
The Bhorat paper applies this theoretical model through ‘a combination of 
nonparametric and parametric analyses, including an IV regression design,’431 and finds:  
• An inverted U-shaped relationship between station area income and property crime, 
suggesting that larger station area incomes indicate higher returns to crime but that, 
past a certain income level, individuals take effective measures to protect themselves;  
• An inverted U-shape between income and violent crime, for reasons that fall beyond 
the model (perhaps because violent crimes are less reported in poorer areas);  
• No relationship between any socio-economic factors and robbery, likely because 
robbery is more opportunistic and involves less scope for rational decision-making;  
• No relationship between inequality and violent crime; and  
• No relationship between unemployment and any crime type.  
Bhorat et al note that insignificant findings should not be taken to signal that the 
indicator has no impact on crime, since station area-level data may not be appropriate for 
investigating individual-level driving factors.  
 
429 Bhorat et al. op cit note 364.  
430 Ibid at 1. 





The levels of explanation within a causal model of this second type might be represented on a 
Coleman diagram as follows. 
 
Figure 11 Coleman diagram of Bhorat et al causal model 
 
Unlike the CSVR, Bhorat et al offer a coherent theoretical account that provides some 
clarity on what exactly is the process being proposed. Each of the four nodes within its causal 
model can therefore be labelled. Also, unlike the CSVR, there has been an attempt at 
empirical evaluation — thus the dotted line is indicated in black. This has been entirely at the 
macro-level, using data on macro-level variables, with the mechanisms of macro- to micro-
causation, the process on the micro-level, and micro- to macro-causation or aggregation 
merely inferred from theory — these lines thus remain grey. This is a common criticism of 
such quantitative approaches: that they may produce statistical evidence to suggest the 
existence of a causal relationship, but in fact do little to reveal the nature of that 
relationship.432  
At least four other papers have used similar theory and data (slight modifications of 
the traditional economic model of crime, different isolations of causal factors, units of 
analysis, data years, and statistical techniques) to provide, untangle or at least examine ‘the 
 
432 Dixon Understanding ‘Pointy Face’ op cit note 67 at 6. 
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determinants’ of crime in South Africa.433 Here there is no talk of conducive environments, 
vulnerabilities, distinguishing features, or risk factors — but straightforwardly, causes. 
Clearly the diffidence of the sociologists is not shared by the econometricians. This 
difference between the disciplines’ degrees of epistemological humility is unfortunate and 
appears to be chronic.434 
These studies are open to dispute on theoretical grounds — that is, on whether their 
accounts of the lines in grey are warranted. For instance, rationality may be a weak tool to 
explain more emotionally-driven crimes.435 Most violence in South Africa seems to generate 
very little material reward for its participants and to involve little rational calculation of 
enrichment.436 Indeed, some have argued that South African property crime is distinctive in 
the gratuitousness of its violence — that more violence is used than seems necessary to gain 
access to the desired goods.437 The economic model of crime may also be difficult to square 
empirically with the many papers and meta-analyses that reveal that ‘most punishment-
oriented or criminal justice system predictors are weakly related to crime rates’, again 
suggesting that rational calculation of expected costs and benefits may not play an important 
role in crime causation.438 
But rational choice theory is not the necessary or only option for this explanatory 
strategy. Other papers on South African crime levels have employed quite different 
 
433 Kay V Brown ‘The Determinants of Crime in South Africa’ (2001) 69 South African Journal of Economics 
2; John M Luiz ‘Temporal Association the Dynamics of Crime and Their Economic Determinants: A 
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Economic and Management Sciences 3; Verrinder op cit note 364.  
434 See for example Ted Goertzel et al. ‘Homicide Booms and Busts: A Small-N Comparative Historical Study’ 
(2012) 17 Homicide Studies 1. 
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‘Cultural Criminology’’ (2010) 44 Social Policy & Administration February. 
436 Antony Altbeker Adding Injury to Insult: How Exclusion and Inequality Drive South Africa’s Problem of 
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theoretical models and causal variables, from the impact of the availability of alcohol or other 
drugs,439 to theories from evolutionary psychology about male intra-sexual competition.440 
Some have attempted to compare the explanatory value of various theories around specific 
explanatory variables,441 or have picked over the quantitative data without any explicit theory 
whatsoever.442 Others have been more obviously focused on methodologies, for example 
those designed for the analysis of spatial data (again, with443 or without444 any real attempt at 
theory). With very few exceptions,445 however, the critical feature that these studies share is 
their inadequate grasp of their dependent variable. Their empirical basis is almost invariably 
official criminological statistics. 
Quantitative models of social causation can be criticised for their assumption that the 
relationships among the variables are linear and additive, ‘like the recipe for a cake — take 
two parts poor education, one part impulsivity, and three parts poverty and you cook up a 
delinquent’.446 Unlike type one explanations, they also tend to strike criminologists as gross 
over-simplifications of the broad, complex phenomenon of all criminal behaviour. Notably, 
Bhorat et al’s literature review explicitly disregards anything that is criminological or 
anthropological in nature, constraining itself only to economic research.447 There is a sense 
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that these were methodological hammers that happened upon crime data as a deceptively 
convenient nail.  
But heavily quantitative methods aren’t the only ones that make use of this 
explanatory strategy of linking a single or small, theoretically cohesive selection of macro-
level causal factors with the general phenomenon of crime prevalence. Another approach 
distinguishable in the South African context (although seen less often in formal academic 
spaces than the popular press), is the use of a methodology of ‘common sense’ or what one 
might charitably describe as informal autoethnography. In this vein it has been proposed, for 
example, that the key macro-variable in the causation of crime in South Africa is a culture of 
violence,448 a culture of disrespect for the law,449 or the nature and personality of top police 
leadership.450  
These arguments are often circular, such as suggesting that crime is caused by a 
culture of lawlessness, which in turn is evidenced by levels of crime. Their conclusions are 
blithely reproduced in lists of causal factors along the lines of the first explanatory strategy. 
However, they have declined to advance beyond the broadest level of ad hoc generality. This 
is because they share with almost all methods within this explanatory strategy (and indeed the 
previous) a fundamental flaw — the operationalisation of their dependent variable. 
 
External dimensions 
This second explanatory strategy within our typology, which comprises those studies that 
seek to explain crime prevalence overall or in its distribution by means of a limited range of 
explanatory factors, produces explanations that are more superficially parsimonious than the 
more inclusive accounts seen in the first strategy. Bhorat et al’s explanation, for example, 
relies on a single behavioural principle and just three causal variables.  
 
448 Anthony Collins ‘Violence Is Not a Crime: The Impact of ‘acceptable’ Violence on South African Society’ 
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Unfortunately, this parsimony is illusory. It in fact relies on important background 
assumptions about the typical operationalisation of the dependent variable of crime 
prevalence levels, namely official criminological statistics. These assumptions are 
unwarranted. These type two explanatory approaches are sabotaged by their 
misunderstanding of the nature of official crime statistics as a measurement of crime 
prevalence. Most acknowledge that under-reporting compromises the completeness of the 
data, and even concede that this reporting-error is non-random. However, they fatally 
underestimate the significance of this fact. These primarily quantitative researchers that dally 
with the subject of crime would do well to note the approach of those whose primary 
expertise is on South African crime and policing. These latter tend to use the police crime 
statistics either not at all or at best very gingerly and tentatively.451 
All attempts to explain crime prevalence overall face the serious stumbling block of 
how this might be determined empirically. How do we know how much crime is happening? 
Is there, in fact, an ontological and epistemological reality to ‘crime’? Caveats about data 
quality and completeness are commonplace, but those from the more quantitative traditions, 
like Bhorat et al, have tended to seriously underestimate the extent and implications of that 
constraint.  
There is major variation in all the relevant parties’ inclinations and capacities to detect 
an incident of possible criminality, identify it as possibly criminal, deem it worthy of official 
attention, and substantially accurately report and officially record it. A given incident’s 
appearance in official statistics is subject to numerous and powerful social and institutional 
factors that winnow down the proportion of all criminal acts that make it into those statistics. 
For most crime types, the official numbers recorded by the police should at best be 
considered a lower bound of the ‘real’ prevalence of crime. Fraudulent claims may 
compromise even this.  
Crucially for quantitative work, the measurement errors in crime statistics introduce 
systematic distortions around precisely those variables in which we are likely to take an 
aetiological interest. Analyses of recorded crime rates that fail to account for large differences 
in reporting behaviour will inevitably be seriously misleading. Because they neglect the 
significance of the non-random variability in the reporting and recording of most crimes, 
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econometric approaches like Bhorat et al’s are simply not modelling what they purport to be 
modelling. What they identify as determinants of crime may just as well be determinants of 
reporting. Reporting factors can completely confound any results. This is so for any analysis 
that takes the official recorded crime statistics as given. No manner of statistical complexity 
or subtlety can make sense of this hopelessly distorted measure of crime prevalence.  
Inferring crime prevalence levels and distribution from the police-recorded crime 
statistics is like inferring disease prevalence levels and distribution from diagnostic data 
provided by general practitioners. Using such data might well lead one to conclude, for 
example, that only the wealthy suffer from flu or depression or erectile dysfunction. One may 
just as well seek to draw conclusions about the relative climates of Earth and Mars based on 
how often their respective residents care to mention the heat. These measurement problems 
with most criminological statistics have already been described in chapter two, but suffice to 
say here that quantitative models that use as dependent variable such measures as the official 
recorded rates of sexual assault, stock theft, or ‘drug-related crimes’ should be met with 
nothing short of derision. 
Most of the official criminological statistics do not withstand scrutiny as a defensible 
measure of ‘real’ crime prevalence. An admirable small handful of papers have opted for a 
different operationalisation of their dependent variable, obtaining their crime prevalence and 
distribution data not from the police but from correctional services.452 Unfortunately, this 
measure shares all the problems and distortions of the criminological statistics and introduces 
a great many more. There is little reason to believe that the distribution of sentenced prisoners 
reflects the ‘real’ distribution of criminal behaviour. There is plenty of reason to believe that 
it does not. It is by now widely accepted that race, gender, and class play critical roles in 
judicial adjudication.  
Victimisation and other population-level survey data are sadly underutilised for the 
purpose of operationalising aggregate levels of crime.453 Statistics South Africa’s national 
victims of crime survey may yet grow to offer radical aetiologists a more palatable measure 
of their dependent variable. There is still, unfortunately, a critical scarcity of large-scale, 
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nationally representative datasets that could feasibly be used in quantitative models of overall 
crime causation.454  
The subjective, ad hoc impressions of crime prevalence as used in the more 
qualitative, less systematic causal claims that fall within this second explanatory strategy can 
operate only on the broadest possible level of generality. Informal, subjective accounts of 
patterns in crime prevalence may well be misleading. Frustratingly few of those who seek to 
explain crime prevalence, broadly defined, seem to grasp how serious and chronic is their 
challenge of testability.  
Another exasperating feature of the quantitative papers in this mould, which has been 
observed in econometric research more broadly, is the apparent interest primarily in the 
statistical techniques rather than in making a substantive contribution to knowledge about the 
subject matter.455 As such, Bhorat et al neglect to specify any recommendations beyond that 
policy-makers should ‘pay attention to precinct-level inequality’ and that different crime 
types imply ‘different foci for policymakers’.456 Yet explanations of this type, with their 
apparent parsimony and broad scope, could conceivably be of clear value for policy. A 
simple, singular recommendation that purports to target the overall phenomenon of crime is 
an undeniably appealing prospect. Accompanied by an effect size and a graph, it is 
irresistible. To the lay reader, the more inscrutable the formulae and smattering of 
econometric jargon, the more authoritative are the text’s conclusions. Unfortunately, none in 
South Africa has yet grappled well enough with the testability problem of the dependent 
variable of aggregate crime levels to warrant such esteem. 
The more qualitative work in this explanatory strategy does not share this problem, 
arguably because it largely originates in its policy vision, rather than in any spirit of more 
open-ended empirical or theoretical curiosity. In this it is akin to the Afrikaner nationalist 
intellectual tradition described in the previous chapter. 
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This second approach within our typology aims to explore the causal significance of 
just a single or small, theoretically cohesive selection of macro-variables for the general 
phenomenon of crime prevalence. Its advantages over the explanations from the first 
explanatory type are that it offers greater (superficial) parsimony and as such can provide 
greater logical clarity and offer a theoretically coherent account of what exactly it is 
proposing in terms of its levels of explanation. It has seen quantitative empirical exploration 
at the macro-level, using data on macro-level variables, although the statistical relationships 
so established have limited capacity to reveal the nature of those relationships.  
More fundamentally, however, these kinds of explanation are compromised by the 
difficulty in defensibly operationalising the dependent variable of crime prevalence 
distribution. Most criminological statistics are simply not up to such a task. Whereas type one 
explanations are akin to theoretical carpet bombing (aim for all the possible targets in the 
hopes of hitting something worthwhile), the military analogy for type two explanations is that 
of counter-insurgency. Like American forces in Vietnam, these explanations may muster 
impressive technical superiority, but struggle to isolate and get to practical grips with enemy 
combatants.  
The testability problem in terms of its dependent variable(s) has meant that this 
explanatory approach has proven and will continue to be a limited source of valuable causal 
explanation. The fact that many of its proponents are dabblers in the criminological field 
render its conclusions touchingly naïve to those more familiar with the nature of South 
African policing and precisely the extent to which contextual factors determine the creation 
of official criminological statistics. For all its appeal in the apparent rigour and complexity of 
its statistical methods, the shortcomings of the readily available datasets are so large that 
drawing causal insights from such an approach are akin to analysis that takes as given the 
claims of an advertisement.  
 
Strategy 3: Inclusive accounts of particular phenomena 
The third ideal type within our typology of explanatory strategies does not seek to explain 
crime prevalence overall or in its distribution, but rather purports to account for a narrowly 
defined crime phenomenon, for example bounded by crime type, space, time, and/or named 
and theoretically-defensible features of the perpetrators or victims. It proposes that a 
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specified, small, theoretically and/or methodologically cohesive selection of crimes are 
accounted for by numerous theoretically unrelated macro-factors.  
Unlike the second type of explanation, it aims for a relatively comprehensive account 
of the causal factors or processes at play in a particular isolation of cases. At its most 
inclusive, it takes an inductive theoretical approach, beginning with relatively open-ended 
observations of specific cases and a search for regularities or patterns, perhaps proceeding to 
more formal theoretical generalisation (or simply naming the specific cases under 
examination as instances of established theoretical categories). Its methods tend to be 
qualitative. This means that it tends to produce something that may look rather more like 
description than explanation in the traditional (social) scientific sense. 
The typical qualitative methods of observation, interviews and documentary analysis 
are more often used for non-aetiological questions, and indeed it remains controversial 
whether qualitative methods can by themselves answer causal questions, ‘since the 
traditional, positivist/empiricist view is grounded in a philosophical understanding of 
causation that inherently restricts causal explanation to quantitative or experimental 
methods…[and due to the need to] address the practical methodological issue of how 
qualitative methods can identify causal influences and credibly rule out plausible alternatives 
to particular causal explanations, a key tenet of scientific inquiry’.457 Yet ethnographies of 
marginalised groups and spaces as tools of causal understanding are an established tradition 
in criminological explanation. Typically, the focus is on certain isolations of potential or 
known perpetrators, although victim profiles have also been done — most often of victims of 
murder or domestic violence.458  
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in South Africa’ (2013) 91 Bulletin of the World Health Organization 8; Rachel Jewkes, Jonathan 
Levin & Loveday Penn-Kekana ‘Risk Factors for Domestic Violence: Findings from a South African 
Cross-Sectional Study’ (2002) Social Science & Medicine 55; Morojele & Brook op cit note 439; Lu-
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In its ideal form, this explanatory approach results in thick descriptions. It is typified 
by Chandré Gould’s Beaten bad: the life stories of violent offenders.459 This study is a 
qualitative exploration, based around narrative interviews with 20 inmates serving sentences 
for violent crimes in South African prisons, as well as observations and discussion with 
others (police, family members, neighbours and teachers) who could provide contextual 
information on seven of the participants. This text’s conclusions can be paraphrased as 
follows. 
The combination of structural violence (for example, high levels of poverty and lack 
of access to quality education) and physical violence, in the absence of warm, trusting 
relationships, is shown to cause complex trauma and lay the basis for further violence. Simple 
dualities such as victim and perpetrator are of little use in this context. Here, the children who 
become criminally violent men are mostly victims themselves — of trauma, racism, bullying, 
corporal punishment and brutalising institutions. Their families are often dysfunctional or 
broken and they continually encounter adults who reinforce their distrust of authority figures. 
While this is not to suggest that the men are blameless for the often-cruel acts of violence 
perpetrated, it does imply the need for a more nuanced and compassionate response than has 
been taken up to now.460 
 
Internal dimensions 
This third explanatory approach lends itself to absorbing human narratives that flourish best 
in long form, as demonstrated by the success of two recent popular books. Through his close 
familiarity borne of literally decades of observation, Pinnock’s Gang Town explores the ways 
in which certain individual experiences (such as exposure to socioeconomic, developmental 
and/or nutritional deprivation and trauma in childhood) translate into adult involvement in 
gangs in parts of Cape Town.461 Similarly, Shaw’s Hitmen for Hire uses the perpetrator life 
narrative to explore the world of South African contract killers.462 Other narrative historical 
accounts of criminal behaviour in particular times and/or places use this same explanatory 
 
459 Gould op cit note 74.  
460 Ibid at 1. 
461 Don Pinnock Gang Town (2016). 
462 Mark Shaw Hitmen for Hire: Exposing South Africa’s Underworld (2017). 
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approach with a quite different methodology.463 Slightly less inclusive accounts have made 
use of surveys, for example with sentenced prisoners,464 or with populations suspected to 
contain a significant number of perpetrators,465 or with victims.466 As with type one 
explanations, quantitative methods using this explanatory approach tend to produce what 
amount to lists of risk factors and effect sizes for the causation of certain crimes.467 
In its thick, narrative form, this is Dixon’s proposed route out of South Africa’s 
aetiological crisis: a detailed qualitative exploration of the life course of the individual 
criminal. The reasoning in such texts, such as Gould’s, are plausible. As with qualitative 
explanations of the second type, however, they often tend to the circular. So, Gould 
effectively suggests that high levels of violence are the result of high levels of violence. This 
raises questions about whether the proposed mechanisms of the causal relationships may not 
be spurious — that there may not be other variables that in fact explain both the subjects’ 
experiences of violence in childhood and their perpetration in adulthood.  
They are also often marked by vagueness about what exactly is being proposed as the 
important causal factor(s). This is related to the fact that the defining characteristic of such an 
explanatory approach is its extremely limited parsimony. The story of just one of Gould’s 20 
participants fills 17 pages of the report and draws on a range of theoretical concepts including 
self-control, socialisation and attachment styles, understandings of the neuroscience of 
trauma, epigenetics, counter-cultural sources of morality, and so on.468 And even this was an 
intentionally selective account, as the interviews gave rise to many other subjects and themes 
that are not discussed in this report.469 Rather than proposing one rationale for the 
 
463 Gary Kynoch ‘Reassessing Transition Violence: Voices from South Africa’s Township Wars 1990-4’ (2013) 
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the Background of Young Serious Offenders’ (2000) 13 Acta Criminologica: Southern African 
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relationship between certain predetermined variables, it recounts narratives that raise many 
variables and hint at numerous possible relationships between them. As Gould freely 
acknowledges, this approach:  
can only go so far in providing an understanding of how these factors influence 
and inform the trajectory of an individual’s life; how that may vary from person to 
person; or how the sequence or timing of stressors can influence an individual’s 
response. The complexity of individual lives and the many factors we may not be able 
to identify and separate into clear, measurable variables mean that research such as this 
can offer depth, nuance and additional understanding of how many factors…influence 
the course of a life.470 
 
Similarly, Pinnock’s Gang Town draws on theories around the development of 
criminality across the life course, parenting and socialisation, the ecology of neighbourhoods, 
biological factors and epigenetics, and so on. The rigid, linear structure of a Coleman 
diagram is ill-suited to capturing the complexity of such a wide-ranging account, but the 
following may be a passable attempt to reflect the kind of causal argument being made. 
 
 
470 Ibid at 11. 
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Figure 12 Coleman diagram of Gould causal model 
 
In other words, this explanation invokes conditions of deprivation and violence on the 
vaguely defined collective level, and hints at the significance of this process for the collective 
outcome of violent crime in South Africa. Gould’s account is unusual in how little emphasis 
it places on describing the crime phenomenon being explained; most other explanations in 
this mould set their stage in the most catastrophic terms possible. Gould focuses attention on 
describing the numerous inter-related processes that translate individual childhood trauma 
into individual adult involvement in violent crime. Other studies based on this explanatory 
strategy will define their causal nodes differently and foreground different constellations of 
causal processes but will tend to produce causal models of a similar nature — fairly tentative 
and thin on either collective end, but empirically solid and broad in the individual middle.  
This is because the difficulty with the perpetrator narrative is that it can’t make any 
more than the most guarded claims about direct causality and it offers no prospect of isolating 
causal factors or determining their real or relative predictive value. Only a small number of 
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South African studies have sought to do so, thus far only for gender-based violence.471 Cohort 
studies and representative cross-sectional surveys make this mode of explanation possible by 
sacrificing some of their inclusiveness in terms of causal factors. This is an area ripe for 
further growth, provided it can avoid slipping into the first explanatory mode and taking the 
form of a simple list of causal risk factors.  
This third type of explanation is also constrained by its limited scope. It does not seek 
to, and thus cannot be maligned for failing to explain crime prevalence overall or in its 
distribution. As those that favour this explanatory approach will happily concede, no account 
that seeks to be inclusive can be sufficiently comprehensive and nuanced to usefully reflect 
the causal processes at play in all crimes at all times and places.  
 
External dimensions 
The difference between type one explanations and these in type three lies in the breadth of 
their explanatory scope. It is precisely this restraint in explanandum that makes their 
empirical work feasible. Theoretically wide-ranging narratives are of little use in explaining 
wide, diverse ranges of behaviour, but can be useful in explaining specific, fairly cohesive 
isolations of crime phenomena. 
Indeed, this type of explanation achieves its empirical value by being selective in 
scope. So, Gould has a good answer to the question ‘How do you know?’, namely, ‘Because 
the subject told me so directly.’ But the interview subject in question can only speak to the 
narrative of her/his own life. If we concede that perpetrators are reliable sources on the causes 
of their own criminal behaviour, this is a solid and entirely defensible grounding in the 
empirical. 
This inductive theoretical approach sidesteps the question of direct testability. But 
there is no simple way to turn these observations into specific hypotheses in unlike cases. 
Such an approach thus has little or no predictive value. Despite Gould’s attempts at a sample 
group broadly representative of national demographics, there is little reason to believe that 
these 20 sentenced inmates’ life narratives provide sufficient basis on which to explain 
 
471 Safety and Violence Initiative ‘Towards a More Comprehensive Understanding of the Direct and Indirect 




macro- or even other micro-level crime outcomes in, for example, the offending behaviour of 
women, or non-violent offenders, or among the better-off. Such a study can’t reveal how 
much of the variance in criminal violence is explained by the factors it foregrounds as 
opposed to others, or why area A has higher levels of crime than area B this year, but perhaps 
not the year before. It cannot account for why only some of those with such childhood 
experiences go on to mete out violence on others. Any broader claims about unlike 
perpetrators or crimes can only be inferred indirectly and tentatively. 
It takes a deft hand to formulate this kind of research into convincing policy 
recommendation. A policymaker may reasonably wonder whether the knowledge it produces, 
albeit compelling, is new or surprising or concrete enough to have warranted the exercise. 
Gould succeeds admirably in weaving these multifaceted narratives into relatively clear 
recommendations for initiatives that support and develop positive parenting, and to improve 
the early identification of at-risk children and adolescents. As a rule, however, this 
explanatory strategy makes for policy recommendations that are at a high level of generality. 
The strength of this third type of explanatory approach, which seeks to give an 
inclusive account of the causal factors for a very particular isolation of the crime problem, is 
that it allows for incomparable depth and nuance, at least when using qualitative methods. 
Dixon may well be correct that this is an area of aetiological exploration that South African 
criminology has neglected, to its detriment. But its tightly limited scope, lack of parsimony, 
inability to test for and establish the existence (never mind strength and exact nature) of a 
causal relationship, and limited policy usefulness mean that the answers it produces are 
destined to be partial.  
If the appropriate military analogy for type one explanations is carpet-bombing, and 
that for type two is a clumsy counter-insurgency, that for type three is the careful selection 
and swarming of a strategic target with all available weapons and resources.  
 
Strategy 4: Exclusive accounts of particular phenomena 
The fourth, last, and rarest explanatory strategy within our typology is that which seeks to 
explain a narrowly delimited proportion of the overall phenomenon of crime by means of an 
also narrowly delimited proportion of explanatory factors. Unlike types one or two, it does 
not aim to explain crime prevalence overall or in its distribution, but a specific crime 
phenomenon bounded by crime type, space, time, and/or features of the perpetrators or 
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victims. Unlike type one but like type two, it does not aim to give a comprehensive account 
of the causal factors at play, but rather focuses on one or a small, theoretically cohesive 
selection of causal factors proposed as important.  
Its best examples in the South African crime context pertain to the impact of specific 
cultural values on intimate partner violence,472 and of firearm policies on rates of murder,473 
as exemplified by the research by Richard Matzopoulos and others in ‘Firearm and 
nonfirearm homicide in 5 South African cities: a retrospective population-based study’.474  
The objective of this study by Matzopoulos et al was to assess the effectiveness of 
South Africa’s Firearm Control Act (FCA) of 2000 at reducing firearm murder, by means of a 
quantitative longitudinal analysis of five years of data (from 2001 to 2005) from the National 
Injury Mortality Surveillance System (NIMSS), across five South African cities (Cape Town, 
Durban, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, and Pretoria). The NIMSS database ‘collates 
information gathered from death registers, autopsy reports, and ancillary police and 
laboratory documentation from forensic pathology laboratories’.475 The study compared the 
trends in rates of murders due to firearms with those due to others methods, adjusting for age, 
sex, race, day of week, city, year of death, and population size.  
It concluded:  
There was a statistically significant decreasing trend regarding firearm 
homicides from 2001, with an adjusted year-on-year homicide rate ratio of 
0.864 (95% confidence interval [CI] = 0.848, 0.880), representing a decrease 
of 13.6% per annum. The year-on-year decrease in nonfirearm homicide rates 
was also significant, but considerably lower at 0.976 (95% CI = 0.954, 0.997). 
Results suggest that 4585 (95% CI = 4427, 4723) lives were saved across 5 
cities from 2001 to 2005 because of the FCA. … Strength, timing and 
consistent decline suggest stricter gun control mediated by the FCA accounted 
 
472 Naeemah Abrahams & Rachel Jewkes ‘Effects of South African Men’s Having Witnessed Abuse of Their 
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Control Act’ (2013) 51 South African Journal of Surgery 3; Western Cape Department of Community 
Safety The Effect of Firearm Legislation on Crime: Western Cape (2015); Guy Lamb Jagged Blue 
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for a significant decrease in homicide overall, and firearm homicide in particular, 
during the study period.476 
 
Internal dimensions 
In what may reasonably strike the busy reader — especially policymaker — as a major 
advantage, this entire report of the Matzopoulos et al study comes to a length of just four-
and-a-half pages (five-and-a-half including the list of references). This is extraordinarily 
parsimonious not just in the length of the final report, but in terms of the neatness and 
simplicity of the causal argument being implied. This is made possible by restricting the 
analysis to a single material item as the causal factor or explanans (the firearm), and a single 
measurable factor as explanandum (changes in the proportion of firearm murders in five 
major South African cities over a five-year period). No attempt is made to contribute to 
knowledge about general crime prevalence patterns or trends. As far as studies like that of 
Matzopoulos et al are concerned, the goal is only to explain this very particular crime type, as 
reflected in these very particular, localised measurements.  
Even so, this hasn’t in this case translated to much logical clarity. Perhaps because the 
nature of the relationship struck the authors as so obvious as to demand no explanation, none 
is provided as to exactly how they arrived at the hypothesis of ‘a significant decrease in 
firearm homicide specifically attributed to the increasingly stricter gun control coinciding 
with the phased implementation of the FCA that was fully implemented by 2004’.477 There 
are a number of ways in which such a relationship might conceivably hold. Two major 
theories are often contrasted in the criminological literature: crime facilitation and weapon 
effects.478 Both theories ‘are predicated on the perceived and actual advantage weapons 
provide weapon carriers’ and their impact in increasing the deadliness of assaults, but 
whereas the first proposes that criminal intent precedes and motivates weapon carrying, the 
second suggests that weapon carrying in fact ‘triggers’ more criminal involvement and 
 
476  Ibid. 
477  Ibid. 
478 Amanda D Emmert Gina Penly Hall & Alan J Lizotte ‘Do Weapons Facilitate Adolescent Delinquency? An 
Examination of Weapon Carrying and Delinquency among Adolescents’ (2018) 64 Crime & 
Delinquency 3 at 343. 
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emboldens individuals to behave in ways that they would not do were they not carrying a 
weapon.479 
So, for example, the important causal impact of the implementation of the FCA might 
be negligible on the overall rate of violent criminal incidents, but reduce the lethality of these 
events. Alternatively, reduced access to firearms among those at risk of engaging in violent 
crimes might shift their incentives towards other means of making money or passing the time. 
There may also be quite different reasons. The policy implementation might, for example, 
result in a cultural shift away from casual possession of and reliance on firearms as a means 
of status or security, towards a reliance on other means.  
Indeed, this is a common weakness of quantitative explanatory approaches that rely 
on apparently simple and narrowly defined macro-level causes and effects: they may make 
convincing claims about the existence and strength of a causal relationship but neglect even 
to attempt to open that black box of causality to show its workings. Thus, they tend to 
produce explanations that are empirically solid at either collective end and in the macro-level 







Figure 13 Coleman diagram of Matzopoulos et al causal model 
 
 
On the other hand, there are also those South African studies within this fourth broad 
explanatory approach that offer more than just such theoretically meagre quantitative 
accounts. Some typical examples relate to the proposed role of certain gender norms,480 
childhood adversity,481 or the two combined,482 in the perpetration of gender-based violence. 
These, too, find their strength in the exclusiveness of their proposed causal factors 
(explanans) and the specificity of their explanandum, which allow for such methods as 
representative surveys. Their authors are intimately acquainted with and forthright about their 
theoretical and ideological positions. 
Explanations of this form have the advantage of extraordinary parsimony. They have 
succeeded in making persuasive claims because they have found a defensible means of 
empirical engagement. This is because they have tightly limited both their explanatory scope 
 
480 Jewkes et al. op cit note 472.  
481 Abrahams & Jewkes op cit note 472. 
482 Shanaaz Mathews Rachel Jewkes & Naeemah Abrahams ‘‘I Had a Hard Life’: Exploring Childhood 
Adversity in the Shaping of Masculinities among Men Who Killed an Intimate Partner in South 
Africa’ (2011) 51 British Journal of Criminology 6. 
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Whereas the first and second explanatory types flounder around the question of testability, 
and the third sidesteps it, in this the type fourth approach as demonstrated in Matzopoulos et 
al excels. It produces clear and specific hypotheses that can be tested and assessed on the 
strength of a statistical relationship. Matzopoulos et al have a defensible grip on the 
empirical. This is reflected in the fact that at least one of the causal lines in its Coleman 
diagram is rendered in black, rather than grey. This is closely related to its constrained scope. 
Crucially, the goal in Matzopoulos et al is not to explain crime prevalence overall; it is only 
to explain changes in levels of firearm murder in five major South African cities over a five-
year period.  
This tight focus is the basis of its empirical strength, as it draws only on that data 
which is genuinely defensible for exploring such a question — mortuary statistics. The 
NIMSS mortuary statistics are understood to be a representative, virtually complete record of 
all deaths due to other than natural causes within their areas and period of coverage. This 
offers the rare prospect of making a reliable claim about relative crime prevalence levels over 
space or time. This methodology would be of little or no use in examining the causation of 
most other crimes, like sexual assault or burglary.  
The strength of this explanatory strategy, which is pragmatically selective in both its 
dependent and independent variables, is that it makes it possible to select only those 
observations that are genuinely defensible for these ends. This is why a causal model such as 
that proposed by Matzopoulos et al boasts a black, rather than grey dotted line at the macro 
level. Unlike the appealingly conclusive just-so stories of the first explanatory type (which 
can offer no empirical access to either their proposed independent or dependent variables), 
the naïve generalisations of the second (which may conceivably operationalise their proposed 
independent variables but fail to grasp quite how undependable are their dependent 
variables), and the woolly narratives of the third (which achieve some empirical solidity at 
the individual level by sidestepping macro-level causal claims), this fourth approach offers 
the prospect of operationalisation of all its variables. 
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This is not to say that it is beyond criticism. Quite the contrary. Because it is so bold 
as to nail its explanatory colours to the mast, to propose a testable — and thus contestable — 
relationship between two or more clearly-defined and empirically accessible variables, it is 
open to refutation in a way none of the other explanatory approaches would brave. Precious 
little criminological analysis in South Africa can boast anything approximating experimental 
conditions, with the result that they cannot hope to eliminate any or all alternative 
explanations.  
But it is precisely this fallibility that makes this fourth explanatory approach so 
admirable and constructive. Explanations of the first type are little more equivocal than 
horoscopes; those of the second are as empirically hollow as homeopathy; those of the third 
are as perceptive but also nebulous as poetry. Each may offer meaning. There is no 
conceivable contradictory observation that would lead to the rejection of the accounts offered 
by the CSVR, Bhorat et al, or Gould. Each of these thus swells, rather than curtails the 
volume of knowledge. Only this fourth explanatory approach offers that superlative prospect 
of refutation. 
Yet perhaps the single clearest advantage of this fourth explanatory approach, as 
demonstrated in this study of Matzopoulos et al, is that it can so succinctly and directly 
translate into specific policy recommendation. Having succinctly established that a single, 
clearly defined explanatory factor is likely to be responsible for a given variation in the 
single, clearly defined crime phenomenon (for example, that about 4600 lives were saved 
across the five cities from 2001 to 2005 because of the FCA), the policy implication is 
equally singular and clear: stricter gun control policies. To continue the military analogy, this 
explanatory approach is akin to a targeted assassination. It may succeed or it may fail. It may 




This chapter has implemented the meta-theoretical explanatory distinctions introduced in the 
third chapter — that is, a four-part typology of approaches to parsimony of explanans and 
scope of explanandum, plus the heuristic simplification offered by Coleman diagrams, and 
the other metrics of theoretical comparison of precision and logical consistency, testability 
and empirical validity, and relevance to policy. By these means, it has conducted an 
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unsympathetic evaluation of that post-Apartheid academic literature on structural crime 
causation in South Africa that takes an implicitly positivist/empiricist approach — which is to 
say, that which assumes that criminal behaviour can to a meaningful extent be explained by 
observable aggregate phenomena external to the individual.  
Its value lies in its systematic nature and severity. There is likely no conceivable 
explanatory approach within this hazy field that could fully satisfy these exacting diagnostics. 
The goal has not been to malign or disqualify the entire existing body of South African 
criminological analysis. Instead, this chapter has sought to illustrate the shaky, inherent meta-
theoretical foundations of each of the four explanatory approaches. It is by these means that 
two important arguments can be made. 
The first is that the discipline’s dilemma of empirical testability is chronic, severe, 
and previously uncharted in scale. Obtaining empirical access to the proposed dependent 
variable(s) at play is a far more difficult task than most analysts have recognised. The 
operationalisation of the explanandum of crime prevalence levels, trends, or distribution is far 
from trivial. It is neither obvious nor unimportant. Failure to acknowledge the extent of this 
challenge has led South African macro-aetiology to innate vagueness — and therefore to 
stagnation.  
The chapter’s second key argument is that it is only in exercising restraint in scope of 
explanandum and parsimony of explanans that empirical work can offer the prospect of 
contradiction. There is no meaningful way to make empirical purchase on ‘crime’ as a 
general phenomenon, as well as on all its potential structural determinants. The broader the 
proposed scope of explanandum and the more inclusive the explanans, the less prospect there 
is for the formulation of conceivably testable and refutable hypotheses. The first explanatory 
approach amounts to claiming that everything about South Africa causes everything about its 
crime situation. The second suggests that one thing explains everything. The third, that 
everything causes one thing. The fourth, that one thing causes one other thing. With every 
step towards the more particular, the greater is the scope for refutation — and therefore for 
progress. To the extent that one values empirical rigour and the potential for theoretical 
advancement, as opposed to vagueness and endless repetition to the point of stagnation, there 
is a cost in generality. There simply is no way to fully explain everything about crime in one 
text. The instinct to do so should carry a large part of the blame for the fact that there is so 
little to be said about the patterns, trends, nature or causes of ‘crime’ in South Africa now that 
couldn’t have been said, or indeed haven’t already been said, 25 or even 50 years ago.  
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Contemporary South African criminology still bears precisely the trademarks of 
largely Continental criminology that were described in 1972 as consisting of ‘[v]ery loose 
general “theories”, hardly refutable at all on the one hand, and an often low level of 
abstraction in empirical research on the other (with narrow applicability of conclusions as a 
consequence)’.483 Fuzzy theory and even fuzzier methodology continue to dominate here to 
such an extent that their fuzziness has languished largely unremarked. Few since 1994 have 
had the audacity to make a causal claim specific enough to warrant opposition. The discipline 
has no shortage of disputes at the level of metaphysics, ideology, and identity — but almost 
none at the empirical. Disagreements centre on what kind of questions should be asked in 
what ways, by whom, and for what purpose, but seldom on whether a proposed explanation is 
correct in fact. The aetiological crisis is extremely severe. 
 
483 Dessaur op cit note 152 at 1. 
146 
 
Chapter six: An empirical confrontation with the dilemma 
The preceding chapters have offered analyses on the levels of meta-theory, history, and 
critical appraisal. They stand justifiably accused of navel gazing and of devoting effort only 
to critique, rather than to building something. Countless scholars have been maligned for 
vagueness about and poor empirical grip on their object(s) of explanation. This chapter seeks 
to establish, as defensibly as possible, just one observation about long-term South African 
crime prevalence trends that would seem to deserve and require explanatory effort (or 
empirical refutation). It pursues an explanandum sufficiently narrow and specific as to allow 
for conceivable testability. It offers no explanans and no causal speculation.  
This chapter has five specific goals, which together provide empirical support for the 
argument that the problem of South African crime prevalence measurement is far from trivial 
— it is practically and theoretically complex and important. The first and least is to suggest a 
specific object for future explanatory attempts. The second is to find some relatively 
defensible empirical fulcrum around which existing and future explanatory theories can be 
weighed. The third is to offer an example of how one might seek to grapple productively with 
the tensions and ambiguities in the measure of crime prevalence. The fourth is to suggest the 
remaining extent and inevitability of those ambiguities.  
The fifth and most important goal of this chapter is to demonstrate the level and 
complexity of knowledge and methodological skill involved simply in making a relatively 
defensible claim about long-term South African crime prevalence trends. The devil of this 
dissertation is here, in the methodology. This extended reflection on methods begins to reveal 
important new ideas for South African criminology. 
To these ends, this chapter details a process in which South African official police 
murder statistics were collected and manipulated in order to make them useful, and the key 
challenges and limitations within which context they must be understood. All the data used 
here is secondary. It was nominally publicly available. It was not, however, in a format that 
could be used for any analysis. This chapter shows why and how it was necessary to combine 
the murder figures with contemporary administrative documents and Geographic Information 
System technology to generate rates per capita.  
This chapter works on the proposition proposed in this chapter that the murder 
statistics officially recorded by the South African police, combined with appropriate 
population data to produce murder rates per capita and corroborated with other sources, might 
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be used to make defensible claims about crime prevalence in a way that could prove 
productive for aetiological theory. They remain far from perfect for this purpose but have 
much to recommend them. Trends and patterns in murder offer a more particular object of 
explanation than crime in general. Whereas ‘crime’ is a category of behaviour too broad and 
shifting to lay much claim to ontological reality, ‘murder’, or intentional homicide, is 
relatively narrow. 
Murder is relatively unambiguous and consistent in lay interpretation and legal 
definition. Murder rates have even greater epistemological advantages. They are a uniquely 
robust quantitative tool to make relatively defensible statements about how much crime is 
happening where and when. They are subject to far less discretion in reporting or recording 
than is the case for any other crime. Victims of murder are not in a position to report the 
event to the police, but by the same token, they are not in a position to opt not to report to the 
police. Murder usually leaves an indisputable and categorical trace in the form of the corpse. 
This makes the police account of its extent subject to routine corroboration from independent 
sources, such as population registers and especially mortuary records.  
As compared to other crime types, there is reason to believe that its ‘real’ incidence is 
more fully and stably captured in official statistics, such that not only are its ontological and 
epistemological constraints reduced, but they are also relatively stable across space and time. 
This makes its accounting uniquely appropriate for purposes of comparison over disparate 
contexts, including large areas and the long term. Murder statistics thus allow for 
incomparable analytical breadth and depth. They are collected and described here over the 
longest possible time frame and at the lowest possible level of geographic aggregation. 
Collecting, scanning, and digitising these figures was the project of many months. Wrangling 
them into a useful shape took many more. The task is massively complicated by the poor 
correspondence between different administrative data sources. Police hierarchies of 
evaluation and jurisdiction have little in common with their counterparts in the fields of 
health or electoral politics. However, close empirical engagement with scale in time and 
space offers a rich source of new ideas for causal inquiry.  
 
The dilemmas of South Africa murder rates 
The preceding chapters have in effect motivated against the use of most recorded crime 
statistics as tools of aetiological testing. This chapter argues for making an exception of 
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murder statistics. This has extensive precedent. A vast volume of international literature uses 
murder rates as the only or primary dependent variable for causal theory — not only in the 
field of criminology, but also sociology, politics, economics, public health, and so on. On the 
level of the nation, region, city or neighbourhood, it has been the key quantitative tool used to 
explore and develop theories around the significance of:  
• modernisation or development,484  
• poverty,485  
• inequality,486  
• democracy,487  
• political legitimacy,488  
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• cultural values,489  
• and social support structures,490 among many others.  
One reason for this is that murder, or intentional homicide, is arguably the ultimate 
crime. The unlawful and intentional killing of a human being is an act of such gravity that it 
meets with almost universal condemnation.491 It is by its definition legally unjustifiable. 
Indeed, its core element is the complete liability of the perpetrator.492 Violent deaths 
considered at least partly justified take different names. An apparently unambiguous act 
whereby one human body deliberately causes sufficient damage to another human body that 
it is rendered incapable of sustaining life, can be categorised in numerous ways. The real and 
legally imagined relationships between and around the bodies involved are critical. If the act 
takes place in the context of formal armed conflict, it is not murder but a casualty of war. If 
the body that does the damage is the same one that is fatally damaged, it may be suicide or an 
accident, depending on what mental state it is ascribed. If the body that causes the damage is 
considered to have been compelled to do so by circumstances, it may be a killing in self-
defence or upon legitimate orders. If the relevant authority attributes recklessness or 
negligence but no intention to take a life to the mental state of the perpetrator, it is culpable 
homicide.  
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In this sense, like all crimes, the meaning of murder remains contingent on its legal 
and situational context. The ontology or ‘thingness’ of murder remains a meta-theoretical 
problem. It is not a distinct, objectively defined and identified phenomenon, but the product 
of both action and relevant social and institutional reaction. What is ‘murder’ in one place 
and/or time may yet be ‘not murder’ in another, with only that difference in place and/or time 
to differentiate the two. There is also evidence to suggest that it is a mistake to group 
different types of murder together. Murders that result from gang activity between young men 
may for instance vary independently from, and be causally distinct from, the murder of an 
intimate partner or a child. The disaggregation of murders by features of the demographics of 
and relationships between victim and perpetrator, or of the weapons or motives involved, 
may well reveal hidden countertrends.493 This is an example of a famous concept in statistics 
known as Simpson’s paradox, which occurs when the manner of grouping of datasets results 
in patterns or trends that disappear or are even reversed when the groups are combined.494 
The ways in which data are aggregated or segregated can determine conclusions.  
‘Murder’ does nevertheless offer considerable improvement over ‘crime’ all told as 
the object of explanation. It has far greater ontological coherence than a category that 
includes behaviours as diverse as digital media piracy and violent physical assault. Further, 
its meaning shows relatively little variation over time and between different national 
contexts. Such concepts as sexual offences are deeply socially fraught and continuously 
contested (see, for example, debates around the non-consensual creation and sharing of 
explicit photographs). The meaning of murder is rarely disputed, although there are some 
notable exceptions in the contexts of assisted dying, termination of pregnancy, and capital 
punishment. Legal change and variation in definitions of murder are comparatively slight and 
rare. This makes it ‘particularly amenable to temporal (longitudinal) and cross-national 
(geographic) comparisons’.495 
Where murder surpasses all other crime types is in its epistemology. Its occurrence is 
subject to far less scope for mistake, disagreement, downplaying, or outright invention. It 
 
493 Sara Skott ‘Disaggregating Violence: Understanding the Decline’ (2019) Journal of Interpersonal Violence 
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allows for less discretion in either reporting or recording. There is no legal requirement that 
ordinary people report most suspected crimes to the police and Chapter three suggested the 
extent of disparity in inclination to report crimes to the police by such factors as gender, race, 
wealth, and expectations of the role of police. Victimisation surveys consistently suggest that 
fewer than half of all incidents of assault in South Africa are reported to the police, with 
significant differences by gender and geographical area.496 This is such that observed 
variations in officially recorded statistics on such crimes as assault, for instance, may just as 
easily reflect variations in social and institutional reaction than in the occurrence of the 
action.  
South Africa has no victim survey data with anything approaching a nationally 
representative sample prior to 1997. Even now, these surveys are designed to produce 
accurate estimates only at the national and provincial levels. They can suggest variations in 
crime and reporting but unfortunately cannot reliably disaggregate to smaller areas or smaller 
demographic groups.497 In the absence of good data quantifying variability in reporting and 
recording practices over time and at the appropriate geographic level, recorded figures for 
most crimes cannot provide a robust enough basis on which to make meaningful quantitative 
comparisons over space and/or time.  
In contrast, many years of surveys indicate that very nearly every murder known to 
households is reported to the police. In the 2018 victims of crime survey, of those who said 
that they had lost a member of their household to a murder in the past year, 89 per cent 
confirmed that they reported this to the police.498 This figure has varied slightly from year to 
year, from as low as 83 per cent,499 to as high as 98.2 per cent.500 This indicates that police 
have nearly complete empirical access to at least what is known by murder victims’ 
households. Assuming that the police proceed to record these correctly, this should mean that 
recorded murder rates track ‘real’ murder rates very closely, without needing to account for 
 
496 Statistics South Africa Victims of Crime Survey 2017/18 at 59. 
497 Ibid at 11. 
498 Ibid at 39. 
499 Statistics South Africa Victims of Crime Survey 1997 at 53. 
500 Statistics South Africa Victims of Crime Survey 2012 at 3. 
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variation in reporting behaviour. Although the victim survey data can lend credence to the 
official police-recorded crime rates, it can unfortunately not offer direct corroboration. 
Crime victimisation surveys elsewhere seldom include murder as a crime type that 
respondents can select as having been victim to.501 Not only is it obviously the case that 
murder victims cannot report on their own experience, but in most places with regular victim 
surveys, murder is so rare that their sample sizes could have little prospective of sufficient 
size as to get an accurate sense of its prevalence. It would be akin to using a survey to attempt 
to determine the number of lottery winners.  
South African victim surveys are unusual in that they do include murder as a crime 
type that respondents can indicate that their household has experienced. Even so, the victim 
survey data cannot give reliable account of the prevalence of so rare an event. Only 30 
households in the 2018 survey reported having lost a member to murder during the preceding 
year.502 In 2017, it was only 25 households.503 This is scant basis on which to draw any 
conclusions about the population and certainly cannot be disaggregated to smaller areas or 
demographic groups. Moreover, even here there is some semantic ambiguity. Whereas the 
police are naturally concerned with the perpetrators’ precise degree of legal blameworthiness 
and therefore make clear distinction between murder and culpable homicide, or unintentional 
killing, respondents in household surveys are not so bound and therefore may recount 
culpable homicides as murder. There may well also be some murders that are recorded by 
SAPS but are not known at the household level — for example the murders of immigrants 
that have no local relatives.504  
For these reasons, as well as the various cognitive biases described in Chapter three 
(such as telescoping), the murder figures suggested by victim surveys are seldom plausible. 
The survey of 1997 suggested that just under 45 000 households had experienced at least one 
incident of murder and that 83 per cent of these had been reported to the police.505 The SAPS 
 
501 Krista Jansson British Crime Survey: Measuring Crime for 25 Years (2007) at 8. 
502 Statistics South Africa Victims of Crime Survey 2017/18 at 37. 
503 Statistics South Africa Victims of Crime Survey 2016/17 at 24. 
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indicated that, in roughly the same reference period, it had recorded a little over half as many 
murders. Survey results in other years have been far lower than the SAPS figures. To account 
for the large disparities, Statistics South Africa have taken to suggesting that, despite 
fieldworker guidance, respondents were referring to incidents of both murder and culpable 
homicide.506 Yet even these figures show considerable fluctuation and little correspondence 
with the official police data. It may also be that a sense of wider kinship results in the same 
incidents of murder being reported by respondents in numerous, ostensibly discrete 
households.507 The methodological differences between survey and police crime prevalence 
estimates are so large that divergence should not be the least surprising. To the extent that the 
two can be compared, it is widely held that this should focus on change estimates rather than 
levels.508 Their divergence should nevertheless suggest some caution in taking the police 
murder figures at face value. 
Household reporting is not, however, the only mechanism by which a murder can 
come to police attention. South Africa has a strict death registration system, which falls under 
the mandate of the Department of Home Affairs. Under the Births and Deaths Registration 
Act of 1992 (variously amended), after a death occurs, notice of death should be given as 
soon as practicable, within 72 hours (three days) from date of occurrence.509 Every death in 
the country or of a South African abroad is legally required be reported to an authorised party 
(the Department of Home Affairs or someone otherwise authorised to receive such reports) 
and the police must be informed if there is reasonable doubt whether the death was due to 
natural causes. An investigation as to the circumstances of the death must then be completed 
in terms of the Inquests Act of 1959, following which a medical practitioner certifies the 
cause of death. All death notification forms are then collected from the Department of Home 
Affairs by Statistics South Africa ‘biweekly for capturing, processing, assessment, analysis 
and dissemination of statistical reports and datasets on mortality and causes of death’.510  
 
506 Statistics South Africa Victims of Crime Survey 2017/18 at 37. 
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Based on this data, Statistics South Africa produces annual reports on mortality and 
causes of death. Civil registration on the national population register is of limited but growing 
value as an independent source of statistics on vital events including deaths. South African 
cause of death classifications prior to 1994 are extremely partial, but these statistics are now 
estimated to have a completeness of 96 per cent of adult deaths.511 Unfortunately, there 
remain serious constraints. Non-natural causes of death are insufficiently categorised. The 
figures for deaths due to assault are well under half those seen in the SAPS murder data.512 
South African cause-of-death statistics are not yet considered to be of good quality, partly 
because of the large a proportion of deaths registered as being ill-defined or of undetermined 
intent.513 
Having received notice of a death suspected of being due to a non-natural cause, the 
police must record and investigate the death under one of three categories: murder, or 
intentional killing; culpable homicide, or unlawful but unintentional or negligent killing (i.e. 
accidents); or inquest, for non-natural but not unlawful killing (chiefly suicides).514 This 
categorisation is provisional and may be revised upon investigation or court decision. 
Incidents such as the killing of Reeva Steenkamp by Oscar Pistorius demonstrate the 
lingering scope for ambiguity in the meaning of murder.515 Intent is sometimes a matter of 
degrees of difference, rather than a simple binary. Compared to other crimes, however, 
murder is relatively unambiguous and consistent in both lay interpretation and legal 
definition, such that its extent is widely understood to be relatively well and stably captured 
in official statistics. This means that observed variations in official murder statistics are more 
likely to track ‘real’ variations in the extent of murder than is the case for any other crime 
type.  
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They remain far from perfect. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime, which collects, compares, and analyses official murder data from as many countries as 
possible on an ongoing basis, only a small handful of highly industrialised countries can 
boast murder data rated as ‘good’.516 South Africa’s police-recorded murder data is 
considered ‘fair’, which categorisation it shares with India, Argentina, France, Russia, New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom, among others. But it is precisely in the feasibility of such 
an assessment that murder offers such an advantage. 
By its nature, murder produces a distinctive, tangible object. It is made corporeal, if 
you will, by the corpse. It constitutes not only a legal event but a categorical medical one. As 
the ubiquity of television dramas involving forensic pathologists will attest, medical doctors 
have at least as much interest in damaged bodies as do police or prosecutors. Public health 
approaches to violence prevention offer complementary strengths to criminal justice 
approaches, to the point where some have ‘called for a theoretical fusing of their methods 
through innovative synthetic approaches such as epidemiological criminology (EpiCrim)’.517 
This dual nature of criminal fatality (but also to a lesser extent other criminal acts with 
physical manifestations, such as violent assault) offers an unparalleled means of independent 
empirical corroboration. The ‘Cardiff’ Model, for example, is one in which data on violence 
are routinely shared and compared between the health and criminal justice sectors.518  
Public health data have the disadvantage that they tend to account for the nature of the 
injury rather than the legality of the act that caused it. A fatal blow may result from accident, 
negligence, or be compelled by self-defence. South African mortuary data have been 
critiqued for insufficient precision and consistency in their cause of death attribution.519 Data 
from criminal justice sources are therefore generally given preference over public health 
data.520 Yet public health data, chiefly from the records of hospitals and mortuaries (or 
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‘medico-legal laboratories’), are invaluable as a means of validating the figures, patterns, and 
trends observed in police data.  
Some slight deviation is standard and explained by different inclinations to error and 
different methodologies. Whereas the police statistics measure crime, of which death is one 
outcome, mortality surveillance systems measure death, of which crime is one cause.521 For 
instance, it may be that multiple deaths due to a single violent event are recorded separately 
by pathologists but as one legal incident by police, or the police may fail to update records of 
attempted murder when victims succumb to their injuries.522  
Larger deviation can point to greater issues with one or the other dataset. In Papua 
New Guinea, for example, where there is substantial deviation between police and hospital 
records of violent deaths, it seems likely that the extreme isolation of some communities and 
the continued primacy of traditional, non-state authorities results in murder being 
significantly underreported to the police.523 
South Africa does not yet have a routine mortuary record mortality surveillance 
system with continuous and full national coverage. But for those times and places where 
there is parallel coverage, discrepancies between the murder figures from mortuaries and 
SAPS are at about 5 per cent,524 or as little as 1 per cent in the Western Cape,525 about 10 per 
cent in Gauteng,526 and perhaps as much as 20 per cent in Mpumalanga.527 Crucially, no 
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significant difference has been observed between the patterns and trends in murder suggested 
by mortuary and SAPS figures.528 
Murder statistics are considered the gold standard of crime measurement and are often 
treated as an imperfect but defensible proxy for overall levels of crime or safety.529 But a few 
more caveats are important. There remains scope for gaps in the data. Some, albeit likely 
small, proportion of murders go entirely undetected. Their victims may indefinitely be 
identified as missing. Those in particularly vulnerable positions, such as undocumented 
migrants, may not even be in a position to report an associate as missing. Deaths due to serial 
killing of hospital patients and of young children (i.e. infanticide and neonaticide) may 
escape suspicion and be misclassified as being due to natural causes. Killings in custody and 
due to police brutality are example of a type of murder that may well fail to be accurately 
reflected in official police statistics. The police are also incentivised by performance 
measurement metrics to ‘downgrade’ incidents wherever possible, such that some murders 
are likely misclassified as accidents, suicide, or culpable homicide.530  
There is also the problem of police data management and publication. The SAPS does 
not routinely provide its data at levels aggregated any smaller than the police station area. 
There is also a lag time of six to 18 months between recording and publication. This means 
that external analysts are forced to go to considerable lengths and explore alternative 
methodologies for rapid and geographically precise murder data. In the Western Cape, for 
example, these include casualty/trauma and emergency medical services data, 
CPF/Neighbourhood Watch mapping, partnership mapping with cell phones, forensic 
pathology services, municipal data based on audio monitoring for gunshots in high crime 
areas, and participatory community mapping.531 Police capacity constraints may come into 
play, especially at lower levels of aggregation. SAPS geo-coded data — that is, which 
purports to provide the exact coordinates of the incident in question — may well be too 
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unreliable for mapping.532 Those who have managed to negotiate access to more detailed 
records in the SAPS’ crime administration system report finding serious quality challenges, 
including a ‘high proportion of missing perpetrator data and misclassified crimes’.533 
Related to this, another major shortcoming of SAPS murder statistics is that they are 
not routinely disaggregated by the age, sex, race, and relationships between victims and 
suspected offenders. Demographic-specific trends have been of critical importance in 
describing and explaining crime fluctuations in especially the US.534 The SAPS does give 
some indication of a few such factors in its parliamentary presentations, but only for selected 
crimes and at the national or occasionally provincial level. These figures do little more than 
reveal what appears to be a chronic problem with investigations. See, for example, the 
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Source: South African Police Service.535 
 
This table and others like it may at first glance seem a useful tool for disaggregating 
different kinds of murder. However, zero methodological detail is provided, such that one is 
left to guess how distinctions were made between such motives as revenge, mob justice, and 
gang-related murders. More importantly, summing the row totals produces a full table total of 
6306 murders. This represents less than a third of the total 21 022 murders recorded 
nationally in the same year. This suggests that the police have been unwilling or unable to 
categorise over two-thirds of the murder incidents, despite a lag time of six to 18 months 
since their recording. There is no reason whatsoever to assume that the categorised incidents 
were based on a random sample of dockets and are therefore representative of the full 
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population of murders. This account of the ‘causative factors’ of murder is almost worse than 
none, as it gives an entirely unwarranted illusion of understanding. 
A final consideration in the interpretation of murder statistics is that the volume of 
violent interpersonal disputes in a society, and the proportion of those that result in death, can 
vary independently.536 It is important to try to determine whether an apparent change in 
murder rates may not be due to a change in the lethality of violence rather than in the number 
of underlying violent incidents. The accessibility of weapons and medical services, but also 
things like declining faith in formal legal institutions’ capacity to resolve disputes, can 
determine the tendency to escalation to fatality.537 Lethality matters, but there is little reliable 
data on it even in contexts where this kind of research is considerably more widespread and 
refined.538 
That said, the official, police-recorded murder statistics provide a far steadier and 
more reliable measure of their phenomenon of interest than is the case with any other type of 
crime. Their ontological and epistemological distortions are relatively stable across space and 
time. This makes them uniquely defensible for purposes of comparison over disparate 
contexts, including large areas and the long term. Spatial and temporal scales are both acutely 
important and interrelated considerations in research design, so we will attend to them below. 
The literature has tended towards ever-longer time frames and ever-smaller geographic focus. 
 
Scales of time, space, and analysis  
Literature on murder trends has shown a tendency towards analysis over ever-longer time 
frames. Pioneered in response to rising crime rates in the United States and Western Europe 
in the 1960s and 1970s, the study of macro-level murder trends over the long-term has proved 
full of surprises and has forced social scientists of various disciplines to rethink long-held 
preconceptions and causal theories.539 Unfortunately, a small number of highly industrialised 
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countries, predominantly in Europe, remain the focus of almost all such work on long-term 
crime prevalence trends. Few developing countries have the statistical capacity to produce 
good quality contemporary crime data.540 Even fewer have had such capacity over a long 
time period — plus the luxuries of stable archival resources and sufficient scholarly capacity 
to attend to what may appear to be diversions from more immediate crime concerns. 
Yet in South Africa a police organisation at least professing de jure jurisdiction over 
something roughly approximating current national borders has reported its recorded crime 
figures in annual reports to parliament for over a century. Country-, province-, and station-
level recorded crime figures have also been released by the SAPS on a more-or-less regular 
basis since 1994.  
The focus of this dissertation is on the structural or macro-level aetiology of crime, as 
opposed to the individual level. This could entail analysis at a level anywhere from 
microspatial environment through supranational factors. Whether the proposed causal factors 
involve trends or disparities in social controls, in criminal propensities and motivations, or in 
criminogenic situations should be core to methodology. It is the operation of the proposed 
causal theory that should determine and give meaning to the unit and spatial scale of 
empirical testing. Poverty, for example, must be quite differently theorised and measured on 
the scale of the nation, the city, the neighbourhood, the family, and the individual.541  
Indeed, there is unlikely ever to be any consensus on the question of which level(s) of 
aggregation are the most productive or appropriate levels or units of analysis for the testing of 
different causal theories.542 South Africa has little in the way of good quantitative spatial 
research, which is especially unfortunate given the extent of its socio-spatial segregation.543 
What there is tends to be based on the convenience of data access rather than theory, often 
resulting in logical fallacy.544 It is likely, therefore, that valuable empirical insights can yet be 
found at almost any level of analysis. 
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The degree of spatial aggregation in crime analysis is important, as for example 
neighbourhood-level explanations may be unsuitable for processes that are in fact driven by 
just a couple of street segments (or chronic offenders).545 In recent years, however, the 
tendency in crime analysis elsewhere has been to move to ever finer spatial resolutions, as 
evidence mounts that crime is often extremely concentrated at particular addresses or 
microspatial areas within neighbourhoods.546 Highly geographically focused approaches risk 
promoting a sense in which the only valid unit of criminogenic analysis is a small physical 
space or hot spot, rather than, say, broader socioeconomic or cultural factors. Some also seem 
to imply that a map is an explanation, as if to precisely locate is to understand. But 
quantitative criminological research is currently most productive at small spatial scales.  
Given that the goals of this chapter did not include the testing of any particular 
explanatory theory, it was therefore determined that the dataset to be constructed should aim 
for maximum span in time as well as maximum precision in space. The longest-possible time 
span is from 1911 to date, and the smallest-possible unit of analysis using publicly released 
police data in South Africa is the station area, or precinct.547 For reasons discussed below, 
however, the station area data were aggregated up to the level of their local municipalities (as 
at their boundaries in 2011).  
Accessing these figures and converting them into a format to make some basic 
description possible proved to be a challenging and time-consuming task. The first step was 
locating data on the raw number of murder figures recorded for the appropriate geographic 
units and time periods, namely: annual national-level murder figures from 1911 to 2019, and 
annual police station-level statistics from 1994 to 2019. Collecting, digitising, and reconciling 
these figures alone took many months of meticulous work. Yet this was only half the battle. 
For comparison between times and places of disparate population size, it essential to 
work with not raw figures, but rates per capita. The methodology thus necessarily consisted 
of three stages: first, the creation of datasets of recorded raw murder figures; second, the 
creation of datasets of population size estimates for the corresponding times and geographic 
areas; and, third, the consolidation of these two into a dataset of murder rates per capita in 
 
545 Andresen & Malleson op cit note 358 at 76. 
546 Ibid at 59. 
547 The term ‘precinct’ is not in common use in South Africa. 
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each of the relevant times and places. The details and implications of these empirical 
strategies are discussed below. 
 
National murder rates from 1911 to date 
Constructing a continuous series of annual murder rates per capita over the longest possible 
time frame necessarily involved several caveats and compromises. For reasons discussed in 
previous chapters — including jurisdictional ambiguity and change, institutional capacity and 
alignment, and systematic alienation from most of the population — the older the figures, the 
more partial and unreliable they should be considered. Still, a set of annual national murder 
figures recorded by police in South Africa have been reported to Parliament for over a 
century. The process of rendering the data intelligible at this temporal scale suggests 
important points of discussion for South African criminology. 
In accordance with shifts in institutional and reporting period norms, the relevant 
police reports have taken different names over time. The first was the ‘Report by the Chief 
Commissioner of Police for the Union of South Africa for the Year 1911: Presented to both 
Houses of Parliament by command of His Excellency the Governor-General’. Later, for 
example, came the Union of South Africa’s ‘Annual report of the Commissioner of the South 
African Police for the year 1932’; then the Republic of South Africa’s ‘Annual report of the 
Commissioner of the South African Police for the period 1 July 1966 to 30 June 1967’; and 
most recently the Republic of South Africa’s ‘Annual Report for the National Commissioner 
of the South African Police Service for the period 1 April 2018 to 31 March 2019’. Each of 
these had to be identified in scattered library records. 
Copies were variously located in the University of Cape Town library’s government 
publications department, the Library of Parliament, and the Cape Town campus of the 
National Library. None could be found in Cape Town for nine of these 107 years, namely: 
1913-1915 (for which years it seems no such reports were made), 1917, 1924, 1931, 1933, 
1942, and 1944. Scans were made of the pages concerning national crime statistics. Because 
many of the older reports were crumbling and held together with ropes, and because of the 
lack of access to scanners in some archives, some scans were made by mobile phone. The 
figures for the annual number of murders recorded nationally were then captured 
electronically. Those from 2003 onwards are more readily available online.  
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Another methodological complication introduced by the extensive temporal scale of 
this dataset is that the recording authority that we may think of us a police institution, is likely 
better thought of as a whole series of related, more-or-less overlapping, but in many ways 
distinct policing institutions. In wrangling the data into a continuous time series, we are 
forced to confront these differences in ways great and small. Such apparently dry, technical 
details as exactly where successive iterations of South African police agencies have drawn 
the lines between one year and the next are confounding. Early figures were for calendar year 
of January to December. At some point before 1964 they started running July to June — i.e. 1 
July 1963 to 30 June 1964. Then from 1987 they again run January to December. Then from 
2002 they run from April to March — i.e. 1 April 2002 to 31 March 2003. This means that 
there are some overlaps of at most six months in the figures, such that the figures throughout 
the series cannot reasonably be summed. 
In having to take practical account of the inconsistencies in norms, nature and extent 
of the official policing agency over this whole long period of South African history, a much 
larger issue is that of the ‘bantustans’. As discussed in chapter four, the ‘independent’ TBVC 
states, as well as the non-independent or ‘self-governing’ entities (Gazankulu, Lebowa, 
QwaQwa, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, and KwaZulu), covered a considerable area of the 
country and housed a large and highly contested number of people. What this means is that 
by the late 1980s, the murders committed in large parts of South Africa were excluded from 
the SAP’s reports.548 There is no remaining record of the crimes reported to the police in the 
homelands. This problem extends beyond police statistics. The Central Statistical Bureau 
(predecessor of Statistics South Africa) did not record deaths in the homelands and prior to 
1979 there was no legal requirement to register Black deaths.549 There thus remains no 
official numerical record of the deaths, violent or otherwise, of large parts of the South 
African population. This is a major limitation. Unfortunately, there is nothing to be done 
about it but acknowledge that the figures are an undercount. 
It is important, however, to account as well as possible for these changes in the 
population figures used to generate rates per capita. From the mid-70s to mid-80s, the SAP’s 
annual reports provide sparse record of what exactly it considered its area of jurisdiction, and 
 
548 In some years there is also some ambiguity about the inclusion of South West Africa. 
549 Thomson op cit note 370 at 23, 90. 
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therefore statistical coverage. It provided population estimates until 1976, from which we can 
glean that at that point it seems to have considered itself responsible for entire area of the 
then Republic of South Africa. Over the next decade, it neglected to provide population 
estimates or clear indication of exactly which homelands’ stations it had excluded from its 
statistical record-keeping. In 1987, it provided both crime figures and a crime rate per capita, 
from which one can extrapolate its population estimate. This figure is far lower than 
contemporary estimates of the South African population excluding the TBVC states, and 
even slightly lower than contemporary estimates of the number of people living in white-
designated areas only. By this point, the SAP seems to have considered its jurisdiction to 
exclude both the independent and non-independent homelands.  
Finding an appropriate national population figure by which to divide the raw murder 
figures required combing through decades of archived documents from the Central Statistical 
Services, supplementing these where possible with data from the publications of the South 
African Institute for Race Relations, and good deal of personal discretion. Moreover, 
contemporary estimates of population size and population were highly political, such that we 
must treat with great care any official indication of how many of which people lived where. 
As of 1994, with the dissolution of the ‘bantustans’, the jurisdiction of the new South 
African Police Service abruptly expanded again to include those that were previously 
excluded. This makes for a spike in the murder figures from 17 467 in 1993 to 26 832 in 
1994. This does not mean that there was an almost 50 per cent increase in murders between 
these two years. The available data is just abruptly applicable to a much larger area and 
population. Whereas the problem of the de jure geographical coverage of the murder statistics 
falls away, a de facto one remains. Stations unaccustomed to regular reporting to Pretoria 
would not suddenly become good at it. Officers unaccustomed to paying attention to Black 
deaths would not suddenly care. Communities unaccustomed to turning to the police for 
service would not suddenly do so.  
Blessedly, the more modern population estimates pose less of a challenge. Statistics 
South Africa now produces annual estimates of the national population, based on census 
counts and projected for the years that follow by models based on known demographics. But 
a census is a massive and infrequent administrative task, itself involving numerous 
assumptions and adjustments to compensate for undercounts, and the models are of course 
imperfect and not beyond dispute. Different weightings of data produce different 
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projections.550 It was discovered in the 2011 Census that there had been more rapid 
population growth than had been anticipated based on the 2001 Census. Statistics South 
Africa therefore revised its estimates for that period. This caused quite the kerfuffle, as the 
SAPS declined to recalculate their crime rates of the past ten years with revised historical 
population estimates,551 despite the Institute for Security Studies calling for them to do so.552 
Despite the reduction in the ambiguity around national borders and population distribution, 
the question of the denominator to be used in crime rate calculations remains difficult and 
contested. 
There is another important methodological consideration in the use of long-term 
national murder rates in South Africa. The argument in this chapter is that, as compared to 
other crime types, murder is relatively unambiguous in both legal meaning and lay 
interpretation and that it receives relatively universal condemnation. A major exception to 
this is the problem of intentional killings with political motivations. This generally offers far 
less difficulty than popular media sources would lead one to believe. ‘Ordinary,’ 
disorganised, more-or-less spontaneous interpersonal criminal violence is far greater in 
volume than that of armed conflicts or terrorism.553 Still, it is important to note that deaths at 
the hands of the police, for example, would in most circumstances not be recorded as 
murders. In circumstances where the official recording authority holds to a legal and/or moral 
position that corresponds poorly to that in other times and places, this is a problem for 
purposes of comparison.  
This problem is particularly acute in the South African historical case, where the state 
itself was a major contributor to violent conflict. Suspicious deaths in detention would not 
have been officially recorded as murders, despite the fact that the consensus of most of the 
South African population and of the world likely was then and certainly is now that those 
perpetrators should be considered legally culpable and held accountable for murder. Chapter 
four discussed how the nature of apartheid policing complicated the reliability of the official 
 
550 See Rob Dorrington Alternative South African Mid-Year Estimates 2013 (2013). 
551 Gareth Newham ‘The Police’s Serious Crime Statistics Bungle – ISS’ Politicsweb 6 November 2013. 
Available at www.politicsweb.co.za. Accessed 14 January 2016. 
552 Institute for Security Studies ‘ISS Statement: Miscalculations in the 2013 National Crime Ratios’ 20 
September 2013. Available at www.issafrica.org. Accessed 14 January 2016. 
553 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime ‘Global Study on Homicide 2019: Executive Summary.’ 
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crime statistics. The mandate, incentives, jurisdiction, capacity, and racist resource 
distribution of the South African Police all served to dis-count black suffering.  
This remains the case with murder. Whether or not such violent deaths as that of 
Hector Peterson can meaningfully be placed in the same analytical category as an intimate 
partner femicide should be determined by reference to the explanatory theory in question. 
Rational choice theory, for example, may have little need to draw a distinction between the 
two. Strain theory, on the other hand, may reasonably leave to others the question of 
wrongful deaths at the hands of the state. The South African Institute of Race Relations, an 
invaluable non-state source of contemporary statistics, estimated that political fatalities 
contributed about 10 per cent of murder figures in the mid-1980s to a fifth or at most a 
quarter in the early 1990s.554 The SAP’s estimate in 1993 was that political motives 
accounted for about 20 per cent of the murders recorded in 1993.555 However, as also 
discussed in Chapter four, determining whether any given incident should be categorised as 
an instance of criminal murder, or rather of political violence, is not so simple. There is 
simply no way to be certain. The best available data on South African historical crime 
prevalence remains very limited. 
This section of this chapter has explored some of the methodological issues involved 
in constructing a nearly continuous series of South African national murder rates per capita. It 
suggests several interesting questions for criminology and other social sciences, for 
discussion in the next chapter. These are insights that would not have arisen in the vague, 
empirically meagre explanatory strategies that characterise most South African primary 
structural criminology. It is in taking seriously the epistemology of the object of explanatory 
interest — in avoiding the temptation to treat the question of official crime prevalence 
measurement as trivial — that new ideas of potential aetiological value are produced. An 
even richer source of promising aetiological insight comes about when methodology is forced 
to grapple with scale in space. 
 
 
554 South African Institute of Race Relations Race Relations Survey various years (Johannesburg: South African 
Institute of Race Relations). 
555 South African Police Annual Report 1993 at 103.  
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Station area murder figures and messy data 
To opt for causal analysis at the structural or macro-level, rather than the individual, suggests 
the need for some degree of aggregation in space. Again, it is the relevant explanatory theory 
that should determine the appropriate spatial scale in empirical methodology. The reality, 
however, is that the available data on recorded crime is inevitably determined by the 
hierarchies of management and responsibility within the police. Crime figures are, after all, 
traditionally a core metric of police performance measurement.  
Prior to 1994, the formal South African policing institution(s) routinely released 
recorded crime statistics only on the national and sometimes provincial levels. Earlier station-
level data were only publicised for selected stations and crimes and in response to 
parliamentary questions, typically from the area’s relevant member of parliament. Lack of 
access to recorded crime statistics at this level of aggregation means that there was little or no 
prospect of meaningful empirical testing of explanatory theories that operate on this spatial 
scale. For example, there is no means of comparing recorded crime prevalence in Cape 
Town’s District Six — both as a space and as a population of individuals — before and after 
forced removals. This means that the suggestion that levels of violence on the Cape Flats are 
the product of this disruption are, however plausible, quantitatively untestable.  
Crime data aggregated to the level of each individual police station’s geographic area 
of jurisdiction has been made available as of 1994. To the extent that station areas reflect 
‘neighbourhoods’, research elsewhere suggests that this level of analysis is likely to be highly 
theoretically productive. As demonstrated in Chapter three with the example of Hillbrow 
station area, however, even this may not be possible. The station area boundaries are fairly 
arbitrary, sometimes cutting across vastly different neighbourhoods which likely experience 
very different crime challenges and require different policing methods. The underlying point-
level data trends may well be confounded or smoothed out with each additional level of 
aggregation. This means that, even now, South Africa’s official recorded crime statistics are 
of limited use in exploring neighbourhood-level causal theories. The micro-place or ‘hotspot’ 
explanatory focus, which has become increasingly popular in Northern criminology, is 
entirely beyond the empirical scope of any South African analysts except those rare few who 
have succeeded in negotiating such recent data from the SAPS. More geographically precise 
records of murder incidents would be invaluable.  
Even at the station area level of aggregation, however, we begin to run into challenges 
in terms of the volume of data. Although it is by no means so large as to qualify as ‘big data’, 
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the number of station areas makes visual inspection at scale nearly impossible. See the 
following map, which indicates the boundaries of SAPS police station areas as made 
available in March 2018.556 
 
Figure 15 SAPS station area boundaries 2018 
 
These 1152 distinct units vary in size, with much smaller geographic coverage in 
densely population urban areas than rural areas. Their number poses no problem for 
quantitative analysis but make for an exceedingly dense map. At the national scale, many 
urban police stations disappear under busy lines. 
The volume of data involved in describing murder prevalence over a considerable 
period of time and at the lowest possible degree of spatial aggregation contributes to the issue 
of analytical short-termism. Indeed, it could all too easily have been lost. In 2005, an 
 
556 Spatial data downloaded in Shapefile format from the South African Police Service website at 
https://www.saps.gov.za/services/boundary.php as updated 6 March 2018 accessed 17 October 2018. 
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enterprising librarian in UCT’s government publications department printed out the available 
spreadsheets of recorded crime figures, which included those for the years from 1994/95 to 
2003/04. This printing of thousands of pages of tables was considered wasteful and earned 
her a reprimand. Yet this is now one of only a handful of places where this data can still be 
found. It is impossible for most prospective South African aetiologists to gain empirical 
access to data on the murders recorded prior to 2004 in any area smaller than the province. 
The creation of this database of station-level murder statistics was feasible only through the 
serendipity of an individual librarian’s conscientiousness (and disregard for economy). 
These figures had been bound into hardcover books, with the tables for most stations 
split across two pages. There were a handful of printing errors. In 11 stations (Brits, 
Cyferskuil, De Wildt, Kwamhlanga, Machadadorp, Marble Hall, Siyabuswa, Vaalbank, Kat-
Kop, Ndevana, and Ntabamhlope) the last column (representing recorded crime figures for 
the 2003/04 year) was cut off. The combined number of murders recorded in these stations in 
the preceding three years were 156, 155, and 165 respectively. As such, the result of this 
printing error is likely to result in an undercount of between 150 and 170 murders in the 
2003/04 year. From a total of over 19 000, this represents an undercount of 0.8 per cent, 
which is unlikely to have a significant bearing on any results. Still, the effect is that around 
160 incidents of murder (more than are recorded annually in total in numerous smaller states) 
have disappeared from this database simply due to an error in the configuration of printer 
settings.  
A total of just under 2 500 pages were scanned on a flat-bed scanner and digitised. 
Various Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software packages proved unreliable, which 
meant that each individual numeral had to be manually entered into a spreadsheet. This was 
done for each of 1104 stations, for 33 crime types, for 10 years — for a total of 364 320 
numbers. Although every effort was made to maintain accuracy, and countless spot checks 
were made for purposes of quality control, there remains the very real risk that errors were 
made in the transcription process.  
The outcome of these months of work was an electronic database of all the annual 
recorded murder figures for police station area for the period 1994/95 to 2003/04. Next, these 
had to be combined with the subsequent figures to date. Four other datasets of SAPS crime 
statistics releases were used for this purpose: one for the period 2000/01 to 2001/02, one for 
2004/05 to 2013/14, one for 2005/06 to 2015/16, and one for 2005/06 to 2016/17.  
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This doubling or even tripling up of time coverage was necessary to be able to track 
station establishments and changes and see how these have been treated in the statistics, an 
issue to which we will return below. It also made it possible to check whether any changes 
were made between statistics released in different years, for example if the 2015 release said 
that X murders were recorded in a station in 2015, but the 2017 release said that the number 
was Y. There was no real evidence of this, although there was the occasional one digit in 
either direction, which can be reasonably explained by such factors as an assault victim 
taking some time to succumb to their wounds or an incident initially deemed to be murder 
turning out upon investigation to have been a suicide. 
The five datasets could not be merged automatically. The process had to be manual, 
involving copying and pasting and checking and investigating each of over 1100 stations’ 
statistics in each dataset. There are various reasons for this. Many researchers might be 
inclined to simply note and dismiss these challenges as examples of the inevitable messiness 
of data. This is a reasonable position in those instances where manual checking was made 
necessary because of inconsistency the use of hyphens, apostrophes, and duplicate station 
names (for example, there are two Balfours, two Richmonds, and two Heidelbergs). But in 
other cases, there is a richness to be found in paying attention to the nature of that messiness 
and of the necessary mitigating methodologies. 
First, many stations have outright changed their names over the period, with the result 
that there were stations listed in the dataset for 1994/95 to 2003/04 but which were called 
something else by 2005/06. For example, Nhlanhleni station used to be called and in some 
places is still called Pomeroy station; Amangwe used to be Loskop; Morebeng station 
previously and sometimes still goes by Soekmekaar. In each case where there was an 
indication of such a mismatch, closer scrutiny was required through maps, and media and 
other records.  
For example, upon discovery that there was a station by the name Soekmekaar in 
earlier records, but none more recently, a search was made on Google maps for ‘Soekmekaar 
police station’. This returned a station (near what is still listed as the Soekmekaar post office, 
Soekmekaar train station, and Soekmekaar NG Church) in the town of Morebeng, which led 
to a Wikipedia page indicating that Soekmekaar and Morebeng were one and the same. Next, 
the recorded murder figures for Soekmekaar station were compared to those for Morebeng 
station and it was confirmed that Soekmekaar station had recorded 4 murders in 2001/01 and 
another 4 in 2001/02, exactly matching the figures for those years at Morebeng station. The 
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figures for Soekmekaar station and Morebeng station were thus merged into a single 
continuous time series under the name Soekmekaar/Morebeng.  
This offers an interesting reflection on the implications of the post-transition national 
project of renaming. Soekmekaar and Morebeng police stations are coterminous in spatial 
jurisdiction. The location of the lines on the faded map that likely hung on the wall in 
Soekmekaar station are the same as those on the map that likely hangs now on the wall of 
Morebeng station. It may still be the same map. Yet the name change suggests that these may 
be quite different places, with quite different policing mandates and priorities. Both the 
similarities and the differences between Soekmekaar and Morebeng could be important 
variables in the development and testing of explanatory theory. At the very least, prospective 
crime statistics analysts should be forced to reflect on the extent to which it is even 
meaningful to compare the two. 
A related reason why it was necessary to merge the datasets manually is that several 
stations (about 25) have names that have not changed outright but have seen shifts and 
inconsistencies in their spelling. For example, what was once Mafikeng is now Mahikeng; 
Umtata is now Mthatha; Ngqamakhwe has at other times been spelled Nqamakwe or 
Nwamakwe; Kei Road used to be Keiweg. Again, acknowledging these shifts raises the 
question of what this may mean for crime causation and prevention in those station areas.  
One common difference between the police crime data released at different times is 
inconsistency in the use of an ‘h’, especially in Xhosa names. For example, what are now 
called Bhisho, Bholo, and Bholothwa stations respectively used to be recorded as Bisho, 
Bolo, and Bolotwa. This has long been a matter of contention, as seen in this extract from a 
community meeting in 1886. 
 
Mr Shadrach Mama introduced much heat into a debate on Xhosa 
spelling. He said that he would personally be uncertain how to write in an h 
were inserted between b and a in such words as bhekile, ukubhala and so on. 
This orthographic porridge causes children to fail examinations set by 
inspectors and teachers because it makes a porridge of understanding how the 
language is spelt… Mr Gqoba said the matter was very important. It draws 
attention to the fact that the transcription of Xhosa emanated from the English 
people.557 
 
557 William Wellington Gqoba Isizwe Esinembali: Xhosa Histories and Poetry (1873-1888) Jeff Opland, 




The presence or absence of an ‘h’ in the names of police stations is not arbitrary. It 
isn’t just a question of messy data. It reflects underlying politics around race, power, and 
language. In acknowledging this, one is forced to confront such questions as what the 
implications are of the alignment between the project of formal policing and that of 
colonialism and white supremacy. This would seem to be an important insight for causal 
theory. 
A third insight that arose from having to grapple with the messiness of the police-
recorded crime data is that ‘problem’ of the expansion of police service delivery. In analysis 
over the long term, such factors as population movement and growth create challenges for 
interpretation. Almost 100 stations (including satellite stations) have been established since 
1994. This makes for inconsistencies in geographical and statistical coverage. Numerous such 
station boundary changes necessitated determining the timing, locations and data implications 
of each of these changes. 
Each time a new police station is opened, its area of jurisdiction is ceded from one or 
more existing stations. This is inconvenient for any longitudinal analysis. A recent example 
demonstrates why. The station area of Nyanga in Cape Town has been called the murder 
capital of the country. In the year to 31 March 2018, it recorded 308 murders, considerably 
more than any other station. In the year to 31 March 2019, Nyanga still ranked first and worst 
in the country, but saw a decrease to 289 murders. Residents were said to have received news 
of this 6.2 per cent decline in raw figures with ‘cautious optimism’.558 However, the 
geographic areas referred to in the two years were not the same. November 2018 had seen the 
establishment of a new police station by the name Samora Machel, ‘as a relief effort to the 
overburdened Nyanga station’.559 With the 30 murders recorded at Samora Machel in just 
four months, this made for a total of 309 murders or a 3.6 per cent increase.  
There has also been inconsistency in the treatment of satellite stations, which are 
smaller outposts (often mobile or in temporary structures) of permanent stations. In some 
years satellite stations’ crime figures are recorded separately under their own names, whereas 
 





in other years their figures have simply been added to those of their parent station. These 
distinctions seem to have been made on a station-by-station basis, rather than in response to 
changes in recording policy across the board. For example, the crime figures for Beaufort 
West’s two satellite stations of Nieuveld and Nelspoort were reported individually in the 
1994/95 to 2003/04 release, but later combined with those of their parent station. To 
complicate matters further, certain satellite stations (such as Olievenhoutbosch) have 
eventually been upgraded to full stations. In each case, it was necessary to find a consistent 
way of sorting the data in order to create a continuous time series over more than 25 years. 
For each of the stations established since 1994, it was necessary to determine when 
and how this affected the geography of surrounding station areas. This issue 
disproportionately affects informal settlements and urban fringes, where rapid population 
growth led to pressure for new stations. These are precisely those areas which are causes of 
most concern and require the closest monitoring and strategic focus. Wealthier areas with 
more established and stable population sizes have not seen nearly such large changes. 
It is in the process of doing careful, laborious visual inspection and reconciliation of 
the various datasets that it again becomes apparent that our causal analyses must account for 
both continuity and change in policing at every level. Residents’ successful demands for 
services complicate longitudinal accounting, especially at smaller spatial scales. It makes it 
almost impossible to track crime prevalence at the neighbourhood level over the long term, 
contributing to the short-termism that places any causal claim beyond dispute. For example, it 
means that major area-based crime prevention initiatives like Cape Town’s Violence 
Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) programme find it very difficult to do 
monitoring and evaluation.560  
The instability in station area names and boundaries poses a problem for crime 
prevalence comparisons within a single neighbourhood over a significant period, or between 
neighbourhoods. These challenges are compounded with each additional dataset. They also 
draw attention to the statistical bias known as the modifiable aerial unit problem (MAUP), as 
described below.  
 
 
560 Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading: Nyanga-
Gugulethu Baseline Survey (2012). 
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Station area population figures and the MAUP 
Just as in the national murder rate calculations, it was necessary to determine the appropriate 
population estimates to use as denominators in the calculation of station area murder rates per 
capita. This required considerable technical skill, because of the poor correspondence 
between different administrative data sources. The level and nature of spatial aggregation 
poses a challenge, as they can have a huge bearing on results. This is known as the 
modifiable aerial unit problem (MAUP) and it is known most famously in gerrymandering.561 
Boundaries should arise from some theoretically informed feature of the data, not be imposed 
arbitrarily from above.  
To minimise the possible effects of the MAUP, analytical units should be as 
disaggregated (small) and consistent as possible.562 Inconsistency in scale and location of 
spatial boundaries over time and between different official datasets makes quantitative 
criminology in South Africa extremely difficult. Recall again the example of Hillbrow station 
area. To fold together the crimes recorded in Houghton with those in Braamfontein is to strip 
those figures of any possible value for their understanding and explanation. Just as 
management hierarchies determine the type and level of available police crime data, so they 
do for all those other sources of data that we may well wish to overlay for purposes of causal 
inquiry. Variation in temporal and spatial scale introduces an additional set of challenges and 
uncertainties with each dataset.  
First, the appropriate census data had to be identified, accessed, and processed into 
spreadsheets. Due to the volume of data involved, these are stored in separate files, in varying 
formats. Upon request, the University of Cape Town’s Datafirst lab granted access to the 
Statistics South Africa databases — and the specialised computer programs to use them — of 
demographic data from the three post-apartheid national censuses. These programs were used 
to extract area headcounts for: 
• Each of the ~12 800 geographic units at the ‘Place Name’ level for Census 1996 
• Each of the ~21 000 geographic units at the ‘Sub Place’ level for Census 2001 
• Each of the ~21 000 geographic units at the ‘Sub Place’ level for Census 2011 
 
561 Matt Vogel ‘The Modifiable Areal Unit Problem in Person-Context Research’ (2016) 53 Journal of Research 
in Crime and Delinquency 1 at 113. 
562 Weir-Smith op cit note 365 at 1. 
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These levels of geography are the closest match that could be made between the 
different censuses. Smaller levels of aggregation are available for Census 1996 (which also 
provided data at the very smallest Enumerator Area level — there were about 100 000 of 
these) and 2011 (which provided data at the Small Area Layer level, of which there are about 
85 000), but not for 2001. The post-Apartheid national censuses have relied on different 
degrees of spatial precision, such that the population estimates used in this analysis are 
derived from different unit sizes. 
For each of the three censuses and for each of the nine provinces, the spreadsheets of 
spatial data, of the numerical codes assigned to each small piece of the surface area of the 
country, and of their associated population counts, had to be joined into a single file using a 
GIS program. To reduce processing time, the join had to be made permanent and stable, 
which required exporting to a new file format. The completeness of the joins was assessed, 
and each of the anomalies scrutinised. Whereas the 2001 and 2011 Censuses were 
straightforward, the 1996 was not. Of the 12 400 spatial units, 400 or three per cent of these 
failed to join properly. This was a problem of dirty data, with some codes showing too few 
digits. This means that the 1996 Census data has some small slivers of missing space. There 
are other issues with comparing the data from the different censuses. The 1996 spatial data 
had to be reprojected to a more modern co-ordinate system. It still suffers from a slight offset, 
of about 20m, as compared to the boundaries used in 2001 and 2011. There is nothing to be 
done about this. The division of an entire country into tens of thousands of geographic units 
is fraught with methodological error and dispute.   
Matching the census headcounts with the appropriate geographic boundaries for each 
census year resulted in three large digital maps. On the advice of and with the help of UCT’s 
GIS lab, each of these maps was converted into a grid (known as a raster) of dimensions 10m 
x 10m, representing the population density in each such square for each census year. This 
simplifies the map of thousands of unique shapes into a set of small squares of 100m2. This 
should make little difference to calculation, but allows for much quicker and easier 
geoprocessing, such that the computer could be left to run uninterrupted for a few hours, 
rather than days.  
The result was three grids of population density, representing population counts for 
Census 1996, 2001, and 2011. Next, the police station boundaries (as made available on the 
SAPS website in March 2018) were converted into a grid of the same scale and then overlaid 
with the census grids. The mapping software was then used to calculate zonal statistics — to 
177 
 
sum the little squares indicating population density for each police station area. This 
produced a set of three tables with estimates of the number of people resident in each police 
station area (as at 2018 boundaries) in 1996, 2001, and 2011. These were rounded to the 
nearest whole number (i.e. person). The MAUP means that these estimates remain far from 
perfect.  
The most extreme example of this problem in the dataset is that of the OR Tambo 
International Airport police station area. In the census of 1996, the spatial boundaries used 
were such that most of the police station area fell within the boundaries of Kempton Park, 
which is large and populous. But in 2001, the census geography was redefined. The OR 
Tambo International Airport police station area was now delineated and enumerated as a 
separate spatial unit, rather than a piece of Kempton Park. As a result, the population estimate 
for this station area falls almost a hundredfold in five years. This limitation is chronic to 
longitudinal analysis using South African census data.563  
OR Tambo station is an extreme case, but there are a handful of other station areas in 
the dataset where such differences in census geography make for impossible fluctuations in 
population estimates. These changes are not due to real changes in population size. Rather, 
they are artefacts of shifting census methodologies and technologies and the problems that 
arise when combining data from different sources and at different levels of aggregation. 
Police hierarchies of evaluation and jurisdiction are not coterminous with their counterparts 
in the fields of health or electoral politics.  
Again, such methodological choices as spatial and temporal scale should derive from 
theory. The goals of this chapter did not, however, include the assessment of any specific 
causal theory. There was thus no constraint on level or unit of analysis. In the interests of 
visual parsimony and to avoid some of the above distortions and uncertainties, the data was 






Municipal murder rates from 1994 to date 
To generate municipal murder rates per capita, the spatial data for police stations (at 2018 
locations)564 were overlaid with the local municipal boundaries as used for Census 2011, 
making it possible to categorise each police station by their municipal location. The recorded 
murder figures for each municipality could then be summed for each year. To compensate for 
random fluctuations, which may well distort patterns, especially in the smaller municipalities 
that record small murder figures, a three-year moving average was used rather than just the 
figure for the number of murders recorded in the relevant year. In other words, instead of 
using the number of murders recorded in each municipality in 1996 alone, an average was 
found for the three years 1994/95, 1995/96, and 1996/97.  
Next, the 1996, 2001, and 2011 population estimates for the stations which fell within 
its boundaries were summed for each municipality. The former was then divided by the latter 
for each census period. So each municipality’s annual recorded murder figures for the period 
1994/95 to 1997/97 were divided by three and then divided by the appropriate population 
estimate from the 1996 Census; the recorded murder figures for 1999/2000 to 2001/02 
divided by three and then by the appropriate population estimate for the 2001 Census; and the 
recorded murder figures for 2009/10 to 2011/12 divided by three and by the appropriate 
population estimate from the 2011 Census. The result is a set of murder rates per capita for 
each of those three periods for each municipality nationally. All the above calculations were 
joined back onto the 2018 spatial, thus creating maps to provide a visual representation. 
This aggregation to the level of the local municipality has some disadvantages. Most 
importantly, it has the effect of smoothing out and obscuring crime prevalence variation 
within the municipal limits. When assembled together into figures for the entire City of Cape 
Town, for example, there is no way to distinguish between those murder rate patterns and 
trends in Rondebosch and those in Khayelitsha. Municipal murder rates can be of no use in 
the testing of neighbourhood-based explanatory theories. There also remain some issues 
around stations that straddle municipal limits, albeit far fewer and to a lesser extent. The 
Ivory Park police station area, for example, falls within the municipal boundaries of the City 
of Johannesburg, but almost half of its geographical area falls within with municipal 
boundaries of the neighbouring municipality of Ekurhuleni. But this is fairly marginal 
 
564 Spatial data downloaded in Shapefile format from the South African Police Service website at 
https://www.saps.gov.za/services/boundary.php as updated 6 March 2018 accessed 17 October 2018. 
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problem — most station areas do fall relatively neatly into the same municipality as that in 
which the station falls.  
However, description at the municipal level also has numerous advantages. It is a 
good compromise for analysis, comparison and tracking over the longer-term and on the 
national scale. It is similar in scale to US counties, which have been the focus of most 
comparative murder rate research. It aggregates and effectively smooths out the problems that 
result from the creation of new stations. Changes in the demarcation of municipal boundaries 
have been far rarer and more minor than those in station area boundaries. This makes for a 
more consistent unit of comparison over longer periods. It offers a major improvement over 
description at the provincial level, which is as low as most other longitudinal analysis has 
been able to go. Description at the municipal level is more manageable than the station level 
in terms of mapping and visual identification of patterns of possible significance. Working 
with data and maps for 234 local municipalities is easier than doing so with 1150 stations.  
But the single greatest benefit of the municipal level of analysis is that it corresponds 
with other hierarchies of existing administrative data. Analysis at the station level would 
require every variable of proposed aetiological interest to be extrapolated from smaller 
enumeration units in the same laborious way as was demonstrated above with the census 
headcounts. On the other hand, there is a wealth of socioeconomic data readily accessible at 
the municipal level. The poor state of quantitative empirical work in South African 
criminology suggests that there remains value even in exploratory research. Municipal 
murder rate analysis would be inappropriate for many theories, but there are various plausible 
causal variables that offer relatively easy operationalisation at this level.  
The above is only one half of what would be required to render any given causal 
theory testable. Yet this could serve as guidance in the operationalisation of the independent 
variable in various macro-aetiological propositions. The data may be put to various such tests 
in subsequent publications by this author and/or any others who may not share the appetite 
for the methodological minutiae here documented. By contrast, crime data in more 
federalised police systems (notably in the United Kingdom) are so easy to link to various 
hierarchies of other data that any layperson can download the statistics and within minutes 





This aim of this chapter was to collect, collate, and combine quantitative data from the South 
African Police with that from Statistics South Africa in such a way as to be able to give an 
account of crime prevalence which offers the greatest-possible historical breadth, geographic 
depth, and epistemic confidence. This new dataset makes it possible to give an 
extraordinarily extensive, thorough, and defensible description of patterns and trends in the 
extent of murder in South Africa. Should the arguments and methods detailed in this chapter 
prove persuasive, what follows is a brief description of a single result about the trend in 
South African murder prevalence over time and space. This is an empirical observation with 
which South African aetiological theory should prove consistent. It is a yardstick alongside 
which explanatory theory should be assessed on the bases of precision and logical 
consistency, parsimony and scope, practical implications, empirical validity, and testability.  
 See below the graph which indicates the recorded South African murder rate per 
capita over the longest-possible time frame. 
 






























































































































See also the following three map images indicating municipal murder rates per 100 
000 as using the population estimates of the three national censuses. The municipalities have 










The data collected and presented here suggests that South African recorded annual 
rate of murder saw an unprecedented and widespread decline between 1994 and 2011. This is 
extraordinary. There is a widespread perception that 1994 marked the beginning of a rapid 
escalation in ‘crime’ in South Africa.565 It is common to read such statements as, ‘South 
Africa has been besieged by high crime levels since the late 1990s’,566 or, ‘since the 
introduction of a new socio-political dispensation in 1994, South Africa has been caught up 
in an escalating and unprecedented spiral of violence, and violent crime in particular.’567 This 
appears to be at best an oversimplification, at worst a complete misrepresentation of what is 
suggested by the best available data on crime prevalence trends.  
That popular perceptions of social issues can differ from more systematic, empirical 
understandings is hardly surprising. Since at least the 1990s, as reporting and concern about 
political conflict declined, reporting and concern about ‘ordinary’ crime grew to fill the space 
on the evening news.568 There appeared to be a rapid crime wave, although retrospect 
suggests that this may have been partly the result of an increase in victims’ inclination to 
report to the police.569 A sense of crisis became pervasive, contributing to a rise in fear and 
popular punitiveness.570 Somehow there grew a nostalgia, astonishingly even among some 
black South Africans, about how much better things were under Apartheid.571 Popular crime 
talk is so heavily politicised that any suggestion of improvement tends to be met with popular 
anger.572 It has almost become taboo. Interestingly, the public health field has also been slow 
 
565 Louw op cit note 256 at 138. 
566 Zenobia Ismail ‘Is Crime Dividing the Rainbow Nation? Fear of Crime in South Africa’ (2010) 
Afrobarometer Briefing Paper 96. 
567 Pelser & de Kock op cit note 354 at 80. 
568 Louw op cit note 256 at 138. 
569 Anine Kriegler & Mark Shaw A Citizen’s Guide to Crime Trends in South Africa (2016). 
570 Diana Gordon Transformation and Trouble: Crime Justice and Participation in Democratic South Africa 
(2009). 
571 Gary Kynoch ‘Apartheid Nostalgia: Personal Security Concerns in South African Townships’ (2003) 5 South 
African Crime Quarterly. 
572 Comaroff & Comaroff op cit note 318 at 154. 
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to note the decline in fatal violence, perhaps because it was so overwhelmed by the crisis of 
HIV/AIDS.573 
What is perplexing is that no post-Apartheid criminological work has made this 
observation, can help explain it, or has even properly taken up the question of long-term 
crime trends in South Africa. Such an observation, of course if true, calls into doubt a great 
deal of the existing analysis on the causes of crime. How can it be that the discipline has 
shown so little interest in the macro-level prevalence of its semantic cornerstone? Many have 
been content to show (or in fact assume) that the situation is dire, with the result that much 
theory has sought to explain simply why the crime situation should be so dire (which, to be 
sure, it certainly still is). This level of generality is all very well but does not lend itself to 
productive empirical enquiry or theoretical development. In contrast, there is an entire special 




The methodology described in this chapter makes it possible to describe prevalence patterns 
and trends in murder in South Africa in a far more complete (combining breadth of time and 
detail in space) and defensible way than in any existing publication. It is the first attempt at 
longitudinal description of South African crime rates — that is, not raw figures — on a 
geographic level smaller than the province. This is an enormous empirical contribution in its 
own right.  
The observation it produces is that of a large, unprecedented, and widespread decline 
in South African murder rates between 1994 and 2011. This result, however, is incidental to 
the core argument of the chapter, which is that simply making a relatively defensible 
statement about long-term South African crime prevalence patterns or trends is conceptually 
fraught and practically difficult. Attempts to give the questions of scale in time and space 
their due reveal the remaining scope for error and ambiguity. This chapter laid bare the 
necessary methodological minutiae and the myriad assumptions, decisions, and compromises 
 
573 Sulaiman Bah ‘Unnoticed Decline in the Number of Unnatural Deaths in South Africa’ (2004) 94 South 
African Medical Journal 6. 




involved in such a way as to invite contestation, replication, improvement, and refutation. 
What was revealed was quite the scale of the challenges posed by quantitative aetiological 
work in South Africa. This should serve as reminder of the need for epistemic humility 
among all who would draw conclusions from this and similar data. There is no escaping the 
degree of caveat, compromise, and discretion. Even the most rigorous possible attempt to 
quantify patterns and trends in South African crime prevalence leaves much to be desired. 
Despite their formal and regular official parliamentary release, collecting the older 
historical data was difficult. Many explanatory theories in South African criminology consist 
of proposed independent and dependent variables that operate over the very long term. Such 
factors as inequality, a culture of violence, or modernisation should only gain significance 
over long time periods. Yet accessing data over sufficiently long periods proved challenging. 
This surely contributes to the proliferation and survival of causal theories that may not be in 
any way consistent with actual trends in crime. There is nothing the least bit trivial to the 





Chapter seven: Discussion and conclusion 
The starting point of this dissertation was a sense of déjà vu. It seemed that what was being 
written now in the popular press about the causes of crime in South Africa was, barring some 
semantic shifts probably so subtle as to be inappreciable to the lay reader, indistinguishable 
from what had been written on the subject 40-odd years ago, if not more. It seems to have 
become a reflex to explain any and all crime in South Africa as resulting from drunken 
interpersonal arguments and opportunistic predation on the few with incomes, the availability 
of firearms, income and wealth inequality, and Apartheid-related alienation from the 
institutions of the state and the law. In more scholarly contexts, for example those reports of 
the CSVR, the list of proposed causal factors was longer. ‘Case closed,’ the undergraduate or 
policymaker may likely have been led to believe. Yet this closed case did not seem to have 
yielded useful policy or any aetiological progress. The project of explaining why crime 
happens, in the ways and times and places as it does, had stagnated. 
A useful starting point to understanding that problem was the recognition that, among 
the many questions that South African criminologists might reasonably seek to address, that 
of crime causation was formative of the discipline — and justifiably described as primary 
criminology. This designation is not simply a means of bringing positivism in by the back 
door. There is nothing inherently naïve, individualist, or conservative about seeking to 
understand why crime happens. Theories of crime causation can just as powerfully disturb the 
status quo as reinforce it. The criminological ‘moment of discovery’ in no sense inherently 
conflicts with the ‘institutional-critical moment’, and the ‘normative moment’.575 Some local 
scholars relish casting themselves in the role of counterhegemonic, intellectual liberators. 
They ignore the extent to which explicitly structural and radical causal theories feature even 
in ‘orthodox’, Anglo-American criminology textbooks. 
This growing impression of endless, circular repetition of the same truisms about 
crime in South Africa was bewildering. Even more bewildering was the realisation that other 
scholars hadn’t seemed to have noticed. Bill Dixon’s critique of the discipline was an 
exception and seemed apposite. It was Dixon who had argued that South African 
criminologists had shied from the task of the explanation of crime itself, just as British 
criminologists had done when the increasingly prosperous post-War period failed to reduce 
 
575  Loader & Sparks Public Criminology? op cit note 22 at 125. 
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levels of crime, as would have been predicted by pre-existing theory around the criminogenic 
influence of deprivation. Yet Dixon’s characterisation of the nature and reasons for the crisis 
in South African causal, structural criminology seemed incomplete. His prescription 
(doubtless to a horror no greater than his own) amounted to placing structural analysis in the 
background of individual narratives about criminality. Such a position might conceivably 
pass logical muster in other socio-cultural contexts, but the South African context makes it 
absurd. Unfortunately, Dixon’s single critic inspired even less confidence with her apparently 
unselfconscious reinvention of the radical criminology wheel.  
Based, perhaps, on an unwarranted optimism about human nature, the question raised 
in Chapter two was this: What if the failure of progress in the explanation of crime in South 
Africa was a result less of conspiracy than cock-up? Rather than frame the constraint on 
primary South African criminology as principally normative, it seemed that there might be 
more to learn in working from the assumption that it was principally a practical, empirical 
one. This required taking a meta-theoretical step backwards, to consider what it is that a 
structural criminological theory should do. Although structural explanations rely on 
assumptions about processes at the individual level, and vice versa, the question of why 
certain individuals become involved with crime is different to that of why certain groups or 
areas see the aggregate levels of crime that they do. The Coleman diagram is a useful 
heuristic tool to help untangle and lay bare the macro-micro-macro relations of a proposed 
structural explanation. 
Chapter three argued that the effect of this meta-theoretical reframing within primary 
South African criminology is to draw attention to that upon which causal claims in 
criminology are made. Within a broadly empiricist paradigm, an aetiological theory is a 
statement about a relationship between two or more observable phenomena. The philosophy 
of (social) science suggests that causal theories differ and should reasonably be adjudicated 
on the bases of certain domains, both of internal and external status: precision and logical 
consistency, parsimony of explanans and scope of explanandum, potential to inform policy, 
demonstrable coherence with empirical observation, and testability. Testability underpins the 
value of any causal theory within a naturalistic/empiricist frame of reference. Macro-level 
aetiology in criminology relies on a means of describing crime in the aggregate. It requires 
that a defensible account can conceivably be given of levels, patterns, or trends in the 
prevalence of the crime phenomenon being explained.  
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Official, police-recorded crime figures are the standard quantitative operationalisation 
of the dependent variable in causal, structural criminology. Only crime statistics make it 
possible to move beyond sloppy generalisation and impressionistic accounts of crime 
prevalence, which may well be wrong. They make it possible to divide crime in the aggregate 
into potentially useful parts and render it analytically accessible. They are by far the best tool 
of empirical access to the explanandum or dependent variable in primary criminology. 
Unfortunately, they fall shockingly short of an objective, simple, reliable measure of 
how much crime is happening. Crime as a concept embodies numerous and large ambiguities 
around both its ontology (or ‘thingness’) and epistemology (or ‘knowability’). These are 
reflected in the methodological minutiae around the challenges with the interpretation of 
recorded crime statistics. Together, the necessity and impossibility of gaining defensible 
empirical access to crime prevalence form a dilemma for structural criminology. This 
dilemma is not unique to the discipline of criminology; the challenge of quantifying the 
extent of the recent novel coronavirus pandemic offers a visceral example. The empirical 
dilemma must, however, be understood as fundamental to the discipline. It is subject to no 
conceivable resolution. There is no methodology that can eliminate it. But it is only in 
bringing rigour to bear on the nature of its data that the discipline can make progress towards 
knowledge.  
The ontology and epistemology of ‘crime’ offer serious challenges for aetiology even 
in the best of circumstances. As recounted in Chapter four, South Africa offers perhaps the 
worst imaginable circumstances. Here, the general meta-theoretical dilemma of 
criminological testability has been crippling. Would-be structural aetiologists in South Africa 
have had to contend with massive practical and normative challenges. 
They have never had access to even minimally reliable, defensible criminological 
statistics. The legacy of Apartheid policing has meant that interpreting the official crime 
prevalence data requires substantial commitment and skill. Unfortunately, that same legacy 
has resulted in various forms of reluctance to do so. There have been various scholarly 
approaches to dealing with the problem of what to make of crime statistics in South Africa. 
As a slight simplification of Van Zyl Smit’s typography of South African intellectual 
traditions, these can be divided into three categories. Each was demonstrated to have formed 
its own habits of treating crime statistics as trivial. 
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First was the Afrikaner nationalist tradition or, as its proponents would prefer to frame 
it, the positivist tradition. Under Apartheid, these scholars made gleeful use of the official 
police-recorded crime statistics, but they had no interest in using them as tools of genuine 
inquiry. Their goal was so closely aligned with that of the state that their effect was inevitably 
to support the status quo. They had no interest in the ambiguities of crime and no reason to 
scrutinise the extent to which crime statistics offer a reliable indicator of ‘real’ crime 
prevalence levels. The question of crime prevalence quantification was trivially simple. The 
result was that, for most of the period in which criminology as a discipline developed, the 
quantitative work being produced was both normatively and empirically indefensible.  
Then there were the critical scholars, who were more inclined to probe questions 
about the enforcers rather than the violators of criminal law. The depth of their mistrust of the 
formal enforcers of law was such that to them there could be no question of using official 
police-recorded crime statistics in the adjudication of questions about the determinants of 
crime. This led to the development of a second reflex in thinking about South African crime 
statistics: that they were unworthy of any serious attention.  
The third intellectual tradition in South African criminological history is that which 
comprises what Van Zyl Smit described as legal reformism as well as what Dixon later 
termed democratic administrative criminology. These have tended to use criminological 
statistics as instruments for criminal justice system reform. Their take on crime statistics has 
developed into a third reflex: a sincere (if, by now, boilerplate) acknowledgement of their 
imperfection as a measure of ‘real’ crime prevalence, followed by precisely the kind of 
analysis that would have been done if those caveats had not been raised.  
The problem of crime prevalence measurement, as quantified in official crime 
statistics, can be understood as both formulated by and formative of the development of the 
South African discipline of criminology. Unfortunately, it has given scholars license to do 
one of two things: either dismiss the prospect of rigorous structural observation or proceed as 
if the empirical problems do not exist. The theoretical depth and methodological rigour of 
which South African criminologists are demonstrably capable have never meaningfully been 
directed at the task of the explanation and understanding of crime itself. The discipline has 
been unwilling and/or unable to give coherent account of what is to be done with or about 
crime statistics. This is because South Africa presents an extreme case of the tension between 
the practical demands of a broadly realist epistemology and an inescapably critical and 
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constructivist understanding of crime. The history and legacy of its policing have made 
radical critique too easy and more orthodox quantitative methodological development too 
difficult. But it is in the process of grappling with the ambiguities around conceptualising and 
observing our object(s) of inquiry that primary criminological knowledge can grow. 
Once the problem with South African aetiology was framed as deriving from a failure 
to make productive use of the inherent meta-theoretical dilemma of crime prevalence 
measurement, it became possible to review the ways in which this dilemma has undermined 
the development of South African crime scholarship. The resulting stagnation has been both 
severe and inevitable.  
Chapter five combined the heuristic tools developed in the second and third chapters 
with the contextual and historical knowledge in the fourth to categorise and evaluate the post-
Apartheid academic literature on macro-level crime causation in South Africa that takes an 
implicitly positivist approach (that is, that assumes that criminal behaviour can to a 
meaningful extent be explained by observable phenomena external to the individual). It made 
two key arguments. The first was that a serious problem of empirical testability has indeed 
hamstrung the discipline. The second was that the explanatory strategies that have aimed to 
give inclusive account, in other words those which have pursued explananda of broad scope, 
have offered the least prospect of testability. They have amounted to lists of plausible 
variables. Only those explanations which pursue parsimonious accounts of narrowly defined 
crime phenomena can conceivably be operationalised, tested, contradicted, and refined.  
There is no meaningful way to make empirical purchase on ‘crime’ as a general 
phenomenon, as well as on all its potential structural determinants. The more inclusive and 
general a proposed explanation, the likelier it is to end in a cul-de-sac of vague speculation. 
The instinct to attempt a full explanation of everything about crime in South Africa has 
contributed to the fact that quite so little can be said about the patterns, trends, nature or 
causes of ‘crime’ in South Africa now that couldn’t be and hasn’t been said a quarter or even 
a half century ago. There has been no mechanism of observation sufficiently defensible to 
allow causal analysis to be subjected to adjudication. Any superficially plausible explanation 
has thus been treated as equivalent to any and every other. Causal theory has been insulated 
from meaningful challenge or refutation. The discipline’s dilemma of empirical testability 
was demonstrated in chapter five to be chronic, severe, and previously uncharted in scale. 




Chapter six took up the next logical question: might official police-recorded crime 
statistics yet be used to make defensible, testable, particular claims about long-term South 
African crime prevalence trends in a way that could prove theoretically productive? The 
chapter attempted to establish, as defensibly as possible, just one observation about long-term 
South African crime prevalence trends that would seem to deserve and require explanatory 
effort. What followed was an empirical demonstration of quite how far from trivial is the 
problem of crime prevalence measurement. A means was proposed by which the general 
phenomenon of ‘crime’ can be rendered more particular and testable: restricting the 
dependent variable to recorded rates of murder. This is in keeping with the overwhelming 
majority of comparative criminological research globally. Murder rates offer a uniquely 
robust quantitative tool to make relatively defensible statements about how much crime is 
happening where and when. 
Even so, Chapter six demonstrated how painstaking are the methods and how 
inevitably unsatisfactory are the compromises involved in gathering the raw figures of 
official police-recorded murders and combining them with the population data necessary to 
produce the rates per capita that make them minimally comparable. In this chapter, a nearly 
continuous time series of annual, national-level, police-recorded murder rates from 1911 to 
2019 was set out. This alone more than tripled the temporal scale of any published academic 
analyses. Geographic Information System technology was then used to digitally overlay 
recorded murder figures from each of the country’s police stations with population data from 
the national Censuses of 1996, 2001, and 2011. This is a dataset far more extensive and more 
defensible an operationalisation of aggregate levels of crime in South Africa than any other in 
existence. This methodology yielded a single observation that would seem to require 
explanation, namely that there was a large, unprecedented, and widespread decrease in 
murder rates from 1994 to 2011. This is arguably the single most defensible statement that 
can be made about South African long-term crime prevalence trends.  
Briefly reflecting on those aetiological theories so slandered in Chapter five, one 
quickly notices how few of them offer any prospect of explaining this observation. The South 
African discipline’s failure to make reliable and specific claims about relative crime 
prevalence over time and/or space is such that it has been unable even to identify that which 
is relatively unequivocal and cries out for explanation. Another problem is the poor 
distinction between criminology as a fundamental science and as an applied science. The 
subject matter of criminology makes it very difficult to refrain from value judgments. 
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Criminologists, especially in South Africa, are inclined to feel that they are pursued by acute, 
urgent social problems.576 This makes for sloppy theory and methodology. 
By framing the aetiological crisis in post-Apartheid South African criminology as 
arising from a fundamental dilemma of empirical testability, that crisis is revealed as far more 
severe and interesting than previously identified. There is a hollow at what should be the 
empirical heart of South African criminology. The causal case could hardly be less closed. 
Systematic empirical observation in the context of profound and acute ambiguity about the 
meaning and measure of crime is extremely difficult. Producing defensible statements about 
crime causation is extremely difficult. Yet empirical description of the timing, magnitude and 
nature of crime prevalence trends is an indispensable foundation of scientific explanation.577 
Qualitative, impressionistic accounts have run their circular course.  
Unlike its Anglo-American prototype, South Africa’s aetiological crisis is not the 
result of well-established theoretical frameworks being shown unequal to the task of 
explaining unexpected new macro-outcomes. Instead, it is the result of a failure to extricate 
itself from vagueness, to even identify with any precision what it is about crime that requires 
explanation (besides that there is more of it than we would like). It is the result of ontological 
squeamishness and epistemological sloppiness, resulting in a dislocation from the empirical, 
particularly at the structural level and particularly using quantitative methods. South African 
criminologists can no longer be allowed to get away with a glib acknowledgement of the 
challenges of crime prevalence measurement. They can no longer be allowed to keep 
repeating the same empty explanatory truisms. 
This complacency is in contrast to the work of Anglo-American theorists, some of 
whom took up the challenge of their aetiological crisis by rigorously exploring such questions 
as which are the most appropriate levels or units of analysis on which to apply certain 
theories,578 which forms of crime data can provide what kinds of insights,579 how increasingly 
complex statistical methods might help one account for the multicollinearity of the usual 
 
576 Dessaur op cit note 152 at 5. 
577 Richard Rosenfeld & James Alan Fox ‘Anatomy of the Homicide Rise’ (2019) 23 Homicide Studies 3. 
578 Teymoori et al. op cit note 403. 
579 Lynn A Addington ‘Introduction to the Special Issue on Measurement Issues in Homicide Research’ (2015) 
19 Homicide Studies 1. 
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explanatory variables,580 or the fact that crime rates in one place may have direct and indirect 
effects on crime rates nearby.581 The last half century has seen extraordinary methodological 
and theoretical development in terms of structural explanations of crime, but very little of this 
seems to have made it to South Africa. The discipline can and must do better in challenging 
popular wisdom and bringing nuance to the generic, by means of its capacity for theoretical 
depth and methodological rigour.  
Finally, to return to that parallel with fictional crime narratives, we must recall that 
the appeal of the murder mystery is not in the closing of the case. It is in the minute 
documentation of the development and application of an idiosyncratic, imperfect empirical 
methodology. It is in paying attention to the process of obtaining and interpreting data in such 
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